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The first aim of the dissertation is to develop a conceptual tool (two paradigms) for the purpose 
of analyzing Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA). This positions the dissertation in a 
field which includes environmental management, the philosophy of science, environmental 
philosophy and ethics. Thus making the research at hand, to a great extent, an interdisciplinary 
piece of research.  
Using two research paradigms, Johansen discusses six Norwegian EIA cases with regard to 
ontology (nature and human), perception of science, scientific ideals, ethics and esthetics. 
The intention of the analysis is to illuminate the paradigmatic presuppositions governing 
Norwegian EIA-research. Part V of the dissertation discusses the transition from atomistic to 
holistic EIA-research. 
Through applying hermeneutical reflexive methodology, the thesis reveals findings of 
significance: the manuals on EIA and EIA reports are characterized by an ever increasing 
incoherence (from EIA report on Veslefrikk of 1987 to Goliat, 2009). Concretely this means 
that contemporary Norwegian EIA-research can be  characterized as  much “talk”, or promises 
about sound ethical and humanistic concerns, and less “walk”, or little actual research and 
implementation of the norms and values promised; hence then the lack of correspondence 
(incoherence) between values (ontology) and method/practice. 
The kernel message of this dissertation is to make it clear that the reason why humanistic 
and environmental concerns are absent and left out in the shade can be explained by the 
epistemological and methodological choices of EIA-researchers. These choices in turn result 
in consequences for ontology. The dissertation discusses it being necessary to use the 
epistemological position of hermeneutics in order to gain a deeper (intuitive and emphatic) 
understanding (‘Verstehen’) of social and environmental impacts. This method utilizes 
a subject-subject relationship between the researcher and the study object in order to 
understand the inner unique experience of subjects and social phenomena. 
The thesis suggests several ways forward (ontologically, epistemologically and 
methodologically) with regard to how current atomistic EIA-research can be developed into 
holistic EIA-research. 
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Man by his existence gives an answer to a question 
which thereby is posed and can never be finally 
answered! Charles Taylor (1985). 
Like all young men I sat out to be a genius, 
but mercifully laughter intervened 
(Clea Lawrence Durrell) 
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Abstract 
Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is the most widely practiced environmental 
management tool in the World and conceived to be a powerful tool for helping 
decision-makers achieve the goal of sustainable development. 
The first aim of the dissertation is to develop a conceptual tool (two paradigms) for 
the purpose of analyzing Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA). This positions the 
dissertation in a field which includes environmental management, ecological 
economics, the philosophy of science, environmental philosophy, ecosophy, 
psychology and ethics. Thus making the research at hand, to a great extent, an 
interdisciplinary piece of research. 
The thesis raises the following research questions: 1. How can an ecosophical-
hermeneutical and instrumental-received research paradigm be conceptualized?; 2. 
What type of information/knowledge do Norwegian EIA-research encompass?; 3. 
What paradigmatie implications do the findings in this thesis have for EIA-research; 
ontologically, epistemologically and methodologically? 
The Instrumental-Received Research Paradigm (IRRP) is characterized by objective 
ontology or a mechanical image of nature and man, in addition to the received image 
of science and a utilitarian ethic. The Ecosophical-Hermeneutic Research Paradigm 
(EHRP) is, on the other hand, characterized by holistic ontology, in addition to 
hermeneutical-phenomenological methodology and a strict humanistic and 
environmental ethic. 
Using these two research paradigms the dissertation discusses six Norwegian EIA 
cases with regard to ontology (nature and human), perception of science, scientific 
ideals, ethics and esthetics. The intention of the analysis is to illuminate the 
paradigmatic presuppositions governing Norwegian EIA-research. Part V of the 
dissertation discusses the transition from atomistic to holistic EIA-research. 
v 
Through applying hermeneutical reflexive methodology, the thesis reveals findings of 
significance: the manuals on EIA and EIA reports are characterized by an ever 
increasing incoherence (from EIA report on Veslefrikk of 1987 to Goliat, 2009). This 
incoherence is mainly evident from the gap existing between political 
intensions/ideals (ontology) anchored within the EHRP on the one hand, and 
method/practice, ethics and esthetics anchored within the IRRP, on the other hand. 
Concretely this means that contemporary Norwegian EIA-research can be 
characterized as much "talk", or promises about sound ethical and humanistic 
concerns, and less "walk", or little actual research and implementation of the norms 
and values promised; hence then the lack of correspondence (incoherence) between 
values (ontology) and method/practice. 
The kernel message of this dissertation is to make it clear that the reason why 
humanistic and environmental concerns are absent and left out in the shade can be 
explained by the epistemological and methodological choices of EIA-researchers. 
These choices in turn result in consequences for ontology; i.e., studying human and 
ecological impacts purely from subject-object perspectives, the use of reductionism, 
producing cause-effect explanations, etcetera, i.e., using method imported from the 
natural sciences, result in a superficial and quantitative understanding of external 
social phenomena. The dissertation discusses it being necessary to use the 
epistemological position of hermeneutics in order to gain a deeper (intuitive and 
emphatic) understanding ('Verstehen') of social and environmental impacts. This 
method utilizes a subject-subject relationship between the researcher and the study 
object, the search for meaning, interpretation of subjective data, amongst other 
things, in order to understand the inner unique experience of subjects and social 
phenomena. 
The thesis suggests severai ways forward with regard to how current atomistic EIA-
research can be developed into holistic EIA-research. At the ontology level the thesis 
suggests widening the perspectives from purely instrumental (economic) values to 
vi 
also including ecological and cultural values. At the epistemologicaljmethodological 
level the thesis suggests a model for dialogue and cooperation aimed at establishing 
integrated networks for the internalization of pluralistie values in EIA-research. 
vii 
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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
1 The High North 
My study was in part inspired by the increased focus on the opportunities for 
extracting petroleum in the northern areas of the world. U.S.G.5 estimated in 2006 
that as much as 25 percent of the existing hydrocarbon reserves could be located in 
the Arctic. Since 2006 this number has been disputed; some have argued that the 
percentage should be even higher, some say less. Whatever the exact percentage 
may be, hydrocarbon extraction in "The High North" is a fashion issue in current 
affairs. Governments and petroleum companies all over the world have turned their 
attention towards the North and the enormous economical opportunities 
represented. In Norway the Government has worked out The High North Strategy 
(2006, 2009) which clearly announces that the North will be the one main political 
concern over the next decades. The High North Strategy of Norway, Nye 
byggesteiner I Nord states that: 
' ... petroleum operations in the north will potentially play a significant role in 
the further development of the region. ... Experience shows that the 
petroleum industry generates significant economic growth nationally, 
regionally and locally. There is currently considerable interest and optimism in 
our northern counties related to the North as a petroleum province,l. 
1 The Norwegian Governments High North 5trategy (pp.17-18, from Norwegian). 
1 
The political objective in the years to come is to take advantage of the energy 
resources and the economical opportunities represented. The positive economical 
impacts can increase the standard of living significantly and industrial activities 
represent new job opportunities for the citizens of the North. Much of the economic 
growth is expected to spin-off directly or indirectly from the petroleum industry. 
On the reverse side of the "medallion", indigenous people, environmental 
stakeholders, and the whole environmental movement is, to put it nicely, not quite 
so optimistic as to future prospects in the High North. The environmental impacts of 
petroleum activity represent something most Norwegians feel to be of the utmost 
importance, indeed this stands out as a key issue to understand when these 
industries approach our "last frontier". Petroleum activity in arctic environments is a 
very risky business because of the sensitive and vulnerable ecosystems. Both the 
Arctic flora and fauna are particularly vulnerable, because the reproduction time in 
cold areas is much longer compared to southern areas. The melting of the poles is a 
sign that the Arctic and Antarctic are already severely exposed as a result of human 
activity. Permanent industrial activity in these areas is therefore high ly disputable. 
The indigenous people of the north, amounting to more than four million also have 
legitimate reasons for being deeply concerned about planned oil and gas exploration 
in their territories (see e.g., Einarsson, 2004). Especially since developers' interests 
normally prevail wherever and whenever indigenous peoples' interests and rights 
clash with development projects (Henriksen, 2006). 
The debate in the local media in Northern Norway has even indicated that a 
petroleum future up here is the only way to move forward if the people of the north 
are to have a future 2• The reason behind this claim is the fact that people are moving 
out of the region and the traditional economies (fishing and agriculture) are 
experiencing declined interest and activity. These are probably the reasons why the 
discussions regarding petroleum activity in Northern Norway are somewhat one-
2 See e.g., Avisa Nordland 2R.12.20 1 O, p.3; and comments in 04.01.2011, p.17. 
2 
dimensional - laeking refleetion. What many discuss is how to create fiscal regimes 
that leave as much revenue as possible in the local communities (see e.g., Bråthen et 
al., 2007; Henriksen, 2010; Henriksen & Sørnes, 2008). Discussions regarding how to 
live rich qualitative lives in balanee with arctic nature remain fairy-tales for most 
local, national and international politicians and business enterprises. This is despite 
the fact that the people of the north have been living up here in harmony with 
nature for more 10000 years. 
The High North Strategy states, however, that both economic and social 
sustainability are important for the future of the North: 
'The primary objective is to increase knowledge, activity and presenee in the 
North and lay the foundation for sustainable economic and social 
development in the years ahead,3 . 
2 Environmental impact assessments (EIA) 
The Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg, stated recently that, in regard to 
hydrocarbon extraction outside Lofoten, we should all "just relax" because in 
advance of development we shall conduct environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
which will clarify what is the best thing to do for society and the environment. 
The World Bank regards EIA as the most widely practiced environmental 
management tool in the world (Noble, 2006). It is also a general assumption in 
society that EIA represents some form of guarantee for sustainability. Noble states 
that an EIA is: 
'a power/ul tool to help decision-makers achieve the goal of sustainable 
development' (Noble, 2006, p. 3, emphasis added). 
Also the Norwegian Planning and Building Act, which is the prevailing legislation for 
EIA in Norway, stress that activities which may impact society and natural 
3 Ibid., p.3, emphasis added. 
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environments significantly shall go through an EIA proeess in order to assure that the 
demands for sustainability are fulfilled (cf. § 1-1). 
Short history of EIA 
During the 1960's, Western Europe and North Ameriea experienced an increase in 
awareness of the relationship between an expanding industrial economy and 
environmental change. This was an era of environmental idealism, also incorporating 
a number of environmental challenges. Academic milieus both from the natural 
sciences and humanities devoted considerable time to environmental research 
which resulted in severai works that today are regarded as cIassies, for example 
Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1962), Lynn White's paper on environmental theology 
(1967), Paul Ehrlich's The Population 80mb (1968) and Dennis Meadows's Limits to 
Growth (1972). Whatismore the public showed commitment in the form of demands 
and pressure put on central governments explicitly to include environmental factors 
when considering development projects. In the u.s. the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) was introduced in 1969 and in it, the term 'Environmental Impact 
Assessment' occurred for the first time (Noble, 2006). 
EIA has gone through an evolutionary proeess since it was first introduced in the late 
1960's and early 1970's, and still it continues to develop as a tool whose purpose is 
to tackle the alarming imbalance between the goal of economic growth and the 
unfortunate environmental situation that the human race and all life on this Earth is 
currently facing. 
In the beginning EIA was characterized by random, discontinuous and local 
observation of the natural environment. During the mid-1970's and until the early 
1980's, public hearings and scoping method were developed to broaden the 
emphasis. During the 1980's and the mid-1990's EIA grew rapidly, largely due to a 
num ber of international events, such as the 1987 World Commission on Environment 
and Development, and the 1992 and 1997 Earth Summits. Through this period the 
4 
definition of environment was broadened to include not only natural environments, 
but also social and economic relations. In the 1990's EIA emerged as a system-
oriented and multi-dimensional approach, involving both quantitative and qualitative 
methods. Growing environmental awareness, partly because environmental idealism 
was revitalized and increased environmental lobbying, EIA was recognized as an 
important environmental management tool. 
Today the situation is characterized by an accelerating demand and pressure from 
public, business and governments to turn EIA towards the goal of global 
sustainability and global climate change (see e.g., Burdge, 2008). 
Catchwords these days are that EIA should serve as an integrated planning tool for 
decision-makers, emphasize global environmental effects, empower the public, 
recognize uncertainties, favor a precautionary principle and contribute towards 
sustainability (Noble, 2006). 
Environmental Impact Assessment did require by law for the first time that 
proponents of development projects had to ensure society that their project would 
not adversely affect the environment. Prior to the 1970's development projects were 
normally just assessed by the use of Cost-Benefit-Analysis (CBA). CBA is still com mon 
today, but obvious drawbacks such as the inability to value environmental and 
human intangibles and limited scope of economical impacts, have given EIA a leading 
position among environmental management tools. 
EIA is mainly conducted for larger project such as infrastructure, extraction of 
minerals and petroleum hydrocarbons, airports, railways, roads, etc., significantly 
impacting on nature and culture. Such projects determine therefore the direction a 
nation or region develops and therefore also determine the sustainability of nations. 
The information/knowledge in EIA is significant because decision-makers base their 
decision to a large extent on this. In other words, the information in EIA is used to 
determine which development project society regards as desirable and undesirable. 
5 
There is no single universally agreed definition of environmental impact assessment, 
but EIA has been defined as a 'tool', 'methodology' and a 'regulatory requirement' 
(Noble, 2006, p. 2). The International Association for Impact Assessment (IAlA) and 
the UK Institute of Environmental Assessment (IEA), for example, define EIA as: 
And: 
And: 
'The proeess of identifying, predieting, evaluating and mitigating the 
biophysical, social, and other relevant effects of development proposals prior 
to major decisions being taken and commitments made' (Noble, 2006, p. 2). 
'a comprehensive and systematie proeess designed to identify, analyze, and 
evaluate the environmental effects of proposed projects; ... an organized 
means to gather information used to identify and understand the effects of 
proposed projects on the biophysical environment (air, water, land, plants, 
and animals) as well as on the human environment (eu Itu re, health, 
community sustainability, employment, financial benefits) for those people 
potentially affected' (Noble, 2006, p. 3, emphasis added). 
"a proeess by which information about the environmental effects of a 
project is collected, both by the developer and from other sources, and taken 
into account by the relevant decision making body before a decision is given 
on whether the development should go ahead'JJ (Therivel & Morris, 2008, p. 3). 
So in other words, EIAs must be understood as a scientific information base aiming at 
analyzing through both quantitative and qualitative methods how a potential project 
or initiative may impact society and natural ecosystems in a wide sense. This 
scientific information is of vast importance for local communities and environments 
because it states firmly, and with the power of no less than 'Science', how these are 
to be affected in the short, medium and long run. It is also crucial because decision-
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makers rely on and trust that the information is valid, that is, scientifically true or 
evident. 
During the last year we have witnessed a heft y de bate in the media regarding 
whether or not environmental impact assessment should be conducted to assess 
potential petroleum fields in Northern Norway. A general feature of this de bate has 
been that opponents of petroleum activity have been negative while proponents 
have been positive towards impact assessment. The dichotomy here is strange and 
signalizes a knowledge gap in relation to what an EIA really is. 
3 Science 
The concept of information and knowledge, however, is not a straightforward one. 
'Epistemology' is the old branch within philosophy of science dealing with the 
question "what is scientific knowledge/information"? (see e.g., Taylor, 1997, p. 1). 
Philosophy of science which can be described as a meta-science or as the science of 
science, argues that the scientific enterprise depends on 'paradigms' or 'disciplinary 
matrix' (Kuhn, 1996), 'hard co re' (Lakatos, Worrall, & Currie, 1978), or ontology, 
epistemology and methodology of any research community. 
In Kuhn's analysis of the history of science, in Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(1962/1996), he discovered that even natural scientists who studied the same 
natural phenomena came up with highly divergent information and explanation; e.g., 
the example of Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy can be offered here. 
Environmental impact assessment gathers information/knowledge through both 
natural and social studies and the latter must be expected to be even more 
ambiguous in relation to the criterion of objectivity than the former, because it 
studies social phenomena; meaning that it interprets an already interpreted reality. 
The media in Northern Norway have also shown interest for the role science plays in 
the debate on petroleum development in the North. The newspaper 'Avisa Nordland' 
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contained a comment on the 'limits of science,4 which criticizes science for being 
va lue-laden in relation to impact assessment because: 
'Its role is really not to produce the foundation for which decisions are based 
on, but to legitimize a decision which is already taken's. 
The criticism is severe and apparently shared by powerful people in Norway because, 
as the comment illustrates, a spokesman for the Socialist Left Party of Norway, 
Snorre Valen, stated that his Party was against petroleum development in the 
Lofoten Islands regardless of what information the report produced. 
The debate in media actualizes the need for knowledge addressed by this 
dissertation. 
4 Deep- and Shallow Ecology 
In light of the recognition that informationjknowledge depends on paradigmatic 
recognition, the thesis endeavor to conceptualize two paradigms which can be used 
to analyze EIA reports and the Norwegian EIA regime as such. The two paradigms 
chosen here are inspired by Arne Næss's concept of Deep and Shallow Ecology. We 
shall briefly mention the gist of these two positions here. 
Deep and Shallow Ecology is an example of two movements which 'compete for our 
attention' (Sessions, 1995, p. 151). The former movement is a so-called ecocentric 
movement holding an ecological worldview. A central general principle of the 
ecological worldview is biospheric egalitarianism putting an equal-sign between all 
living and non-living creatures in nature; i.e., perceiving nature as an intrinsic value 
(human, animals, plants, bacteria, etc.). 
In relation to environmental and cultural degradation Deep Ecology is concerned 
with designing politics eliminating the cause of pollution and resource depletion, that 
4 Avisa Nordland, 16.04.2010, p.ll, author: Stein Sneve. 
5 Ibid. 
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is, increasing the quality of life in nature, while at the same time enhancing the 
quality of life for the human race. 
The latter movement on the other hand is characterized by anthropocentric 
worldview whose central objective is 'the health and affluence of people in 
developing countries' (Sessions, 1995, p. 151). A general principle of the shallow 
worldview is biospheric hierarchy placing the human being on top of the pyramid, 
that is, as the source of all values in nature. 
In relation to environmental and cultural degradation, Shallow ecology is concerned 
with the fight against pollution and resource depletion and increasing standard of 
living, that is to say, a technological and economically optimistic approach. 
5 Research question and the structure of the thesis 
The term 'Shallow', however, is perhaps unfortunate to use because it indicates 
negative prejudice, thus leading to the risk that readers misinterpret the research 
paradigm as being a scapegoat or P/Ugenknabe. Therefore, the thesis chooses to 
operate with the name 'Instrumental-Received Research Paradigm' (IRRP). This is a 
term less value-Iaden and more precise - as we shall see. 
For the same reason, i.e. to hinder misinterpretations, the term "Deep" is replaced 
with the more precise and neutral name Ecosophical-Hermeneutic Research 
Paradigm (EHRP). 
Based on these two divergent movements and their respective worldviews, in 
addition to what has been said about the philosophy of science, the thesis poses the 
following problem statement: 
1. How can an Ecosophical-Hermeneutic and an Instrumental-Received 
Research Paradigm be conceptualizedjoutlined? 
After the thesis has conceptualized the two research paradigm, it is interesting to use 
this as basis for a comparative study of EIA reports. The crux of the study is to reveal 
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what type of informationjknowledge EIA reports encompass and thus to describe 
how various EIA reports relates to these paradigms. The next research question is 
therefore: 
2. What type of informationjknowledge does Norwegian EIA-research 
encompass? 
The next natural step to take is to address what implications the findings have for 
EIA-research; ontologically (values) and methodologically (colleetion and analysis of 
data, etcetera): 
3. What paradigmatie implications do the findings in this thesis have for EIA-
research; ontologically, epistemologically and methodologically? 
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PART Il: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
The purpose of Part II is to answer research question 1: 
1. How can an Ecosophical-Hermeneutic and Instrumental-Received Research 
Paradigm be conceptualized? 
CHAPTER Il: THE PARADIGM CONCEPT AS FRAME OF REFERENCE 
llntroduction to the Paradigm Concept 
In this chapter the frame of reference being used to describe and conceptualize the 
instrumental-received and the ecosophical-hermeneutic research paradigm is 
presented. 
The modified structure which the dissertation applies was originally created for the 
purpose of evaluating the scientific progress of the physical sciences in a historical 
perspective. This work was done by the American physicist and historian of science, 
Thomas s. Kuhn (1962) in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn established 
his famous paradigm theory, probably one of the greatest scientific achievements 
after the 1950's (Sharrock & Read, 2002). Kuhn criticizes logical positivism thoroughly 
especially the aspect of value neutrality and argues that scientific acknowledgement 
is far more complex than logical positivism claims it to be. Central to Kuhn's work is 
that scientific acknowledgement depends absolutely on the activities conducted by 
research communities. In other words scientific recognition (or scientific discovery, 
results, work, etc.) has a highly psychological and sociological side. This wider frame 
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for scientific acknowledgement Kuhn terms a paradigm, a 'disciplinary matrix' and 
'an exemplar' (Postscript to Kuhn, 1996). 
Kuhn argued that members of different paradigms "live" in different, 
incommensurable "worlds" and that communication between different members will 
be extremely difficult (Kuhn, 1996, ch. X). He sees the existence of more than one 
paradigm at the same time as a sign of weakness which represents a pre-
paradigmatic state for the actual scientific discipline. The social sciences he thus 
believes as being pre-paradigmatic and immature. 
Kuhn's paradigm theory was initially established (based on ex-post observations and 
interpretations) for describing scientific theory development within the natural 
sciences. He provides profound evidence that concrete scientific data, especially 
within the field of physics, is highly sociologically and psychologically laden. We must 
expect that data within the social sciences must be even more socially laden, 
because of the problems related to the ideal of 'objectivity', that is, the total absent 
of subjective influences. The paradigm concept has been thoroughly studied and 
modified, especially by Tornebohm, for the purpose of analyzing other disciplines. 
For example, J. Barmark's (1976) analysis of the American psychologist A. Maslow 
and Ingebrigtsen's and Petterson's (1979) analysis of the marketing field. 
EIA-research consists of both natural and social scientific information with a clear 
emphasis on the former. The paradigm concept will therefore be used to analyze 
both natural and social scientific information on a descriptive (ex post) level. The 
main focal point, however, is the social research of different EIA reports and 
manuals. In other words, the research at hand endeavors to conduct research on 
research; i.e., meta-research. 
T. S. Kuhn's analysis was conducted ex post (analysis of the history of science), but 
that does not limit the paradigm theory to be valid purely in relation to descriptive 
aims. Severai other researchers have used the paradigm theory for ex ante 
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(normative) aims; i.e., prior to outcomes being revealed (e.g., Ingebrigtsen & 
Pettersson, 1979; Lindberg, 2001). Ingebrigtsen and Petterson (1979) state in 
relation to this that: 
'If values can be traced ex post by others, it is not unrealistic to believe, that 
these can also be forwarded ex ante by the researcher him/herself' 
(Ingebrigtsen & Pettersson, p. 17, from Danish). 
This provides clear argument for the possibility of using the paradigm theory for 
normative purposes as well. For example in relation to providing guidelines with 
regard to what information an EIA ought to address - in order to be a sufficient tool 
for sustainable development. 
In this study the thesis applies J. Barmarks' 5 interrelated factors which together 
compose the paradigm concept. The 5 factors are a result of J. Barmarks' expansion 
of T6rnebohms' 4 factors: 
1.lmage of Man 
2. Perception of science 
3.Scientific ideal 
4.Ethics 
5.Esthetics 
The 
Paradigm 
Concept 
The structure above is not the fixed structure for a paradigm. Sharrock and Read 
(2002) state that T. S. Kuhn provided more than twenty definitions of the concept in 
his magnum opus. The important part, however, is that a paradigm tells the 
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researcher what to look at, how to look at it, and how to interpret it. 50 in other 
words, a specific paradigm is composed of a specific ontology, epistemology and 
methodology which are interrelated to one another; e.g. the choice of ontology will 
influence epistemology, methodology will influence ontology and so on. 
Ad 1) This first point represents the point of departure for a paradigm. Therefore all 
the other levels will be influenced and are results (directly or indirectly) of the 
worldview. Worldview or metaphysics/ontologl is the study of the peculiar and 
essential traits of existence; i.e.: 
'the science of Existence inasmuch as it is, especially the study of the 
necessary and essential traits of existence' (LLibcke, 1983, p. 294, from 
Danish). 
Formal ontology is the study of existence as such, while material or regional ontology 
is the study of human beings. From this twofold distinction the following questions 
arise: what are the necessary and essential traits of nature, or what is the reality of 
nature, or what nature is, and what does it mean to be human, or what is the human 
nature, or what human/person is? 
Worldview or metaphysics/ontology is those general, a priori assumptions and 
hypothesis concerning reality and being, which the researcher does not investigate in 
the concrete project. In order to reveal these meta assumptions, F. Lindberg argues 
that it is necessary: 
' ... to conduct analysis of lower levels and interpret possible consequences for 
the higher abstraction leveis' (Lindberg, 2001, p. 16). 
The worldview impacts the arrangement and production of research problems within 
an area and even the boundaries of an area (Ingebrigtsen & Pettersson, 1979). This 
means that it is actually possible to get a grasp of those meta-Ievel-assumptions that 
6From Greek; on (to), (the) being, and logos, study - the study of being (Ujbcke, 1983, p. 323) 
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researchers have by studying which problems, research questions and concepts they 
use. 
In relation to this it may be useful to mention that one of the essentials of Deep 
Ecology is to ask 'deep questions' ("why's" and "how's"), i.e. to challenge the 
deepness of our premises for which we base our conclusions on. This is one of the 
reasons why deep ecology is deep. A. Næss says that: 
'Why-strings in science inevitably lead us beyond science' (Næss, Drengson, & 
Glasser, 2005, p. 25). 
Ad 2) Perception of science concerns the question what is the nature of science, or 
what science is, that is, the philosophy of science. The branch in philosophy dealing 
with the nature of knowledge is termed: "epistemology,,7; i.e. the "definition of 
knowledge" (Aristotelian) or the 'study of knowledge' (Lubcke, 1983). In Greek 
philosophy "episteme" (see footnote) describes certain and secure knowledge in 
contrast to doxa or pseudoscience; na'ive assumptions or opinions. In modern times, 
"episteme" is normally related to what the mind calculates as rational while doxa is 
related to the mere bodily senses or perceptions (Lubcke, 1983, p. 113). 
A researcher's epistemological view represents how she/he evaluates their 
respective science absolutely and in relation to other sciences. This implies the 
evaluation of one's own and different "schools", paradigms and traditions which in 
turn affects how she/he views own and others' methods, hypothesis and 
identification of interesting research problems (Ingebrigtsen & Pettersson, 1979). 
The classical debate in the philosophy of science and particularly the one concerning 
epistemology is the question about whether there are one method for all the 
sciences (so called methodological monism) or if it is necessary to distinguish 
between the natural and the social sciences; the latter being the hermeneutie 
sciences of man (see e.g.,the first chapter of Taylor, 1985b; 1997). 
7 From Greek; Episteme; "knowledge", "science"; and Lego; "definition" (LObcke, 1983, pp. 113,278). 
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What a person or researcher understands as truthful knowledge, however, is closely 
interrelated with his/her worldview and image of man. For example, in the time 
before science made its vast breakthroughs and greatly started to dominate social 
life, during the 17th century, it was common knowledge to regard certain virtues as 
"goods". This was possible because the distinction between scientific facts and 
ethical values, which is common sense today, was not so obvious. For example 
Aristotle often talked about "the good society" and "the good life" (see e.g. 
DesJardins, 2006, p. 25). 
Ad 3) This level en com passes, concretely, scientific ideal in relation to methods, 
models and theories. Scientific ideals are "ideal" because they represent superior 
techniques or ways to produce the "relevant" knowledge; it is conceived "relevant" 
because it is compatible with the higher meta-Ievel (epistemology and ontology); or, 
in other words, compatible with the realization of some ideal social and natural 
state. 
Scientific ideals refer to the researchers' normative assumptions regarding how 
science should progress (Ingebrigtsen & Pettersson, 1979). Kuhn claimed that 
researchers who are in the fortunate position of having a scientific ideal are at the 
stage of 'normal science', that is, follow 'an exemplar' towards the aggregation of 
scientific knowledge or towards scientific revolutions. 
The natural sciences, especially physics, have traditionally served the role as scientific 
ideal and exemplar throughout the history of science (Lubcke, 1983). The ideals of 
Logical Empiricism and the 'received image of science' are maybe the most influential 
ideals within the whole scientific endeavor. Its trust in pure observable "objective" 
facts also holds up a significant position within the various social sciences. The 
French philosopher August Comte (1853), for example, encapsulated this well in 
saying: 
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'All good intellects have repeated, since Bacon's time, that there can be no 
real knowledge but that which is based on observed facts' (Easterby-Smith, 
Lowe, & Thorpe, 2002, p. 28). 
Ad 4) The ethical dimension of research is important, because researchers have a 
special role in society, both with regard to individuals and collectives. In Chinese 
there is a saying expressing this role and it goes something like this: "Once our 
teacher, always our father". 
J. Barmark (1976) divides ethics into two categories: internal and external. Internal 
ethics concerns honesty in relation to references, citations etc., while external ethics 
concerns researchers' responsibility towards society and nature (societal and 
biophysical impacts of scientific results). The external ethic of EIA's must be devoted 
special attention because of the potential adverse ex ante effects (both intended-
unintended and expected-unexpected) which decisions may have on natural eco-
systems, cultural systems and individuals in both the short and long term. 
Ad 5) Esthetics concerns the researchers' attitude towards presentation or scientific 
styles of empirical research. For example the literary st yle versus the 
mathematical/statistical st yle. 
2 Limitations 
It is of course an unfortunate abstraction to divide the paradigm concept into partial 
sizes, when in fact one of the essentials is precisely that of unit y and coherence. A 
partial structure may easily lead the focus away from the relations and the whole. 
There is, however, one fair reason for doing this. This is for general pedagogical-
analytical reasons - such as making the process of interpretation, that is, making 
sense of the empirical texts, more clear-cut. The partial structure allows us to 
develop individual criteria for each factor which can be further used as reference 
knots in the work of making sense of the empirical texts. 
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3 On incommensurability 
Kuhn originally thought that scientific progress occurs as changes of worldview or 
scientific revolutions. Kuhn makes then a distinction from Popper's 'Iogical-critical 
view' by defending his own 'psychology of research' position (see Kuhn's paper in the 
preface to Lakatos & Musgrave, 1999). Kuhn's psychology of research interprets 
theoretical-conceptual development as something extraordinary, as a breakdown 
('Extraordinary Science' as compared to 'Normal Science'), reaching very deep into 
the psychic sphere of a researcher. In corollary with this he argues and indeed 
demonstrates that different camps of theoriesjparadigms, and thus also researchers' 
perceptions are incommensurable. This belief is closely related with his view of a 
scientific community as a 'closed system', also a major demarcation between Kuhn 
and Popper (see e.g. J. W. N. Watkins paper in Lakatos & Musgrave, 1999). 
The hypothesis of incommensurability is valuable because, amongst other things, it 
offers explanation value in relation to understanding communication problems, 
especially in academia, but also in politics and probably in society as such. The belief, 
however, that different camps are una ble to reach an adequate understanding and 
consensus must not be taken for granted, in that it speaks directly in favor of anti-
dialogical moralsjpraxis. 
Popper's view of a research community as being open and reflexive represents a 
more optimistic and rational perspective on scientific progress. S. Toulmin describes 
this point well by comparing the Newtonian to the Einsteinian system of thought. If 
Kuhn's mechanistic view of discovery as a 'conversion of experience' was correct, 
physicists switching from a classical to a relativistic position could not be aware of 
the facto This is due to the Kuhnian 'deepness' of the change. On the contrary, 
Toulmin shows, relativists 'were able to say, after the event, why they had changed 
their own personal position' (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1999, p. 44). The 'why' in the 
previous sentence contains the fact that relativists' were able to give reasons for why 
they changed position. In other words the change was perfectly normal and 
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happened for perfectly good reasons. In this sense, therefore, the structure of the 
scientific revolution in physics was not a mechanistic, cause-effect transition, but a 
purposeful learning process resulting Einsteinians' now being able to 'see' Nature 
both in accordance with the classical and the new view. 
Toulmin's analysis is, however, ex post of the scientific revolution in physics and it 
seems rational that he is right when he states that a relativist with an already 
experience and knowledge of both positions (classical and relativist), that is, a 
scientist for whom the revolution is history, can 'see' nature in both ways. It is, 
however, a complete other thing to assume that the same scientists could 'see' 
nature in the two way's in advance, that is, ex ante to the revolutions; i.e., to see the 
future and to understand how history will look like. At least in this pre-revolutionary 
stage Kuhn's hypothesis of incommensurability seems high ly plausible. 
The two, ideal-typical, paradigms employed in this study will probably meet the same 
problems, but we can also hope that comparison to some extent is possible; i.e., 
through information and insight into each position we bring forth a descriptive 
account of them both and subsequently we may be able, or this process may have 
the potential of helping us to see things in two ways. The question of 
commensurability, however, is difficult. The situation remains especially difficult in 
relation to where and how our comparison should begin: based on the one or the 
other paradigm. This seems especially ambiguous with respect to determining the 
meaning of concepts in the light of the two radically different views. Some 
advantage, however, must be expected from the upcoming analysis because it 
endeavors to say something about the implicit and tacit assumptions of the 
respective concepts and hypotheses underlying the two paradigms. Whether this 
technique succeeds or not, is to the reader to decide. 
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4 Implication for further conceptualization 
On the basis of the paradigm concept which constitutes the frame of reference for 
this thesis the following sub-research question to RQ 1 can be formulated: 
How can ontology, perception of science, scientific ideal, ethics and esthetics 
be interpreted in light of the two paradigms? 
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CHAPTER Ill: CONCEPTUALlZING THE INSTRUMENTAL-RECEIVED 
RESEARCH PARADIGM 
llntroduction 
This chapter endeavors to illuminate the sub-research question to RQ 1 in the light of 
an instrumental-received research paradigm: 
How can ontology, perception of science, scientific ideal, ethics and esthetics 
be interpreted in light of an Instrumental-Received Research Paradigm? 
2 Ontology of nature 
It is of course a rough generalization to outline one paradigm and especially one 
worldview and image of man, commensurable for this paradigm. However, this 
thesis argues that it is possible to outline some conditions which apply in general and 
be relevant in relation to the problem statement. These general conditions, it is 
argued, have in turn implicit or explicit consequences for the lower meta-Ievels of 
the frame of reference. 
The point of departure for conducting scientific research about how a project may 
impact nature and culture, that is, to assess the potential negative or positive 
impacts of a development initiative, the researcher must have a clearly defined idea 
and concept concerning what nature and man is in order to be able in the first place 
to study "it". Such ideas and concepts constitute part of what Kuhn (postscript to 
Kuhn, 1996, p. 182) termed the 'worldview', or what Lakatos referred to as the 'hard 
core' of a research program (Lakatos, et aL, 1978, p. 48) , that is, 'symbolic 
generalization' which are fundamental 'Iaws' or 'definitions' seldom tested or 
disputed by the research community (Gilje & Grimen, 1993, p. 88, from Norwegian). 
The purpose of this section is to discuss what nature is or the ontology of nature in 
light of an Instrumental-received tradition with inspiration from Shallow Ecology and 
to outline some criteria that can be used to analyze the empirical material. 
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Even though the ontological assumptions prerequisite for a theory are not always 
mentioned and may often even be unknown to the researcher, a theory always 
postulates some kind of a priori assumption. Hence the Kierkegaardian notion that a 
system can never start immediately and without any postulations: 
'The system begins with the immediate and is therefore assumption free and 
thus absolute .... How does the system begin with the immediate? Does it 
begin with it immediately? The answer to this question must be an unqualified 
no' (Kierkegaard & Næss, 1994, p. 100, from Danish). 
It is possible to get a hint of the worldview presupposed by Shallow Ecology through 
studying A. Næss description of the Shallow Ecology Movement8 : 
'The shallow ecology movement is concerned with fighting pollution and 
resource depletion. Its central objective is the health and affluence of people 
in the developed countries' (Næss, et al., 2005, p. 7). 
From Næss' description here, an obvious dualism between human beings and nature 
can be deduced. To draw a demarcation line between man and nature is to assume a 
worldview in which man is subscribed significantly more worth or value than natural 
"resources". This is in accordance with Jakobsen et al. who states that a 
dualisticjanthropocentric (human centered) worldview implies that: 
'nature is at disposal for human beings' (Jakobsen, Jaminon, & Nystad, 2008, 
p.67). 
This also accords with F. Capra's view: 
'Shallow ecology is anthropocentric, or human-centered. It views humans as 
above or outside of nature, as the source of all value, and ascribes only 
instrumental, or "u se", value to nature' (Capra, 1996, p. 7). 
8 First published as the: The Sha/low and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary, in: 
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 16, (1973) pp. 95-100. 
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Further, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes anthropocentric theories 
as follows: 
' ... they assign intrinsic value to human beings alone (i.e., what we might call 
anthropocentric in astrong sense) or they assign a significantly greater 
amount of intrinsic value to human beings than to any nonhuman things such 
that the protection or promotion of human interests or well-being at the 
expense of nonhuman things turns out to be nearly always justified (i.e., what 
we might call anthropocentric in a weak sense). For example, Aristotle 
(Polities, Bk. l, (h. 8) maintains that "nature has made all things specifically for 
the sake of manI! and that the value of nonhuman things in nature is merely 
instrumental. Generally, anthropocentric positions find it problematic to 
articulate what is wrong with the cruel treatment of non human animals, 
except to the extent that such treatment may lead to bad consequences for 
human beings,9. 
A. Næss refers to G. Tyler Miller when he outlines some of the consequences of 
anthropocentrism, or of the beliefs that (1) humans are the source of all value and 
(2) nature exists only for our use. The consequences are: (a) that our primary 
purpose is to produce and consume. Success is based on material wealth. (b) 
Production and consumption must rise endlessly because we have a right to an ever 
increasing materiallevel of living (Næss, et al., 2005). 
Fig. 2 is an illustration of the dualistic-anthropocentric worldview. 
9 Stanfod Encyclopedia of Philosophy, emphasis added: ~"-'L1~~""",~"-"-'~='-=-=-"-'-'-~ 
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Sources of 
value 
50 far the discussion regarding the ontology of nature in the light of 5hallow Ecology 
can be said to feature a dualistic-anthropocentric understanding. Further some of 
the historical roots of this interpretation of nature as a piece of machinery will 
shortly be diseussed. The purpose of this is to illustrate the genesis and the growth of 
the idea of dualism. 
Objective ontology - historical roots 
The ontological tradition of dualism has ancient roots in 'atomism' originating from 
Leucippus, Demoeritus and Epicurus. Atom 10 means "indivisible" element of 
something (Lubcke, 1983, p. 37). Demoeritus (ca. 460-380/70 B.C.) endeavored to 
give a rational description of reality by referring to the theory of atoms: The only 
reality is atoms and the empty space. Atoms are massive, compact elements which 
cannot be divided and whose properties are eternal, unchangeable and invisible. 
From this Demokrit concluded that all phenomena which we experience can be 
explained through simple theories, atoms and empty space. In this perspective 
10 Atom from Greek atomos; "indivisible" (LUbcke, 1983, p. 37) 
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nothing happens randomly, every eventuality just form links in the long chain of 
cause and effects. Demokrit explains both cosmos and the soul in the light of the 
atom theoryl1. 
Epicurus (ca. 341-271 B.C.) was greatly inspired by the studies of Demokrit. In line 
with his major source of inspiration he explained that body and soul are made up of 
atoms, and that all functions of the human being are results of isolated atom-
processes, like that of a machine. Human beings, however, have a small portion of 
free-will which we should use to increase our own 'happiness' (gr. hedone) and 
therefore deprive the ultimate evil which is 'pain'. This was the ultimate goal for a 
human being: to maximize happiness and minimize pain (Lubcke, 1983, p. 113; Næss, 
2001, p. 227). 
In Democritus and Epicurus we see the outline of a worldview based on dualism: 
separation between nature, as a total mechanistic and deterministic affair, and 
human nature as characterized by similar traits, but equipped with a small portion of 
free-will which should be used to seek happiness and avoid pain in the material 
world. Dualism has a relatively long history in modern philosophy. Its strongest roots, 
however, are from the early ages of modern natural science. Two figures are of 
special importance in relation to metaphysics based on dualism: Galileo Galilei (1564-
1642) and Rene Descartes (1596-1650). Galileo and Descartes were of vast 
importance for the establishment of objective ontology and it can therefore be 
fruitful to mention their philosophies. 
Galileo Galilei was an Italian mathematician, physicist, astronomer and philosopher, 
and is regarded as one of the founders of classical physics. His physical and 
astronomical investigation brought him quickly in opposition to the teachings of 
Aristotle and the Scholastics. Galileo believed that the true method in natural 
sciences unites mathematics and empirical observation. This belief led him to 
formulate his famous statement: 
11 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford,edu/pntries/dErnocritus/ 
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'The book of nature is written in the language of mathematics". 
His research method is anchored on measurable data, mathematical hypothesis 
refleeting legitimate relations between phenomena and experimental testing of 
hypothesis (Lubcke, 1983). 
Galileo divided the properties of nature into primary and secondary qualities or 
properties. Secondary qualities are non-measurable and subjective qualities (50 
called sensual qualities) such as color, sound, smell, taste and felt heat. Subjective 
qualities are not ascribed to the substance or the "matter"; they only applied to 
things in 50 far as they are objects of experience and should therefore be totally 
neglected by the physical description of nature. The "real" physical description of the 
world should describe what is objectively real, that is, the primary properties, in 
contrast to the things only appearing real from our subjective experience (Lubcke, 
1983). 
Galileo did not doubt that nature is made up of firm, quantifiable relations 
(structures, invariances). The only way to get into contact with them is through 
establishing mathematical relations between one or two variables. These hypotheses 
are subsequently tested through empirical observation: hypothetical-deduction 
(Næss, 2001). 
The man who brought forward the mechanistic, materialistic view of nature to a 
significant extent and whose ambitions was to establish a universal philosophical 
system based on the substance view, was Rene Descartes. 
The French mathematician and philosopher Rene Descartes (1596-1650) is normally 
regarded as the father of modern philosophy and hence also the originator of 
modern metaphysics 12 . In France, Descartes' philosophy still dominates at the 
universities (Næss, 2001). 
12 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford,edu/pntries/df'scartes-works/ 
26 
The main point in the Cartesian metaphysical system is dualism (LLibcke, 1983, pp. 
82-87). The meaning of dualism is a distinction between the human mind as a self-
conscious substance, i.e., a "thinking thing" (res cogitans), and everything else 
(nature) including our body, as material substances, i.e., "external things" (res 
extensa). The soul is different from the material world, because it can itself 
acknowledge that it exists ("Cogito ergo sum"): 
' ... there is a vast difference between mind and body, in respect that body, 
from its nature, is always divisible, and that mind is entirely indivisible,13. 
This implies that the human soul (mind) and the human body belong to two different 
worlds each having different properties. The Cartesian professor Arnold Geulincx 
(1625-69) stated about the duality between mind and body that: 
'I am a spectator of the production of changes and movements in my body, 
but I am not the actor, the real causal agent, in spite of my interior acts of will. 
... Body and soul are like two clocks, neither of which acts on the other but 
which keep perfect time because God constantly synchronizes their 
movement' (Copleston, 1994, pp. 177-178). 
In Descartes' own words: 
'I right ly conclude that my essence consists only in my being a thinking thing 
[or substance whose whole essence or nature is merely thinking]. And 
although I may, or rather, as I will shortly say, although I certainly do possess a 
body with which I am very close conjoined; nevertheless, because, on the ane 
hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in as far as I am only a thinking 
an unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a distinct idea of 
body, in as far as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that I 
13 From Descartes' {2008/1637}. Meditations on the First Philosophy, VI. On the Existence of Material 
Things, and of the Real Distinetion between the mind and Body, p.139. 
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[that is, my mind, by which I am when I am] am entirely and truly distinct from 
my body, and may exist without itd4. 
From cogito ergo sum Descartes derives the following natural philosophl5 : Our 
perceptions are not in our command and must therefore belong to something 
different from our cognition, something which extends in space. This being said, we 
should ascribe to the substance (nature) only those properties which we can firmly 
and distinctly understand without any doubt. Descartes said that only divisibility and 
motion are such properties. Other subjective properties such as color, smell, sound, 
etc., we can imagine as being absent properties. In Descartes we find a similar 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities as we find in Galileo's 
worldview. In order to understand what reality is then, we should limit our research 
purely to studying the primary qualities (Næss, 2001, p. 401). 
To further demonstrate the limitations of the senses, Descartes proceeds with what 
is known as the Wax Argument16. He considers a piece of wax; his sen ses inform him 
that it has certain characteristics, such as shape, texture, size, color, smell, felt heat 
and 50 forth. When he brings the wax towards a flame, these characteristics change 
completely. However, it seems that it is still the same thing: it is still a piece of wax, 
even though the data of the senses inform him that all of its characteristics are 
different. Therefore, in order to properly grasp the nature of the wax, he cannot use 
the senses. He must use his mind. 
Mechanistic philosophy views the reality of nature as a large piece of clockwork 
which is devoid of meaning and life. Organic life (microorganisms, plants, animals, 
the human body, etc.) is understood as machines whose properties can be perfectly 
described through the language of mathematics. Nature is built up by eternal and 
14 Ibid., p.133 
15 Ultra short description 
16 From Descartes' {2008/1637}. Meditation Il, On the nature of the human mind, p. 86. 
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unchangeable atoms which are externally related to one another. F. Capra has 
described the Cartesian worldview as such: 
'To Descartes the material universe was a machine and nothing but a machine. 
There was no purpose, life, or spirituality in matter. Nature worked according 
to mechanicallaws, and everything in the material world could be explained in 
terms of the arrangement and movement of its parts. ( ... ) Descartes gave 
scientific thought its general framework - the view of nature as a perfect 
machine, governed by exact mathematicallaws' (Capra, 1982, p. 60). 
In sum, objective ontology interprets nature as being constituted by objective, 
lifeless atoms whose qualities are the primary ones -Iength, breadth, tallness, etc. -, 
and which are externally and causally related to one another. In other words, nature 
is perceived as a 3D space, eternal in time and space, consisting of gears which are 
externally and causally related and put into motion by the forces of gravity, and 
devoid of inner life and subjective qualities. Objective ontology can now be 
summarized as followed: 
Dualism; demarcation line between Man (Mind) and Nature (Body). 
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Distinction between primary (objective) and secondary (subjective) qualities: 
only the former applies to things-in-themselves. 
Mechanistic: these properties are externally and causally related. 
3 Ontology of man and his motivation 
The implications of objective formal ontology had implications for regional ontology, 
that is, the perception of the human nature as well - as we saw with Descartes 
dualism of mind and body. The result was an objective (primary qualities) model-of-
man with a dominant focus on those objective (intersubjective) sides of life (e.g. 
material, uti lit y, happiness). This image of man was accepted as the objective image 
of man and it has been absorbed by a wide range of scientific disciplines, e.g., 
behavioristic (mainstream) psychology, economics, politics. 
One of the earliest and maybe most influential behaviorists was John B. Watson 
(1878-1958) (Raaheim & Helstrup, 1975). His goal was to make the discipline of 
psychology more scientific. He argued that psychologists who studied human 
consciousness worked with subjective and vague data which did not meet the 
demand for scientific validity. Watson believed that the only rigid and logical 
responsible form of functionalism was objective studies (pure observation) of 
behavior; i.e. behaviorism (Raaheim & Helstrup, 1975). Behaviorism's main function 
is to determine causal relationships (Stimulus-Response) between external stimulus 
and internal responses. Crucial underlying information for behaviorism was 
Descartes ontological argument that consciousness neither could be observed nor 
logically explained (Raaheim & Helstrup, 1975, p. 38). 
Behaviorism's emphasis on the objective sides of human life (visual, auditory, tactile, 
kinetically) fits in well with Galileo's and Descartes' unbendable will to promote the 
primary (physical) and undermine the secondary qualities (experience) of life. 
Ingebrigtsen & Pettersson (1979) argue that behaviorism implies that human beings 
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are regarded as plain things who 'behave consequently and rationally in relation to 
what they want' (p. 39). 
The moral behavior of this objective-mechanistic model of man was assumed to be 
motivated by an objective ra tion ality, i.e., a rationality deansed of subjective 
qualities. Lubcke et al. (1983) defines this type of rationality 'instrumental rationality' 
and refers to it as: 
'pure reason, i.e. an ability to understand, which is cleansed of sensory 
impressions' (p. 136, from Danish) and that 'the right and justice action is that 
which compared with other alternatives produces the greatest amount of 
positive (non-ethical) values. This means that the ethical value of an action 
depends on its ability to increase the amount of positive values of an non-
ethical art, e.g., happiness, richness, beauty, knowledge, etc.' (p. 440, from 
Danish, emphasis added). 
The ethical tradition which is compatible with the objective image of man is 
utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is an anthropocentric ethical theory (see e.g., 
DesJardins,2006) concerned with the instrumental consequences of human actions. 
There are two traditions within utilitarianism: egoistic and altruistic. Egoistic 
utilitarianism is an extreme tradition explaining human behavior as motivated from 
purely egoistic motives; i.e. individualistic egoism. Altruistic utilitarianism explains 
human behavior as motivated from altruistic motives; i.e. striving to maximize 
happiness for the group; i.e. collective egoism (Thommessen, Egeland, & Wetlesen, 
1996). This way of thinking and reasoning, the authors' states, enjoys the hegemonic 
position in modern ethics. 
Shallow Ecology is occupied with the satisfaction of a segment or group (nation, the 
developed countries) of people as we have seen earlier in this chapter. The moral 
idea behind this type of reasoning then lies dose to altruistic utilitarianism 
(Thommessen, et al., 1996). This tradition is oriented towards solutions supporting 
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'the best overall consequences for everyone concerned' (Rachels, 2003, p. 92), or the 
'greatest amount of happiness for the greatest amount' (Thommessen, et al., 1996, 
p. 171). Becker states that the philosophical tradition underlying this principle is that 
it goes one step further and describes human beings as 'not only self-related, but ( ... ) 
systematically related to the community' (Ingebrigtsen & Jakobsen, 2009, p. 2780). 
The famous sentence, ''The greatest amount of happiness for the greatest amount of 
people", was formulated by the famous utilitarian figure, Jeremy Bentham (1748-
1832). Happiness is here understood as the ultimate premise in relation to the 
question of what is morally right. The utilitarian interpretation of "happiness" is 
hedonistic, from the Greek word hedone, "pleasure". Central utilitarian criteria are 
therefore the production of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. J. Bentham stated 
that humans are ruled and determined by these two 'sovereign masters' and that 
they: ' ... govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think ... ,17 
C. Taylor (1985) has termed evaluations concerned with the outcomes of our action: 
'weak evaluations'. Weak evaluations are not concerned with the motivation behind 
outcomes. Taylor states that: 
'In weak evaluation, for something to be judged as good it is sufficient that it 
be desired' (Taylor, 1985a, p. 18). 
The primary goal of utilitarian ethics is that acts are considered moral, if the outcome 
increases uti lit Y for most people. Taylor states in relation to this: 
'The bent of utilitarianism has been to do away with the qualitative distinction 
of worth on the grounds that they represent confused perceptions of the real 
bases of our preferences which are quantitative. The hope has been that once 
we have done away with strong evaluation, we will be able to calculate .... 
Utilitarians are certainly right from their own standpoint in rejecting strong 
17 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford,edu/pntries/utilitarianisrn-historyI 
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evaluation, for doing away with this is a necessary condition for reducing 
practical reason to calculation' (Taylor, 1985a, p. 17). 
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The behavior of this objective model of man thus is assumed to be mechanistically 
and deterministically programmed in accord with the objective of maximizing 
happiness or utility and minimizing pain. 
Objective regional ontology can now be summarized using following criteria: 
* Objective: the primary qualities constitute the real human nature. 
* Social reality exists outside the human being, that is, outside the subject. 
* Deterministic: human behavior is best understood through the concept of 
instrumental rationality. 
* Value-monism; maximize happiness ~ minimize pain. 
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4 Perception of science 
This section attempts to describe some of the epistemological consequences 
inextricably related to objective ontology. Epistemologies 18 constitute the a priori 
assumptions (or meta theories) concerning what the nature of science 19 or what 
certain knowledge is. This means the theory of knowledge which a scientific theory 
holds as absolute. The crux of theories of knowledge is to outline what science is and 
thus also what pseudoseienee is. Central here is the de bate surrounding validity, that 
is, the problem of what makes knowledge valid. 
It is reasonable to suggest a relationship between ontology and epistemology. The 
paradigm theory, for example, confirms such relationships. Also the Canadian 
philosopher C. Taylors argues in favor of an intimate relationship between 'the 
nature of the human agent' or 'anthropological beliefs' and 'modern science'. In his 
case he analyzes the connection between epistemology and the concept of 'freedom' 
conduding: 
'And 50 the epistemological tradition is also intricate in a certain notion of 
freedom, and the dignity attaching to us in virtue of this. The theory of 
knowledge partly draws its strength from this connection. But, reciprocally, 
the ideal of freedom has also drawn strength from its sensed connection with 
the construal of knowledge seemingly favored by modern science' (Taylor, 
1997, p. 7). 
The perception of science or 'true knowledge' in social science must necessary build 
on some meta-theories concerning what human nature is, that is, to assume or 
postulate a certain fundamental understanding or interpretation (meta-
understandingjinterpretation) of what the human nature is; hence the dose 
relationship between meta-theories/,worldview's (cf. Kuhn) or 'hard-co re' (cf. 
18 From the Greek word: "episteme": "knowledge" and "logos": "the study of"; i.e. the 
studyjphilosophy of knowledge or philosophy of science (LObcke, 1983, p. 113). 
19 From Latin: scienta; "certain knowledge" (Gla re, 1982). 
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Lakatos) and the understanding of knowledge. Traditionally, however, the line of 
argumentation has gone the other way around as Taylor puts it: 
'We might say that it is an ontological issue which has been argued ever since 
the seventeenth century in terms of epistemological consideration .. .' (Taylor, 
1985b, p. 17). 
Desjardins (2006) provides an illuminating example of how the epistemological 
construal has encouraged objective ontologies: 
'Because all these primary qualities can be fully described in mathematical 
terms, the real world turns out to be the world of mathematical physics and 
mechanics. Real trees, for example, have no color. They merely reflect light 
waves. If our eyes were constituted differently, they would appear differently . 
... Therefore, description of natural objects that refer to secondary qualities 
such as color, weight, and taste are scientifically irrelevant. They are not really 
true, rational, or objective' (Desjardins, 2006, p. 213). 
The consequences for a theory of knowledge ultimately regarding the real nature of 
humans as objective and rational must necessary be a theory or philosophy of 
knowledge that is best able to explain objective phenomena (body and mind) while 
at the same time sweeping away vague speculations and sensory projections (cf. e.g., 
Descartes' "The Wax Argument"). 
The philosophical movement that has delved most extensively into the philosophy of 
knowledge is logical positivismjempiricism as proclaimed by The Vienna Circle (1924-
1936). The central figures in this movement are Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), Rudolf 
Carnap (1891-1970), Otto Neurath (1882-194S) and Carl Gustav Hempel (190S-1997). 
The publications of the circle can be found in The Berlin Circle Journals: Erkenntnis 
(1930-1937), Schriften lur Wissenschaftlichen Weltauffsassung (1929-1937) and in 
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science (1934-1963). 
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The aim of logical positivism was to establish a Unified Science, applicable for the 
study of both nature and man. The tradition has been a direction in which methods 
drawn from the natural sciences, especially physics or The real Science, have been 
worshipped 20 • Hempel illustrates this well by stating: 
' ... general laws have quite analogous functions in history and in the natural 
sciences, that they form an indispensable instrument of historical research, 
and that they even constitute the com mon basis of various procedures which 
are of ten considered as characteristic of the social in contradistinction to the 
natural sciences' (Hempel, 1942, p. 35). 
The dominant position of the physical sciences was emphasized as early as the 17th 
century by the genius Descartes. In his The Principles of Philosophy he writes: 
'Thus, all philosophy is like a tree, of which metaphysics is the root, physics the 
trunk, and all the other sciences the branches that grow out of this trunk .. .' 
(Descartes, 1637j2008, p. 156). 
This willingness to use the physical sciences as an ideal for other sciences is also 
accounted for in C. Taylors' Overcoming epistemology in which he writes that: 
'In practice, epistemologists took their cue from what they identified as the 
successful sciences of their days, all the way from Descartes's infatuation with 
mathematics to the contemporary vogue for reduction to physics' (Taylor, 
1997, p. 2). 
In this quest, the positivistic interpretation of what sciencejknowledge is has been 
enormously successful and powerful. The positivisticjempirical interpretation of 
what science is has not only been influential within physics and the other natural 
sciences but 0150 'immensely influential in social science' (Taylor, 1997, p. 1). 
20 (for beautiful illustrations see Capra, 1982, 1996). 
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Easterby-Smith et al. states that an implication of applying the positivistic 
interpretation of knowledge within social science is that: 
' ... the social world exists externally. And that its properties should be 
measured through objective methods, rather than 
subjectively through sensation, reflection or intuition' 
Thorpe, & Lowe, 2002, p. 28). 
being interfered 
(Easterby-Smith, 
The authors further argue that this illustrates the close connection between 
ontology, the social world being 'external and objective' and epistemology, that 
knowledge is only significant if based on pure 'observation of this external reality'. 
They warrant their claims by referring to the French philosopher and "Father of 
positivism", August Comte (1798-1857), who stated that: 
'All good intellects have repeated, since Bacon's time, that there can be no 
real knowledge but that which is based on observed facts' (Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe, et al., 2002, p. 28). 
The positivistic theory or modern way of inquiring knowledge about social reality 
involves scoping it from an observational-objective perspective, that is, to see the 
world through quantitative lenses devoid of subjective and phenomenological 
aspects. This way of looking at the world involves the traditional subject-object 
relationship, in which the subject (or researcher) is detached from the study object. 
C. Taylor states that knowing theories based on 'mechanistic activities' involves 
scanning the world in the same way as computers scan numbers: 
' ... passive reception of impressions from the external world .... This construal, 
valid for Locke, applies just as much to the latest artificial-intelligence models 
of thinking. It is one of the mainsprings of the epistemological tradition .... The 
epistemological construal is, then, an understanding of knowledge that fits 
well with modern mechanistic science. This is one of its greatest strengths, 
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and certainly it contributes to the present vogue of computer based models of 
the mind.' (Taylor, 1997, p. 4). 
The example provided earlier by Desjardins is a good illustration of the passiveness 
which Taylor discusses here. 
The crux of the positivistic/modern theory of knowledge is that the researcher 
(subject) must be distanced or detached from the study object, that is, a subject-
object relationship. This implies that researchers must play the role as a speetator in 
order to enable pure observation of the external social world and subsequently to 
meet the criteria of objectivity, that is, to describe or explain the "object" objectively. 
Maslow has termed this way of knowing 'spectator knowledge' and, with reference 
to Martin Buber, he also terms it 'I-It knowledge', and states that it encompasses 
"'knowing the external physical world'" (Maslow, 1966, p. 49). He describes 
'spectator knowledge' as follows: 
'It means looking at something that is not you, not human, not personal, 
something independent of you the perceiver. It is something to which you are 
a stranger, a bystander, a member of the audience. You the observer are, 
then, really alien to it, uncomprehending and without sympathy and 
identification, without any starting point of tacit knowledge that you might 
already have' (ibid.). 
The perception of science or epistemology which is compatible with objective 
ontology thus is characterized by the following criteria: 
* "Subject-object" knowledge; i.e., "I-It"-knowledge. 
* Certain/true scientific knowledge is deduced from detached observation of 
the physical world. 
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5 Scientific ideals 
The scientific ideals a researcher and his/her research community strive to live up to, 
are intimately related to his/their perception of science and worldview. In other 
words, the scientific ideal of the IRRP endeavors to generate as precise l-It 
knowledge as possible. As we have seen the perception of science which is 
compatible with objective ontology is the dualistic subject-object tradition from the 
epistemological construal of the 17th century; i.e., natural science. Further we saw 
that the philosophical movement that has delved into this tradition and shaped 
modern scientific thought immensely is logical positivism/empiricism. 
Although logical empiricism in its original form is 'dead', e.g., the belief that the 
principle of verification constitutes "The" demarcation criterion, many features of 
the tradition and its enormous influence still remains with us as we have seen. 
Therefore, it needs to be made clear that the present discussion of the scientific 
ideals of the IRRP attempts to outline what normally goes under the received image 
of science21 and not to provide an account into the originally form of Logical 
Positivism. In order to understand the received image, a short discussion of logical 
empiricism and critical rationalism (Sir K. Popper) does, however, follow, because the 
influence of both is crucial in relation to contemporary scientific thought. 
In the Vienna Circle, where the logical positivistic tradition was born, one was 
motivated to discover the objective truth of reality, those truths which were 
universal and indisputable, and not to mess with metaphysical speculations. P. Frank, 
for example, has termed the Vienna Circle 'antimetaphysical' (Gilje & Grimen, 1993, 
p. 48, from Norwegian). The elimination of metaphysics was of cardinal importance 
for the member of the Circle and to a significant extent it continues to be a hallmark 
of what goes under 'the received image of science'. This is simply because if we 
believe in a pre-analytic/-empirical reality or in synthetic a priori sentences, the 
21 For a comprehensive and well reputed account of the subject see F. Suppes' (ed.) (1979) The 
Structures of Scientific Theories, 2nd ed. 
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whole criterion of objectivity becomes threatened; i.e., we no longer have a firm 
foundation on which to build our unprejudiced analytic/empirical descriptive science; 
because our objective facts and data are meant to represent the secure starting 
point of science. The argument against metaphysics and pre-analytic visions is clearly 
articulated by the young Ayer: 
'One way of attacking a metaphysician who claimed to have knowledge of a 
reality which transcended the phenomenal world would be to enquire from 
what premises his propositions were deduced. Must he not begin, as other 
men do, with the evidence of his senses? And if so what valid process of 
reasoning can possibly lead him to the conception of a transcendent reality?' 
(Ayer, 1952, p. 33). 
Kant, probably the finest intellectual of the 18th century, delivered a significant 
account against a pure empiricist and rationalistic image of knowledge in his Critique 
of Pure Reason; but for the moment we shall not enter this debate. Rather we should 
just notice that logical empiricists (and also modern science/received view) 
distinguish between meaningful analytical or "positive" sentences and meaningless 
synthetic/metaphysical sentences. 
The aim of the logical positivists was to assert that all sciences are fundamentally 
alike (Unified Science) and that theories ought to be developed on the basis of 
experience (induction) (cf. Hempel's statement above concerning the function of 
laws in history). Furthermore, theories and hypothesis ought to be testa ble in 
relation to empirical data (verification), and all scientific results ought to be 
explainable in mathematical and logical terms (universal language). Again we can 
include a statement from Hempel that illustrates our point here: 
'Any explanation of scientific character is amena ble to objective checks' 
(Hempel, 1942, p. 38). 
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The criterion for determining whether a sentence is 'meaningful' or 'meaningless' is 
thus a matter of whether or not our claimsjpropositions are analytic or empirically 
verifiable. This implies that scientific theories must be testa ble in the light of 
observation and experience. Logical positivism emphasizes the need to evaluate 
empirical knowledge in relation to a certain fundament and to the criteria of truth 
(cf. an analogy to Descartes' fundamentalism). The criterion of truth refers to the 
correspondence between observational-statements and experience. Observational-
statements (or protocol-sentences) represent reductions of complex statements 
which can be directly verified through observation or experience. In other words, a 
complex statement about the world is verifiable and meaningful if it can be proved 
through observations (see e.g., Gilje & Grimen, 1993, p. 55). 
For example, claiming that "human impacts of petroleum activity are positive" can be 
reduced into "petroleum activity in the High North will increase BNP per capita in the 
three northern regions by approximately 10 to 30 percent or whatever". This latter 
claim is quite easy to verify for an experienced economist. That BNP represents an 
objective measure for "positive human impacts" is an important pre-assumption for 
this observation claim. Or, for example the statement "there is an economic 
depression in Norway" can be verified through observations such as: "there has been 
a prolonged recession of 5 % in GDP". 
The intensions of the logical positivists were to build an exact and unambiguous 
theory of science. The honesty and integrity of the Vienna Circle is remarkable and 
beyond dispute, because its members criticized their own theory right up until the 
grave. The main problem is that the principle of verification is at the bottom an 
illogicol principle - in the sense that it prerequisites induction: the meaning of a 
sentencejpropositionjclaim is determined by porticulor instances. Blaug explains this 
well: 
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'This is the famous problem of induction . ... which has worried philosophers 
ever since the time of David Hume .... induction from particular instances to a 
universal law requires an illogical leap in thought, an extra element that may 
welilead from true premises to false conclusions' (Blaug, 1992, p. 13). 
This was a problem for the members of the Vienna Circle, because they held logical 
deduction as the ideal: from the universal to the particular. The movement also 
experienced problems in relation to the assumption that natural and social science 
can be treated similarly, that the certain point of departure for theoretical 
development is sense-data, and their image of a universallanguage. 
The correct process of reasoning or inference (deduction as opposed to induction), 
that is, how we can decide whether or not a hypothesis/belief represents 'scientific 
knowledge', is through the rules of logical deduction: from the general to the 
particular; our conclusions must be deduced from our premises; which also in fact 
are (pre-) hypothesis (e.g., all Greeks are men, Socrates was a Greek, therefore 
Socrates is a man). Thus we can define knowledge as valid, when it is deduced from 
"known" premises (Russeli, 2011). 
Popper's critical rationalism criticizes logical positivism for believing that the growth 
of knowledge happens as a cumulative process precisely because it is logically 
erroneous to use verification as a criterion of truth, as shown above. Popper 
therefore argues that instead of endeavoring to secure verification of hypothesis, 
science ought to construct tests endeavoring falsification of hypotheses (Popper, 
2002). In this sense science is based on critical-rational research. Science is thus the 
method of testing, ex post, our theories and hypothesis through deducing empirical 
and testa ble consequences from our hypothesis, and subsequently to control these 
in relation to particular facts/data; i.e., the traditional hypothetical-deductive 
method. Blaug explains efficiently the principle of falsification and Popper 
demarcation criterion: 
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'In short, you can never demonstrate that anything is materially true but you 
can demonstrate that some things are materially false ... science is that body 
of synthetic propositions about the real world that can, at least in principle, be 
falsified by empirical observation' (Blaug, 1992, pp. 13-14). 
Popper encounters, however, a problem in his attempts to build a theory of science 
on a deductive foundation. His demand that theories and hypotheses ought to be 
falsifiable, assumes that our basic empirical observations (particulars) are true. 
Implicitly this means that if we do not demand that knowledge of particulars ought 
to be falsifiable, science is not based on a scientific foundation, but rather on 
induction. Popper therefore demands that some knowledge of particulars ought to 
be sufficiently true for a given period and time, i.e., a researcher must agree that 
some "truths" or observation statements are true; i.e., so called 'known premises'. 
Such agreed-upon truths can in turn hel p us falsify our theories. This process of 
attempting to falsify our hypothesis through repeated observations, which can in 
principle never verify our theories in the strict sense, helps us to refine and adjust 
our theories so that we in turn can approach an objective knowledge of the world 
(Papper, 2002). 
Thus the central trait of logical empiricism, critical rationalism and consequently the 
received or conventional image of science can be captured in the criterion of 
"objectivity" and value-neutrality; or as Chalmers puts it: 
"'science is derived from the facts" ... Science is to be based on what we can 
see, hear and touch rather than on personal opinions or speculative 
imaginings. If observation of the world is carried out in a careful, unprejudiced 
way then the facts established in this way will constitute a secure, objective 
basis for science' (Chalmers, 1999, p. 1). 
When scientists talk about objectivity or 'unprejudiced observation' in science, they 
mean that data or facts about reality ought to be interpersona/; i.e., independent of 
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observer/interpreter. Thus science proceeds from facts or data given by observation 
which are 'objective' in the sense that they are interpersonal. Logical positivism was 
in fact a reaction to and a fear of pure subjectivism (Gilje & Grimen, 1993). The aim 
of science is thus to render highly probable 'mechanistic explanation' or cause-effect 
relations or hypothesis/ natural "Iaws"; i.e., descriptive knowledge. 
An interesting discovery is that positive theories and modeis, i.e., descriptive 
knowledge, will never concern themselves with normative, 'purpose-explanations', 
that is, how things ought to be. This is because objective-positivistic knowledge-
generation is oriented towards describing and explaining the interpersonal facts of 
nature and culture. In other words positivistic science is pragmatic science, that is, a 
means to further other ends (not an end in itself). This is in accordance with Lubcke 
who draws some of the implications for science of the pragmatic position: 
'science is merely an intellectual tool for systematizing our experiences with 
the aim of increasing our commercial choices' (LLibcke, 1983, p. 214, from 
Danish). 
This claim is reasonable because objective (value-free, spectator) knowledge can only 
produce knowledge about what we can do and not about what we ought to do; i.e., 
precisely value-free knowledge. Gilje and Grimen illustrate this point well by 
referring to the American sociologist G.A Lundberg's example of the implication of 
value-neutral research: 
'it is not the job for a chemist who develops high-power explosives to let 
himself be influenced in his work by consideration as to whether his product 
will be used to blow cathedral up in the air or to build tunnels through the 
mountains' (Gilje & Grimen, 1993, from Norwegian). 
Ingebrigtsen and Pettersson (1979) argue that the consequences of descriptive 
knowledge are that practical life is never a function of theoretical concept and 
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theories, and that positivism thus never serves normative purposes, that is, how life 
in practice ought to be. 
It makes sensational reading to see the similarities between the positivistic ideal of 
objectivity and the early writings of Rene Descartes' (the father of analytic 
reasoning), the "radical doubt" of the 17th century. The following quotation is taken 
from his Discourse on Method (1637): 
'The first thing was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly 
know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, 
and to com prise nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to 
my mind 50 clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt. The 
second, to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts 
as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate solution'(Descartes, 
1637/2008, p. IS). 
A more modern interpretation of analytic philosophy/method is provided by Lubcke: 
'L. a skeptic or downright hostile attitude towards metaphysical system-
construction ... 2. then there is the perception that the traditional philosophical 
problems can only be (dis)re-solved through a clarification of the meaning of 
the concepts which are central in the problem statement .... 3. Philosophy is 
not systematically beyond what concerns method. The philosophical problems 
can thus be treated partial and without an eve for the comprehensive whole. 
4. Finally, analytic philosophy is characterized by a basic empirical attitude' 
(Lubcke, 1983, p. 16, from Danish, emphasis added). 
Within psychology, the analytic method has for example influenced researchers to 
explain complex feelings and behaviors from muscle reactions in the eve-region. 
Another example of reductionism in psychology is the belief that mind and body are 
separated and should therefore not be studied together; hence the dualistic 
worldview (Hothersail, 2004). The utter consequence of analytical reasoning within 
45 
psychology is probably the culmination of G. T Fechner's psychology school of 
'psychophysics' and J.S. Mill's concept of 'mental-chemistry' (Egidius, 2008, p. 412; 
Lauridsen, 1977, p. 25) and Skinner's strict behaviouristic image of psychology. 
Summing up what has been said 50 far about the image of science in this chapter, the 
received view is that science proceeds from fact or data given by observation, and 
that these facts are objective in the sense that they are interpersonal (Logical 
positivism) or taken for granted in the sense that they are assumed true for the time 
being (Popper). Observations and facts (or 50-ca lied "observations statements") are 
independent of theories and can therefore function as yardsticks for judging the 
qualities of competing theories. The scientific method is always some kind of 
hypothetico-deductive explanations. The scientific explanations are always some 
kind of nomological-deductive explanations. A clear distinction between synthetic 
and analytic a priori sentences. No difference exists between the social sciences and 
the natural sciences. 
The scientific ideal of the received image of science can now be summarized by way 
of the following criteria: 
* Interpersonal 
* Observation of data or facts 
* Evidence-based 
* Cause-effect explanations 
* Verification 
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6 Ethics 
The internal and external ethical dimension of the Instrumental-Received Research 
Paradigm (IRRP) is closely related to the scientific ideal described above. Internal 
ethics concerns norms and rules for how research is conducted. These were 
described paraileled with the 'ideal' above. 
The external ethic of the received view of science is rather downsized, that is, a lack 
of responsibility towards individuals, society and nature. This claim makes sense 
precisely because of the objective and value-free point of departure taken by the 
paradigm. Ingebrigtsen and Pettersson state that this objectivity: 
'".has led to a lack of interest towards decisions with potential damaging 
social and individual effects, "side effects". The belief that scientific objectivity 
disclaims scientists of any responsibility and subjective evaluations (values), is 
probably the reason behind this (Ingebrigtsen & Pettersson, 1979, p. 43, from 
Danish). 
The ideal of objectivity enables science to develop information which can be used to 
describe the relation between means and ends. Science can generate knowledge 
about whether given means are appropriate in relation to a given end. Subsequently, 
science can reveal or calculate probabilities between means and ends. Science is thus 
equipped with a critical potential with regard to means-ends evaluations. Indirectly, 
this implies that science is also able to provide a critical evaluation of actual ends. 
Furthermore it can also asses the indirect impacts of realizing ends: that is, what an 
end 'costs' us. In other words science tells us not what to do, but what we can do. 
Science cannot reveal the quality of fundamental ends, values and ideals in the light 
of our actions, for example, helping children in the poor world, but can shed light on 
the relation between means and ends and the costs of realizing ends (Gilje & Grimen, 
1993). 
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The external ethic of the received view, that is, responsibility towards society and 
nature, will probably be evaluated in terms of instrumental (economical), material 
means. This is because of the ability to conduct mean-end evaluations. An 
instrumental rationality necessarily means the absence of any real ethical 
evaluations; i.e., whether something is bad/good. Pure instrumental, ends-means-
reductions, are considered "objective" because they lack any real ethical evaluation. 
But at the same time, instrumental uti lit Y evaluations are evaluation, they represent 
value judgements originating from the human mind. 50 in other words, what the 
"received-researcher" understands as objective is his/her interpretation of the 
concept in light of his worldview. This connection between ontology and ethics point 
in the direction that the paradigm theory holding water. It also supports the claim 
that human beings are hermeneutical beings, i.e., interpretative and learning animals 
whose understanding depends on pre-understanding and prejudices (this ontology is 
outlined in the next chapter). 
The connection between ontology and ethics is perhaps better explained by 
remembering that objective ontology (primary qualities) eliminates subjective 
"speculation" about what the good~bad and right~wrong is beyond instrumental 
evaluations. This is because, as A. Næss nicely illustrates: 
'Chemistry, physics, and the science of ecology acknowledge only change, not 
value change (Næss & Rothenberg, 2001, p. 24). 
In objective ontology nature has little worth in itself, and therefore it makes sense to 
exclude any ethical or esthetical evaluation towards it. Ethical evaluations within the 
received tradition are subsequently interpreted as subjective "projection", that is, 
"image of the surface", about the world (Næss, et aL, 200S). Moral questioning is 
also considered to be metaphysical speculation which the modern researcher does 
not want to "mess with". 
The ethics of received image of science can be summarized as followed: 
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* Internal: Objectivity, reliability, validity, etc. 
* External: Non-existent; i.e., 
o Purely instrumental, i.e., end-mean reductions. 
7 Esthetics 
In the beginning of M. Blaug's book The Methodology of Economics, the following is 
stated about the methodologist: 
'Exposed as a bore, the methodologist cannot take refuge behind a cloak of 
modesty. On the contrary, he stands forth ready by his own claim to give 
advice to all and sund ry, to criticize the works of others, which, whether 
valuable or not, at least attempts to be constructive; he sets himself up as the 
final interpreter of the past and dictator of future efforts' (Blaug, 1980, p. vi). 
With this I think Blaug places emphasis on and criticizes the important role a trained 
methodologist plays in science and modern societies. The obvious reason for this 
criticism is the dominant role which quantitative and objective methods play today. 
A. Næss comments that the scientific worldview whose characteristic is the objective 
perception of nature, that is, the description of how natural objects are in 
themselves (UDinge an sichU) has eliminated, amongst other things, all individual 
differences of sense qualities. Næss follows up his comment with the following 
statement: 
'What then remains? Perhaps merely an abstract structure of some kind - in any 
case recent development in physics seems to indicate just this. There does not 
appear to be neither world nor nature remaining, merely severai common 
reference points suitable for mathematical description' (Næss, 1999, p. 43, from 
Norwegian). 
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Again we see the interrelatedness between worldview and science. Næss' argument 
is also compatible with the Galilean postulation "Nature is written in the language of 
mathematics" . 
A researcher's esthetics concerns his/her choice of method and writing st yl es. Within 
the logical positivistic tradition it is common to make a distinction between 'cognitive 
meaningful claims' and 'cognitive meaningless claims'. This distinction is also by far 
valid for the received view as interpreted here. The content of the distinction is the 
following: 
Cognitive meaningful claims 
* Analytical claims in logics 
and mathematics 
* Synthetically, verifiable claims 
in the social sciences 
Cognitive meaningless claims 
* Metaphysical claims 
* Theological claims 
* Normative (moral) claims 
* Pseudoscientific claims 
The received researcher must therefore be anticipated to have a loving relationship 
towards quantitative writing styles; i.e. mathematics and statistics. This fits in 
intimately with the sharp emphasis on the objective sides of social and naturallife. 
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8 Summary of criteria constituting the Instrumental-Received Research Paradigm 
INSTRUMENTAL-RECEIVED RESEARCH PARADIGM (IRRP) 
Regional 
* 
OBJECTIVE: THE PRIMARY PROPERTIES CONSTITUTE THE 
Ontology REAL HUMAN NATURE 
* 
VALUE MONISM 
* 
SOCIAL REALITY THUS EXISTS OUTSIDE THE HUMAN 
BE ING, THAT IS, EXTERNALLY TO THE SUBJECT. 
* 
DETERMINISTIC: HUMAN BEHAVIOR IS BEST 
UNDERSTOOD THROUGH THE CONCEPT OF 
INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY. 
Perception 
* 
SUBJECT-OBJECT KNOWLEDGE. 
of science 
* 
CERTAIN/TRUE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IS DEDUCED 
FROM OBSJcRVA 710N OF OBJECTIVE /JATA. 
Scientific 
* 
INTERPERSONALI OBJECTIVITY 
ideal 
* 
OBSERVATION OF DATA OR FACTS 
* 
EVIDENCE BASED 
* 
CAUSE-EFFECT EXPLANATIONS 
* 
VERIFICATlON 
Ethics 
* 
INTERNAL: OBJECTlVlTY, RELlABlLlTY, VALlDlTY, ETC. 
* 
EXTERNAL: INSTRUMENTAL 
Esthetics 
* 
QUANTITATIVE: A LOVE FOR HARD FACTS; 
MATIIEMATlCs/STATlSTlCS; ANALYTlCAL CLAIMS; 
SYNTIIETlCALLY VERIFlABLE CLAlMS. 
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9 Some examples of 'normal science', 'puzzle-solving' and growth of knowledge 
within neoclassical economics and where traces of an Instrumental-Received 
Research Paradigm do occur 
Neo-classical economics is what we commonly understand as mainstream economics 
and thus represents the dominant research paradigm within the science of 
. 22 
economlcs . 
Alfred Marshal (1842-1924) is commonly regarded as the father of neoclassical 
economics as Ekelund and Hebert clearly state in their article: 
'When we refer to neoclassical economics today, we usually mean the 
collection of tools of economic knowledge available to (and invented by) 
Marshall, channeled and directed into uses dictated by Marshall's view of 
economic science. To be sure, not every contemporary neoclassical economist 
follows Marshall's path. Some "high-brow" theorists prefer to adopt Cournot's 
view of economics as rational mechanics. Other maintains the connection to 
the real world is unimportant in theoretical research. But the bulk of the 
profession walks in Marshall's footsteps' (Jr. Ekelund & Hebert, 2002, p. 198). 
From Marshall we can trace the ontology of neoclassical economics which seems 
remarkably similar to the image of man discussed in this chapter. In Book I, Ch. V of 
his The Principles of Economics (1898), he explains how neoclassical economics 
perceives human nature within the science of economics: 
'They deal with man as he is. But being concerned chiefly with those aspects 
of life in which the action of motive is 50 regular that it can be predicted, and 
the estimate of the motor-forces can be verified by results, they have 
established their work on a scientific basis' (Marshall, 1898, p. 89). 
22 See e.g., E. Roy Weintrub's article on the subject in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Encl/NeoclassicaIEconomics.html 
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Neoclassical economics endeavored to achieve the status of a science or more 
correctly as an exact and mathematical and quantitative science - as clearly 
articulated by Marshall in the quotation above. For that purpose it was necessary to 
adopt a deterministic image of man whose behavior and motivation is predictable, 
objective and possible to verify through solid empirical evidence. What the 
neoclassicists did was to adopt the utilitarian theory of value/human motivation 
proclaimed by J. S. Mill. Marshall is thinking on the 'mechanics of utility' when he 
discusses the 'motor-forces' of the self in the quotation above. When these grips had 
been taken, Marshall made 'economics an engine of scientific discovery' (Jr. Ekelund 
& Hebert, 2002, p. 212). 
Before Marshall, Jevons (1835-1882), who Marshall read thoroughly (ibid., p. 207), 
explains in his Theory of political economy, the intricate connection between the a 
priori assumption about the 'economic-man' discussed above, 'normal science' and 
the method of neoclassical economics: 
'value depends entirely upon utility . ... we have only to trace out carefully the 
natural laws of the variations of utility, as depending upon the quantity of 
commodity in our possession, in order to arrive at a satisfactory theory of 
exchange .... Many persons seem to think that the physical sciences form the 
proper sphere of mathematical method, and that the moral sciences demand 
some other method, - I know not what .... To me it seems that aur science 
must be mathematical, simply because it deals with quantities. Wherever the 
things treated are capable of being greater or less, there the laws and 
relations must be mathematical in nature.' (Jevons, 1888, pp. 1-3). 
The 'general uti lit y' of consumer goods and services of whatever kind within the 
neoclassical economic paradigm, which Jevons is longing for, Marshall completed 
with his 'The Marshallian Cross'. 'The Marshallian Cross' or 'standard market madel 
diagram' explains that the price or the value of a commodity depends on production 
costs (supply) and willingness to pay (demand) (Sandmo, 2006). 
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Today neoclassical economics occupies the hegemonic position within natural 
resource economics and environmental management literature. Puzzle-solving within 
the field is mainly concerned with the pricing of natural and human capital. An 
enormous amount of researchers spend their time solving problems with regard to 
the price or uti lit Y of natural ecosystems, biodiversity, experience of well-being, etc., 
etc. DeFries and Pagiola (2005) point this out precisely: 
'Economic valuation attempts to answer these questions. It is based on the 
fact that human beings derive benefits (or "utility") from the use of ecosystem 
services either directly or indirectly, whether currently or in the future, and 
that they are willing to "trade" or exchange something for maintaining these 
services. As utility cannot be measured directly, economic valuation 
techniques are based on observation of market and nonmarket exchange 
processes' (Hassan, Scholes, & Ash, 2005, p. 54). 
Economic valuation can be defined as the attempt to assign quantitative values to 
the goods and services provided by ecosystems. The economic value of any good or 
service is generally measured in terms of what we are willing to pay for the 
commodity, less what it costs to supply it (Kumar & Kumar, 2008). This is what 
neoclassical or mainstream economists' commonly refer to as 'market value'. From 
this point of departure, i.e., that values are quantifiable, mainstream economists 
puzzles with problems concerning 'what' parts of natural ecosystems that 
matters/society are willing to pay for, and 'how' much market-value these parts are 
worth. (It seem plausible to characterize this point of departure, i.e., that all values 
are quantifiable, as candidate for a 'Iaw', 'definition' or a 'hard co re' which is seldom 
tested or disputed by members of the neoclassical paradigm; cf. section 2 in this 
chapter). 
'Total Economic Value' (TEV) also ca lied 'Environmental Costs' (EC) is a concept 
widely used by neoclassical economists. These frameworks typically disaggregate 
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utilitarian values of ecosystems into direct and indirect use values and non-use values 
(see e.g., Hassan, et aL, 2005; Perman, Ma, McGilvray, & Com mon, 2003). The first 
being 'direct use value' (DUV) and refers to values used directly or indirectly by 
humans. Direct use value includes consumptive values such as harvesting of food 
products, timber, fuel, medicines, recreation, enjoyment, water sports, spiritual and 
social utilities and 50 on. The second, 'indirect use values' (lUV), is derived from 
ecosystem services, such as natural water filtration functions of wetlands, the 
protection function of forests and mountains, carbon sequestration and 50 on. 'Non-
use values' (NUV) are typically 'option values' (OV) referring to the value of 
preserving environmental goods and services for use sometimes in the juture. And 
last, 'non-use values' can refer to the value people may gain from knowing that a 
resource exists, even if they never use that resource directly. This kind of value is 
usually referred to as 'existence values' or 'passive value'. 'Total economic value' or 
the 'environmental costs' typically involves adding the different utilitarian values into 
a total sum. For example as such (from Perman, et aL, 2003): 
TEV/EC = DUV + lUV + OP + NUV 
Neoclassical economists' possess a broad arsenal of methodological approaches for 
measuring utilitarian values of natural ecosystem services (Braden & Kolstad, 1991; 
Dixon, 1994; Field, 2001; A. M. Freeman, 1993; A. M. Freeman & Resources for the 
Future, 1979; Global Biodiversity Assessment, Heywood, & Watson, 1995; 
Hufschmidt, 1983; Johansson, 1994; Kumar & Kumar, 2008; Markandya, Pearce, & 
OECD, 1989; May & Motta, 1996; Mitchell, Carson, & Resources for the Future, 1989; 
Navrud, 1992; Norwood & Lusk 2011; Pearce & Centre for Social and Economic 
Research on the Global Development, 1993; Pearce & Moran, 1994; Perman, et aL, 
2003; Torres, Hanley, & Riera, 2011; Willis & Corkindale, 1995). 
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The valuation methods can, however, typically be divided into two groups of 
methods: 1) 'Stated Preference Methods' and 2) 'Revealed Preference Method'. 
'Stated preference' involves asking people directly to respond to hypothetical 
markets or situations concerning their willingness to pay or willingness to accept 
compensation. Stated preference methods are normally divided into 'Contingent 
Valuation' (CV) and 'Choice modeling' (Hassan, et aL, 2005). 'Revealed preference' 
involves deducing values indirectly from behavior in actual or hypotheticaljsurrogate 
markets. This group of methods includes for example: 'the travel costs method', 
maybe best known as the 'Hotelling rule', and it involves inferring environmental 
values from the costs travelers spend in order to experience the service; the 'cost of 
illness, human capital' method, involving tracing impacts that affect health (e.g., air 
or water pollution); the 'replacement costs' method, involving the identification of 
costs of replacing the lost good or service (Hassan, et aL, 2005; Perman, et aL, 2003). 
Common for these two groups of methods, we see, is the attempt to attach 
utilitarian preferences or instrumental (economic) values on nature and culture, or, 
in other words, to convertjjuxtapose environmental and cultural values into the 
'willingness to pay'. Consequently neoclassical economists can explain and 
communicate a) individual social behaviorjlifestyle, i.e., consumption of goods and 
services differing in accord to individual income budgets, and b) efficient resource 
utilization at system (segment, market, nation) level as the aggregation of different 
individual demands, through the language of mathematics. Consequently this 
dynamic of the market or of demand, supply and prices can be manipulated and 
controlled, i.e., desired behaviorjlifestyle can be forced by businesses and authorities 
through price regulation and other mechanisms affecting the budget of consumers 
and producers (e.g., rents, tax, expenditures, advertisement, etc.). The example 
below (fig. 5) illustrates how neoclassical economists interpret this behavior. A 
utility-maximizing consumer will choose Cl and C2 as to maximize U = U(C1, C2) 
(Perman, et al., 2003). 
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Conclusion 
Based on the discussion in the last section of chapter Ill, it is reasonable to conclude 
that neoclassical economics is to a significant degree compatible with the 
instrumental-received research paradigm outlined in this chapter. The reasons for 
this claim can be found in the assumption that all values are quantifiable, or 
utilitarianism governing the paradigm, which probably enjoys status as a part of the 
'hard core' of the paradigm. The second pillar of this paradigm is the view of 
mathematics as the true scientific method. Together these two pillars, or the 
combination of an objective-instrumental image of man and an analytical-
mathematical image of science, govern the neoclassical economic paradigm. The 
latter is especially evident from the clear analytical-reductionistic approach of the 
paradigm. This is evident from the fact that the various methods, described above, 
for settling marketjpreference value on nature, apply nomological-deductive 
explanations. The postulate 'all values are quantifiable' works as the 
rigidjnomological hypothesisjsentence. Thus the endeavor of neoclassical 
economists is to puzzle about the problem about how much people are willing to pay 
for natural and cultural goods and services. 
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CHAPTER IV: CONCEPTUALlZING THE ECOSOPHICAL-HERMENEUTIC 
RESEARCH PARADIGM 
llntroduction 
This chapter endeavor to illuminate the sub-research question to RQ 1 in light of an 
ecosophical and hermeneutic tradition: 
How are ontology, perception of science, scientific ideal, ethics and esthetics 
interpreted in light of an Ecosophical-Hermeneutic Research Paradigm? 
2 Ontology of nature 
First it should be said that Deep Ecology as a movement does not outline or 
prerequisite one specific worldview which all members must accept and hold as 
ultimate premises. Instead Deep Ecology "jumps" over this disputed area and lands 
on the so-called "Eight Point Deep Ecology Platform" (Næss, 1986). The platform was 
worked out by A. Næss, G. Session, B. Devall and A. Drengson during the late 70's 
and the early 80's (Næss, et aL, 2005, pp. 617-618) and can be considered to be the 
Deep Ecology Movement's manifest or program. As a longer name for the Eight 
Points Næss suggests the following formulation: 
'a set of fairly general and abstract statements that seem to be accepted by 
nearly all supporters of the deep ecology movement' (Næss, et aL, 2005, p. 
58). 
The eight points represent fundamental principles, from ethical norms to practical 
policies. Deep ecology is therefore better explained as a total view rather than a 
consistent philosophical (e.g., like Cartesian, Whiteheadian and Spinozian) or 
religious system (e.g., Buddhism, Christian) with many levels and ultimate premises. 
Instead supporters live in different cultures, have different religions or philosophies 
(see The Apron Diagram in Fig. 6). This enables environmentalists to mobilize their 
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views and concerns in a more efficient way. The platform emphasizes how we can 
establish harmonic interplay between natural ecosystems and cultural systems. By 
focusing on these common principles many of the traditional areas of dispute, for 
example between Christians and non-believers (Atheists) are undermined. Instead 
different people can agree and join forces for something practical. The rich manifold 
of fundamental views represents a value in itself says Næss. This is because deep 
ecology holds diversity both biologically and culturally as a strong value in itself and 
as a necessary prerequisite for sustainable, green societies. 
Questioning 
B = Buddhist 
C= Christian 
Logical 
Deviation 
B p 
p = Philosophical (e.g., Spinozist or Whiteheadian) 
c 
Levell: 
Ultimate premises 
and ecosophies 
Lcvcl2: 
The 8-point dccp ccology 
Platform or principles 
Lcvcl3: 
General normative 
consequences and 
"factual" hypotheses 
Level4: 
Particular rules of decision 
adapted to particular 
situation 
In the following, however, the study endeavors to outline some general criteria of 
the Deep Ecology worldviewjontology. We shall see that the discussion develops 
quite comprehensively when we come to regional or human ontology and the 
motivation of man, and that the discussion moves from traditional deep-ecology 
texts to include an account of critical philosophy originating from 18th century 
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German philosophy (e.g., Kant and Hegel) in order to deduce compatible regional 
ontology criteria. 
The starting point, however, involves the three first normative principles of the deep 
ecology platform. The platform is presented in many articles and books, but maybe 
the most comprehensive description of the Eight Points can be found in Næss (1986) 
The Deep fcology Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects, and supplemented in 
Næss (1993) The Deep fcology "fight Points" Revisited in G. Sessions (Sessions, 
1995). The first three sound as follows (Næss, et al., 2005, p. 37): 
1. 'The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have 
value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These values 
are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for (narrow) 
human purposes'. 
2. 'Richness and diversity of life-forms contribute to the realization of these 
values and are values in themselves'. 
3. 'Human beings have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to 
satisfy vital needs'. 
Point one indicates a clear demarcation between Deep and Shallow Ecology. In this 
point the principle of biospheric egalitarianism is presented. This implies that Deep 
Ecology does not provide ranking between species or living and non-living creatures 
in nature. In other words the deep ecology worldview assumes an ecocentric or li fe-
centric understanding of reality. This in turn implies that all life in nature is 
understood to be in possession of an equal amount of intrinsic value because 
"everything ha ngs together". The Deep Ecology worldview can therefore be seen as 
monistic, holistic and organic instead of dualistic, atomistic and mechanical. 
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Monism 23 claims that reality consists of the existence of one single substance 
(Lubcke, 1983, p. 95). In other words the "body-mind" and the "person-world" 
dualisms are invalidated and instead considered as one unit y; i.e. the Unit y of Life. 
This leads to the important notions that the deep ecology worldview is a totally 
holistic and organic view of life. This means that (1) eve ry part is connected to the 
whole and the parts cannot be understood without reference to the whole, and (2) 
the essence of life is that it develops for itself, as an organism with intrinsic value. 
This second point is expressed in the platform under point one, two and three. 
Defenders of monism are to be found going back to Ancient Greece (e.g., Thales, 
Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus), through the Middle Ages (e.g., Spinoza, 
Leibniz) and to modern times (e.g., Heidegger, Whitehead, Næss). 
Holism 24 is the study that "wholes" (e.g. systems; physical, biological, cultural, 
economical) are more than the mere sum of observable parts and that the 
23 From Greek: monas, "single" (Lubcke, 1983, p. 94). 
24 From Gr.: h%s; "whole", "entire", "complete in all its parts" (Liddell, Scott, Glare, & Thompson, 
1996, p. 1218). 
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constituent parts cannot properly be described without reference to their respective 
place and function within the whole (Lubcke, 1983, p. 191). A holistic perspective on 
reality implies that all living and non-living creatures in the whole biosphere are 
interrelated and therefore mutually depend on one another and the whole. In the 
end, this reasoning concludes that all life is inevitably one whole or one unit; i.e. a 
monistic view. When NASA successfully pictured the Earth from space, it had a vast 
impact on peoples' perception of Gaia. Here we could see our planet as one Whole, 
aillife connected and vigorously alive (see Fig. 8). 
L. Holbæk-Hanssen argues that the "parts" in reality are 
'Synthesized in the "whole". This "whole" represents more than the sum of 
the elements, the pattern of interrelations represent the essence' (Holbæk-
Hanssen, 2009, p. 16, translation from Norwegian). 
Both process-philosophers - such as A. Næss and A. N. Whitehead -, ecologists - such 
as Baskin and Costanza - and natural scientists such as J. Lovelock emphasize 
relations instead of atoms as the essenee of life. This means that natural objects such 
as human beings, animals, plants, mountains, etc. are not "things-in-environment" 
("Ding an sich, das") but knots in the web of life. On 'relation' A. Næss wrote that: 
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'The deep ecology movement rejects the "human-in-environment" image in 
favor of the relational, total-field image: organisms as knots in the biospherical 
net or field of intrinsic relations. An intrinsic relation between two things A 
and B is such that the relation belongs to the definitions or basic constitution 
of A and B, so that without the relation, A and B are no longer the same thing. 
The total-field model dissolves not only the human-in-environment concept, 
but every concept thing-in-milieu - except when we speak at a superficial 
preliminary leve!' (Næss, et al., 2005, p. 7). 
This metaphysical presupposition, that the "Ding an sich" view is overthrown in favor 
of the total relational, field-image, is nicely described by DesJardins: 
'In the spirit of Deep Ecology, we might begin by taking a hint from scientific 
ecology. If we think of ecosystems as energy circuits through which solar and 
chemical energy flow, we might begin to think of individual organisms as less 
permanent and less real than the chemical and biological processes 
themselves. Individual organisms come and go, but the process goes on as 
long as environmental conditions permit. An individual organism can be 
thought of as the location at which these chemical processes occur. ... Another 
way of approaching this conclusion is to consider what it means to say that an 
individual organism is alive. Minimally, an individual organism is alive only if 
certain chemical and biological processes are occurring. When these processes 
cease to occur, the organism ceases to live. Thus the processes are necessary 
for the existence of the organism. On the other hand, when the processes do 
occur, life exists. Thus the processes are sufficient for life. Because chemical 
and biological processes are both necessary and sufficient for the existence of 
life, we have some reasons for saying that the processes are at least as real as, 
if not more real than, individual living organisms' (Desjardins, 2006, pp. 210-
211). 
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Deep Ecology is thus a process philosophy rather than a substance philosophy 
because it postulates that reality is something alive where all parts are 
interconnected; i.e., the doctrine of interrelations. This corresponds closely with the 
hallmark of process philosophy: 
'what a thing is consists of what it does,2S. 
The guiding idea in process philosophy is that: 
'natural existence consists in and is best understood in terms of processes 
rather than things - of modes of change rather than fixed stabilities. For 
processists, change of eve ry sort - physical, organic, psychological - are the 
pervasive and predominant features of the real,26. 
The main metaphysical presupposition of process philosophy involves Time and 
Change. This implies that temporality, activity and change are the ultimate factors for 
our understanding of reality. Reality itself is a vast macro-process embracing a 
diversified manifold of micro-processes fostering novelty, innovation, and the 
emergence of new processes is an inherent feature of the cosmic scene; cf. e.g. the 
Gaia Theory. In other words, nature evolves towards more complex processes over 
time. Or according to A. Næss' Ecosophy T, towards 'max Self-realization'; i.e. 
'maximum diversity' which in turn prerequisites 'maximum symbiosis' and 'maximum 
complexity' in the biosphere (cf. fig. 7); if it is not victim of external subjection or 
exploitation (e.g., meteor, self destructing animals (humans?), polluting industries, 
etc.). 
The ontology characteristic for the ecosophical position of deep ecology can now be 
described using the following criteria: 
* Monism ("Everything hangs together"): nature and man, that is, life, is One 
Unit y; i.e. an eco-centric perspective on reality. 
25 Sta nford E ncycloped ia of p h i I osophy: DlIQ.;LæJl~c!ililD.!I~fQlW:ITIi~:Jl!:Cl!æ~:lJJ!IQ2.(~'iL 
26 Ibid. 
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* Holism: the reality of nature involves integrated wholes which cannot be 
reduced to the sum of each part; e.g., both primary, secondary and tertiary 
qualities are real qualities of reality. 
* Organism: The trait of the reality of nature is best understood as intrinsic 
relations instead of isolated atoms. 
* The reality of nature is a self-developing and meaning-carrying system. 
3 Ontology of man and his motivation 
Let it be said at once, the Deep Ecology worldview is mystical and spiritual. This is, of 
course, a burden for the human mind, because it inevitably implies that we can never 
fully understand Gaia nor the human nature (aspirations, desires, goals, etc.). At the 
same time, the fact that we live a life in a world which we can never fully understand 
represents enormous opportunities. This is because "opportunities" (possibilism) is in 
fact "all" we have. The very fact that we have received life is a total mystery for the 
human mind, and 50 it will probably remain for eternity. The evolution of the human 
organism is the most mysterious and fascinating proeess on this Earth. Here we have 
to do with an organism which is able to be aware of its own existence and choose, 
literary, the life it wants. (This is the topic to be diseussed more closely in this 
section). A. Næss emphasizes this in the beginning of his book Ecology, Community 
and Lifestyles (1989): 
'Humankind is the first speeies on earth with the intellectual capacity to limit 
its numbers consciously and live in an enduring, dynamic equilibrium with 
other forms of life. Human beings can perceive and care for the diversity of 
their surroundings' (Næss & Rothenberg, 2001, p. 23). 
According to Deep Ecology, the enormous potential of the human organism is its 
ability to be self-conscious and aware of its conditions. No other organism on this 
Earth has developed the ability to refleet more finely than the human organism. The 
ongoing discussion will look into the philosophical argumentation behind this 
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metaphysical standpoint. Readers may find this discussion vague and "unscientific" -
as discussions on ontology usually are. Despite this most readers will probably 
intuitively know that what is being said is trivial and obvious. The validity of 
ontological arguments is also not a matter of methodology. Therefore anyone who 
feels that the discussion is unscientific, because it does not follow the rigid rules of 
logic or whatever, has misunderstood the whole point of reflecting upon ontology, 
and thus also philosophy and has maybe also lost contact with a central part of what 
it means to be human. 
The ontology position perceiving humans as subjects equipped with a free-will and a 
self-reflective-critical reason, i.e., secondary qualities (felt heat, color, etc.), has its 
latest origins from existentialist/humanistic philosophy/psychology. The 
existential/humanistic perception of human nature, i.e., subjective ontology, 
represents a radically different (incommensurable) anthropological belief than 
objective ontology - humans as deterministic objects. Some of the most influential 
thinkers in the existential-humanistic tradition are Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Husseri, 
Heidegger, Jasper, Dilthey, Gadamer, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Marcel, Maslow and 
Rogers. This chapter is not an introduction to the classical existentialists. Instead the 
study is an attempt to outline the essence of humanistic/existentialist ontology 
through the readings of "histories of philosophy", "dictionaries" /"Iexicons of 
philosophy" and other contemporary existentialist philosophers (especially Taylor) 
and humanistic psychologists (especially Maslow). The aim of this section is to 
develop some concrete criteria which can be used for further analysis of the 
empirical material (EIA reports). 50 with this short introduction let us get into the 
business of subjectivism; i.e., the ontology tradition imaging humans as subjects 
instead of objects. 
Before getting started, however, there is a problematic condition which needs to be 
addressed. The concern is to what extent are subjectivistic philosophy and deep 
ecology compatible? There exists a notorious impreciseness here, because 
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subjectivism has 'subjects' as point of departure ('Cogito ergo sum') and draws a 
clear distinction between subjects (res cogitans) and nature (re extensal, i.e., a 
dualistic position, while Deep Ecology, on the other hand, takes a monistic point of 
departure, viewing mind and nature as ane unity. How these twa apparently 
divergent philosophies can be united is thus a serious theoretical and conceptual 
problem which the presented thesis does not attempt to salve. 
Hans Skjervheim, the Norwegian philosopher's pioneering study, Objectivism and the 
Study of Man (1959) discusses 'two divergent philosophical directions'; i.e., 
objectivism and subjectivism, stating that: 
'The key term for subjectivists is "intentionality", meinend Gerichtetsein 27 (the 
intention of being directed towards something) ... It belangs to the nature of a 
subject to be directed towords something, to be obout something (Skjervheim, 
1959/2000, p. 25, from Norwegian). 
The concept of 'intentionality' originates from Franz Brentano and his student 
Edmund Husserl. The former provided the following distinction between physical 
objects and psychical phenomena: 
' ... the distinctive feature of psychical phenomena, in contradistinction to 
physical, is an inherent hoving-of or a directedness-towords an object' (RusselI, 
2006, p. 79). 
Skjervheim argues that a basic trait of human nature is to exist as subjects in a world, 
that is, being creatures directed towards objects and subjects. The crux of what it 
means to be a human organism is thus our 'intentionality' - consciously 'directed' 
towards something. The content of intentionality is experience - the psychical 
phenomena. 
Intentionality is a characteristic quality for the human organism. It makes sense to 
elaborate on the concept of intentionality through Martin Buber's Ich und du 
27 German for "intentioned directedness". 
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philosophy (1923/1967). Here he explains that human beings have the capacity to 
meet the other (subjects, animals, plants, etc., etc.) in away which immerses the "I" 
and the "Thou". Buber does in fact state that if we do not meet 'the other' in an 1-
Thou way we do not live or experience reality as a human being ought to/have the 
potentialjcapacity to experience it: 
'He who takes his stand in relation shares in areality, that is, in a being that 
neither merely belongs to him nor merely lies outside him. All reality is an 
activity in which I share without being able to appropriate for myself. Where 
there is no sharing, there is no reality. Where there is self-appropriation, there 
is no reality. The more direct the contact with the Thou, the fuller is the 
sharing' (Buber & Smith, 1986, p. 67). 
The gist of Buber's Ich und du philosophy is that an 'I' only really becomes a whole 
human being when he meets (Begegnung) the other as a 'Thou, that is, as a closeness 
(Gegenwart) which cannot be reduced into a collection of properties/elements 
(Buber & Simonsen, 2003, p. IX). 
Buber's concept of a close meeting and the existential presupposition of 'man-in-the-
world', represent keys for understanding the spirit or Einfijhlung of Deep Ecology. 
'The spirit, the human reality, is not within the '1', but between the 'I' and 
'Thou'. First in this 'between' is the human way of being constituted' (Lubcke, 
1983, p. 63). 
A. Næss emphasizes this and warns us of the dangers of designing cultural patterns 
depriving ourselves of this closeness: 
'As far as I can understand we have, or we are about to eliminate vast sources 
of meaningfulness in technocratic societies. We do not understand any more 
what it means for our well-being that things are always telling us something, 
that we are on the same channel as them, and answering them' (Næss, 1999, 
p. 361, from Norwegian, emphasis added). 
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Taylor shares by far the alarming message stressed by Næss: 
' ... the relation to the earth as raw material is therefore experienced as empty 
and alienating, but the recovery of a valid relation to the earth is the hardest 
thing once lost; and there is no relation to the absolute where we are caught 
in the web of meanings which have gone dead for us .... and what must arise is 
an identity crisis of frightening proportions' (Taylor, 1985b, p. 50, emphasis 
added). 
C. Taylors' description of 'intentionality', though the essenee and the implications of 
displaeing intentionality is the same as Buber's interpretation, is somewhat less 
metaphorical and mystical: 
'Dur refleetions on the condition of intentionality show that these include our 
being "first and mostly" agents in the world. But this also ruins the conception 
of the agent as one whose ideal could be total disengagement. This turns out 
to be an impossibility, one that it would be destructive to attempt' (Taylor, 
1997, p. 12, emphasis added). 
It is therefore more correct to understand the "human-animal" as a subject or agent 
with value priorities, interests, aspirations, feelings, etc., i.e., directedness 
(intentionality) instead as deterministic object, because: things always mean 
something for someone. Gilje and Grimen underline this point when they state: 
'A characteristic feature of human beings, in contrast to (other) animals, is 
that they assign to their own action and other phenomena meaning' (Gilje & 
Grimen, 1993, p. 145, from Norwegian, emphasis added). 
A central metaphysical belief in existentialism is thus that "things" or objects are 
never simply "things-in-themselves", Dinge an sich, because a precondition for the 
veryexistenee of these "things", as they occur to the human organism, is the 
existence of a subject which is able to be aware and experience the "things". Thus 
things are not things in themselves; they always means something for someone, that 
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is, humans are inevitably moved by the world around them. This is, says Heidegger, 
the foundation for our ability to feet (Heidegger, 2007). 
Typically human is thus to experience reality. This implies that we ascribe reality 
subjective (secondary) and phenomenological (tertiary) qualities (see e.g., Næss & 
Rothenberg, 2001) (cf. the tradition of 17th century philosophers' willingness to 
distinguish between primary and secondary qualities). Subjective sensory qualities 
(color, smell, felt heat, etc.) are characterized by them being dependent on who is 
experiencing them. In other words, the one and same natural object, or milieu, 
reveals itself differently or manifests itself different!y depending on who experiences 
them. Phenomenological qualities refer to spontaneous experience of something and 
the spontaneous act itself. Tertiary qualities are for example "noble", "base", 
"beautiful", "joyful", "majestic", "fantastic", "good", "bad", "horrible", etc., etc. 
Subjective and tertiary qualities are thus important because they bring !ife into 
"things". 
The claim that the objective, "Oinge an sich" description of reality is inadequate and 
that subjective-phenomenological description is more adequate, can be illustrated by 
imagining the opposite. This would imply that we reduce from our description of 
reality (social or natural) all sense qualities and spontaneous experiences (as was 
discussed in the previous chapter). What we are left with then is simply physical 
atoms/substances or: 
'merely severai common reference points suitable for mathematical 
description' (Næss & Rothenberg, 2001, p. 48). 
Næss states that pure objective descriptions are characterized by that them being 
completely independent with regard to who perceives them: 
iSO the things in themselves cannot have color, nor shape' (Næss & 
Rothenberg, 2001, p. 48). 
Corollary to this, Whitehead argues, 'nature is a dull affair' (Whitehead, 1967, p. 54). 
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Næss and Whitehead here refer to the reality of nature. The consequence of 
reducing our social realm into a purely objective description must be expected as 
even more fatal. This would literarily mean the elimination of a subject's senses, 
norms and values, feelings, personal history, and thoughtsjhopes for the future, just 
to mention a few important aspects. 
The perception that reality is a symbiosis of objective, subjective and 
phenomenological description provides the crux of Næss's concept of gestalt 
ontology (see e.g., Næss & Rothenberg, 2001). Næss argues in relation to this that 
"joyfulness" is not just "projections" of joy being felt by an observer, but instead a 
spontaneous experience (real experience) of something real: 
'Joyfulness is on a par with tallness and specific weight, when we only talk 
about pure realness' (Næss, et al., 200S, p. lxxviii). 
Subjectivejexistential-phenomenological ontology holds true that such subjective 
and phenomenological experiences of the world are as real as pure length, weight 
and tallness. This is 50 because a human being is a being amongst other beings. This 
means that man is always interrelated with the world through his intentionality. In 
fact, the crux of existential ontology is that man is never "a self-enclosed ego" as the 
objectivist claims, but always a "man-in-the-world". This is central in Heidegger's 
atheistic existential philosophy: 
'Man is a being who is set towards the realization of his possibilities, not as an 
isolated ego, but as a being who is necessarily interrelated with the world of 
things and the world of persons .... Two main paths lie open to him. He can 
acquiesce in his membership of "the one" to the extent of becoming absorbed 
or immersed in the crowd-consciousness, thus gaining assurance at the 
expense of personal responsibility and resolute self-direction. This is 
"unauthentic" existence. Or he can, within limits at least, assume personal 
72 
responsibility for his destiny, freely choosing his own possibilities, above all his 
destiny to death. This is "authentic" existence' (Copleston, 2003, p. 180). 
The "man-in-the-world" doctrine simply means that human beings are not 
mechanistic things which objective ontology claims, but rather agents in constant 
change, that is, subjects with interests, needs, values etc. which are constantly being 
reflected, criticized and thought through (evaluated). In other words, the human 
agent is able to reflect and evaluate his/her own desires, behavior, and values, that 
is, his/her own Existenz. This leads to the important trait of existential ontology that 
man is in possession of free will meaning that human nature is ultimately 
indeterministic. More about this follows below. 
This implies that, what distinguishes us from other biologicallife, is the human ability 
to choose a responsible life; that is, we can "choose-to-choose", hence Sartre's' 
statement: "I am my choices". In light of this reasoning, that a human is essentially 
an organism along the same lines as other organisms, bearing in mind the fact that 
we are free to choose how to live and develop, human freedom reveals itself as an 
enormous possibility. Human freedom enables us both as individual persons and as a 
human speeies to build our own road and choose our own path in the biosphere. 
This is in accordance with Sartre's notions: "Existence precedes essence" which 
means that human nature is not bound to some specific essenee taking choices for 
him/her or determining (delimiting) him/her in some way, but rather that man is free 
to choose his own path (inauthentic or authentic) as an: 
'existential, free-subject which exceeds (transcends) his own objectiveness' 
(Lubcke, 1983, p. 144, from Danish). 
C. Taylor has elaborated more on the human agent's capacity for evaluation and 
freedom in his: "What is human agency?" (198Sa) and "What is wrong with Negative 
Liberty?" (198Sb). He begins his analysis by referring to H. Frankfurt when he 
describes the difference between animals and human desires: 
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'But what is distinctly human is the power to evaluate our desires, to regard 
some as desirable and others as undesirable. This is why "no animal other 
than man ... appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation .. .' 
(Taylor, 1985a, pp. 15-16). 
Taylor draws another place, in the paper What's wrong with negative liberty, a 
demarcation line between what we can call "desirable desires", so-called 'first-order 
desires and "desire-worthy desires", so-called 'second-order desires' (Taylor, 1985b, 
p.220). He comes up with the following definition of the two types of desires: 
'When we refleet on this kind of significance, we come up against what I have 
called elsewhere the fact of strong evaluation, the fact that we human 
subjects are not only subjects of first-order desires, but of second-order 
desires, desires about desires. We experience our desires and purposes as 
qualitatively discriminated, as higher or lower, noble or base, integrated or 
fragmented, significant or trivial, good and bad' (Taylor, 1985b, p. 220). 
The definition here is in accordance with the existential image of man as an agent in 
possession of self-reflective, critical reason which constitutes him as a "Being" (das 
Sein) of "beings" (die Seien den) to use Heidegger's words. 
'Weak evaluations' diseussed previously in Chapter III are concerned with outcomes 
of our desires, whilst strong evaluation is concerned with the quality of our 
motivation, that is, 'the qualitative worth of different desires' (Taylor, 1985a, p. 16). 
Strong evaluation is therefore constituted by a "desire" component plus a real 
"evaluation" component. This ability to evaluate values as either authentie or 
inauthentic is the key to experience 'positive freedom' or 'to fulfill the desires of your 
own true self' (Taylor, 1985b, p. 216). 'Positive freedom' focuses on who or what 
exercises control, and is thus an inner capacity enabling subjects to conduct life, that 
is, to conduct ourselves through our own choices and decision. Positive freedom can 
thus be perceived as a "goal in life' which human beings have the potential capacity 
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of reaching through 'exereise' (Taylor) or the 'Project' (Sartre). This means that a 
human is understood as an organism or a proeess which develops and evolves, 
beginning with birth and ending with death; i.e. the concrete life. The central 
question here is then how a person develops? How a person develops her/his 
abilities to be aware and conscious about herself/himself, others and everything else 
in nature. Taylor describes this capacity as such: 
' .. .for the capacities relevant to freedom must involve some self-awareness, 
self-understanding, moral discrimination and self-control, otherwise their 
exercise could not amount to freedom in the sense of self-direction; and this 
being so, we can fail to be free because these internal conditions are not 
realized' (Taylor, 1985b, p. 215). 
Subjective ontolog/8 as described here can be summarized as follows: 1) Human 
beings are subjects, i.e., beings with intentionality, i.e., an organism which interprets 
and makes sense of his/her world and experiences his world. 2) Consequently, 
human beings are open to/aware of the world and themselves, and thus able to 
choose for themselves, i.e., as beings with afree will, i.e., an indeterministic nature. 
A human beings' existence, life-world or lebenswelt, in light of this ontology, is thus a 
highly active (refleeting, feeling, sensing, experiencing, etc.) proeess. 
The discussion has so far outlined subjective ontology of man as a subject/agent with 
intentionality, inner values/needs, i.e., an embodied-ego, whose persona lit y and 
identity (Existenz) is created through his own personal choices. The further literature 
review of the human nature will put emphasis on the value/need-dimension of 
human nature. This is important to shed light on because human behavior and 
products are always meant to satisfy some certain needs/values, or in other words, 
there are always some meaning/intentions behind behaviour. For this purpose the 
28 Occasionally the terms 'subjective', existential' and 'holistic' ontology are used interchangeably 
depending on context: in general 'subjective' is applied because it represents the classical term; 
when discussing classical existentialist philosophy, however, 'existential' is more suited; 'holistic' 
(the 'whole' human) when discussing more recent psychology such as personality theories. 
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study applies Maslow's conceptual framework of persona lit y and motivation from 
humanistie psychology because these schools share by far subjective ontology, and in 
fact, originate from subjectivism/existential philosophy (see e.g., Jørgensen & 
Nafstad, 2005; Lauridsen, 1977; Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1995). A central topic which 
will be devoted special attention is what it means to choose a responsible life in light 
of Deep Ecology. 
The image of man which has been described here must be characterized as 
humanistic because it is concerned with the intrinsic nature of human beings, that is, 
what distinguishes the human organism from other organisms. 'Humanistic' or 
'existential psychology' ('The third force') is a direction within psychology which 
takes subjective ontology as its point of departure. This is emphasized by P. 
Lauridsen in his description of humanistic psychology: 
'In general these psychologists are referred to as "humanistic" because they 
dissociated themselves from the purely naturalistic empirical perception, for 
which a human being is first and foremost a biological and social determinate 
product ... A person is, according to these psychologists, qualitatively and 
categorically different from other phenomena in this world (both living 
creatures and dead things) by being a psychosomatic unit y and whole, which 
is aware of his own existence and self and relates hereto and chooses' 
(Lauridsen, 1977, pp. 21-22, from Danish). 
Lauridsen's interpretation of the humanistic image of man as qualitative and 
'categorical different' is in accordance with K. Raaheims' 'Basic-thesis' which, 
according to him, is the fundamental point of departure for existential psychology: 
'a) Every individual is unique in its inner life, in their own way to experience 
the world, as well as in their reactions. b) Individuals cannot be understood 
as a "gathering place" for functions and elements, and can thus not be fully 
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explained in a physical, chemical or neuro-physiological conceptual 
framework' (Raaheim & Helstrup, 1975, p. 67, from Norwegian). 
Based on this short argumentation it should be fair to claim that the humanistic-
existential school of psychology is compatible with subjective ontology. 
Consequently the study draws knowledge from this paradigm about general human 
needs and values as we now shall elaborate on. 
The first organized study program in humanistic psychology was developed in Berlin 
by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) in 1882. Dilthey developed a "Science of man" or 
study program in "humanities" (geisteswissenschaftlich) (see e.g., Dilthey & 
Betanzos, 1988). The study program contained a graduate degree in "Verstehende 
Psychologie" (Understanding Psychology) the main concern of which was the 
interpretation of subjects instead of the 'explanation of objects'. Dilthey formulated 
his demarcation as such: "Die Natur erklaren wir, das Seelenleben verstehen wir", 
which can be translated: "Nature we explain, the human soul we understand" (see 
Lauridsen, 1977, p. 21). 
The gist of humanistic-existential psychology is first and foremost the image of man 
as a subject which has been discussed in this chapter, and as illustrated by the 
quotations from Lauridsen and Raanheim. The second characteristic trait which is a 
consequence of the first, that is, the holistic point of departure, is that humanistic 
psychology endeavors to understand the whole human nature, that is, the whole 
personality. A person is thus understood as one whole unit y, as a gestalt which is 
different and more than the mere sum of each parts. The third characteristic is that, 
consequently, a personality cannot be studied through reductionistic-analytical 
methods, because then the picture of the whole personality is lost. More about the 
methodological implication of subjective ontology will be presented in the next 
section of this chapter. Here and now the literature review will focus on the second 
point. 
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A.H. Maslow (1908-1970) was probably the most central figure within The Third 
Force. The reasons for this is that he was, of course, one of the founders, together 
with Charlotte BLihler, of the "Association for Humanistic Psychology" and the 
"Journal of Humanistic Psychology". 
Humanistic psychology or "The Third Force" was a reaction to and an alternative to 
the other two mainstream psychology school, Behaviorism and Psychoanalysis, 
which dominated American universities before the 50's. After Maslow's death the 
humanistic tradition has taken the character of an ideological-religious movement 
instead of a scientific discipline. This is probably because Maslow signalized in the 
preface to the second edition of his Toward a Psych%gy of Being (1968), that "The 
Third Force" could be understood as a transition phase to an even higher IFourth 
psychology': 
II should say also that I consider Humanistic, Third Force Psychology to be 
transitional, a preparation for a still "higher" Fourth Psychology, 
transpersonal, transhuman, centered in the cosmos rather than in human 
needs and interest, going beyond humanness, identity, self-actualization, and 
the like' (Maslow, 1968, pp. iii-iv). 
Humanistic science is of ten criticized for being pseudoscience because the rigid 
criteria of objective science, as we discussed in the previous chapter, are often 
abolished in favor of generating knowledge centered on understanding and helping 
existential subjects, that is, not purely descriptive science, but science which suggests 
action and implies consequences (more about the epistemological and 
methodological consequences of subjective ontology in the next sections of this 
chapter). The theory which this study uses, partly however, for the analysis of human 
needs and values is Maslows' main work: Motivation and Persona/it y (1954). Central 
here is the INeed Hierarchy'. Motivation and Persona/it y is Maslow's magnum opus 
and it gave him an international reputation and status as "one of the greats". 
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Lauridsen concludes therefore that the scientific quality of Motivation and 
Personality 'can hardly be doubted' (Lauridsen, 1977, p. 408, from Danish). 
The 'need hierarchy' consist of 5 qualitative different groups of need: physiological, 
safety, love and belongingness, esteem and seJf-actualization (Maslow, 1970)29. 
Maslow originally structured his motivation theory as a hierarchical 
structurejpyramid. In the preface to his later work, Toward a psychology of being, 
however, he "philosophizes" on the human capacity to transcend own needs and 
interests (cf. quotation above). This conclusion seems more reasonable or plausible 
in the light of subjective ontology whose main message is free will and thus the 
human ability to choose-to-choose (cf. earlier discussion in this chapter). An 
existential or need profile rather than a hierarchy thus seems more adequate to 
explain human motivation and persona lit y, that is, a dynamic personality theory 
which is constantly being reflected upon, revised and adjusted as the person 
matures and grows (as a hermeneutic circle - hence 'hermeneutic ontology'. This 
weakness is discussed by Ingebrigtsen and Pettersson: 
'The choice for the existentialist (Kierkegaard, Camus, Sartre) is not related 
and evaluated ad hoc according to the specific needs (physiological-, safety-, 
esteem- and need for self-actualization), but is the choice of an actual 
existence. The choice of an actual existence is due to the existentialists' 
perception, that existence precedes essence .... When actual existence is the 
continuous choice an individual conducts in relation to a total perception of 
himself, the needs must be understood as partially equal instead of 
hierarchical' (Ingebrigtsen & Pettersson, 1979, p. 76, from Danish, emphasis 
added). 
On the basis of this argumentation Ingebrigtsen and Pettersson converts Maslow's 
motivation hierarchy into a motivation or need-profile (see fig. 9). 
29 See Chapter 4: "A theory of human motivation". 
79 
As emphasized by (Næss, et al., 2005) in the Deep Ecology Platform (see point 3 
above), it is important to demarcate strictly between 'vital-needs' and 'preferences'. 
This point is typically recapitulated by members of the deep ecology movement with 
slogans such as: "Simple in means, rich in ends" (see e.g., Devall, 1990). 
Characteristic for "deep ecology -personalities/lifestyles" is that a person realizes his 
inner capacity/freedom through choosing a responsible, rich qualitative/immaterial 
life exposing other living and non-living creatures to as little damage as possible, 
neither treating other human beings nor natural objects merelyas means - except for 
the satisfaction of vital needs. A central part of the 'exercise' /'project' of maturing 
one's personality in this direction is what Næss describes as identification with all 
that lives: 
'The ecosophical outlook is developed through an identification 50 deep that 
one's own self is no longer adequately delimited by the personal ego or the 
organism. One experiences oneself to be a genuine part of all life. Each living 
being is understood as a goal in itself, in principle on an equal footing with 
one's own ego' (Næss & Rothenberg, 2001, p. 174). 
Levelof 
Aspiration 
Salet y-
Physiological- needs 
needs 
Belongingness-
and love needs 
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Esteem needs 
Seil· 
actualization 
The transcendence of self here discussed by Næss and Rothenberg bears astriking 
resemblance to what Maslow signalized the "higher" Fourth Psychology (cf. 
quotation above). Maslow in fact discusses the concept of "The Enlarged Self" in his 
book not published until after his death: Farther reaches of the human nature (1971). 
Here he argues that the distinction between self and not self has been broken down 
(or transcended) in self-actualized persons: 
'There is now less differentiation between the world and the person because 
he has incorporated into himself part of the world and defines himself 
thereby' (Maslow, 1971, p. 312). 
It is important to mention that the responsibility towards all life which Næss and 
Maslow emphasize here, is not of the kind where the person manipulates himself to 
do what is right simply because it is the right thing to do: similar to Kohlberg's lowest 
moral stages where the "child" acts properly in fear of being punished; moral is thus 
not an intrinsic value but obedience and punishment oriented (see Duska & Whelan, 
1975, pp. 45-46). The care -"Sorge" is the fundamental structure of man for 
Heidegger - for life in the mature person is intuitive (Næss & Rothenberg, 2001). 
Næss provided us with the following description of "intuitive care": 
'Care flows naturally if the "self" is widened and deepened so that protection 
of free Nature is felt and conceived as protection of ourselves .... Just as we 
need no morals to make us breathe ... [sol if your "self" in the wide sense 
embraces another being, you need no moral exhortation to show care .... You 
care for yourself without feeling any moral pressure to do it .... If reality is 
like it is experienced by the ecological self, our behavior naturally and 
beautifully follows norms of strict environmental ethics' (Capra, 1996, p. 12). 
Deep ecology lifestyles are thus compatible with non-anthropocentricjecocentric 
(earth centered) ethical theories, i.e., a biospheric moral standing. Albert Schweitzer 
wrote that biospheric ethics had contributed to a 'reverence for life'. (Desjardins, 
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2006, p. 131). Biospheric moral standing means that everything on this Earth has a 
value in itself and therefore also has an objective interest or a 'prima facie' to use the 
words of Christopher Stone (Ariansen, 1992, p. 181) (see fig. 10). 
Sources of 
value 
That something has value for its own sake means, in other words, that it has a value 
in itself which is independent from the instrumental values human beings ascribe to 
it. The opposite of intrinsic value is instrumental or economic value: 
' ... when we treat an object that has a value in itself and of its own as though it 
has value only in relation to us' (Desjardins, 2006, p. 129). 
Aldo Leopold was one of the first to articulate an ecocentric ethic. In his A Sand 
County A/manac, and sketches here and there ([1949], 1989) he writes about the 
fabulous manifold and how nature evolves in a manner which is ethically beautiful. In 
his Almanac he presents the cIassic concept of a 'land ethic' where he states that: 
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'A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of 
the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise' (Leopold, 1989, pp. 
224-225). 
Ecocentric ethics and the "reverence of life" involve, Næss argue, that Immanuel 
Kant's categorical imperative: "You shall never use a human being merelyas mean" 
must be expanded into: 
'You shall never use aliving being mere ly as mean' (Næss, 1999, p. 335, 
emphasis added). 
The good life then, according to subjective ontology and ecocentric ethics, is to live a 
deep moral-responsible life, where ailliving and non-living creatures are perceived 
and experienced (through our inner intentionality; i.e., feelings, reason, thoughts, 
etc.) as high intrinsic values (see fig. 11). Human beings relate to their world in an '1-
Thou' way, that is, perceiving "the other" as "subjects" (both humans and nature) 
not objects devoid of value and meaning, but as intrinsically valuable, fascinating and 
part of oneself. 
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The Universe 
Planet Earth 
Ecosystems 
Landsea es 
Living creatures 
Plants 
Animals 
Humans 
The Race 
The Nation 
Finally the ontology of man (subjective ontology) within the Ecosophical-
Hermeneutic Research Paradigm (EHRP) can be outlined using the following criteria: 
* Primary, secondary and tertiary qualities are real qualities of the human 
nature. 
* Intentionality; i.e., human-in-the-world; Le., "Ich und du" relationship. 
* Humans as Creators of MeaningjValues 
* Value pluralism 
* Indeterministic; subjects have a high degree of free-will 
The human being as a deep moral human being is of course not a description of the 
average man (Das Man) in the street. The deep moral person is a potential Being, 
that is, the "best" (authentie) image of man from an existential-, ecosophical 
perspective. It is thus difficult, perhaps even impossible, to state what a human 
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being is, because "the problem" is that we are not a thing or a static state. Human 
beings are better understood as personal 'worlds' or 'beings' in a world or being. The 
feature of the human nature which thus reveals itself is that we are fundamentally 
freedom. We can define ourselves either as moral, immoral beings or alive or dead. 
The alternative to an authentic image of man is, however, an inauthentic perception. 
Being aware of the dangers that follow the latter alternative, a responsible 
researcher ought to construct his/her theories on the authentic image of man, that 
is, he/she must choose a moral theory of the human nature, because, as Isaac 
Bashevish humorously and paradoxically formulated in his Noble prize lecture 
(1978): 
'We must believe in free-will - we have no choice!' (Bu ber & Simonsen, 2003, 
p. xxxv). 
The rest of this chapter will endeavor to outline a perception of science compatible 
with subjective ontology. Or in other words, to make the Ecosophical-Hermeneutic 
research paradigm complete. The gist of this discussion is that what a researcher 
looks at, that is, how she/he "sees" the world, that is, her/his worldview, will have 
implications for how she/he looks at it, that is, how she/he conducts research. This in 
turn will impact how she/he interprets data (cf. ch. Il). 
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4 Perception of science 
'To man the world is twafold, in accordance with his twafold attitude. The 
attitude of man is twa fold, in accordance with the twafold nature of the 
primary words which he speaks . The primary words are not isoloted words, but 
combined words. The ane primory word is the combinotion 1-Thou. The other 
primary word is the combinotion l-It; wherein, without a change in the primory 
word, ane of the words He and She can repIoce It. Hence the I of man is 0150 
twafold. For the I of the primary word 1-Thou is a different I from thot of the 
primary word l-It' (Martin Buber (1878-1965), "Ich und Du"). 
As illustrated previously in the literature review, and as M. Buber is emphasizing in 
the quotation above, theories of knowledge (epistemology) stand in an intimate 
relationship with theories of human nature (ontology). This means that a theory of 
knowledge always hold an a priori interpretation of what it is studying (for example 
humans as either objects or subjects as we have explored in the last two chapters). 
This is probably the reason why philosophy of science or knowledge is so 
undermined in the day-to-day research of social scientists because problem 
identification of this kind, that is, what human nature is, is regarded as either too 
speculative, controversial or simply uninteresting; the reason for the latter is 
probably because science is regarded as a descriptive activity. C. Taylor has reflected 
upon the matter: 
'We don't need to unpack these ideas any further to see that the 
epistemological tradition is connected with some of the most important moral 
and spiritual ideas of our civilization - and also with some of the most 
controversial and questionable. To challenge them is sooner or later to run up 
86 
against the force of this tradition, which stands with them in a complex 
relation of mutual support' (Taylor, 1997, p. 8). 
This section endeavors to outline some central epistemological consequences of 
subjective ontology and thus "challenge" some moral and spiritual ideas. The 
consequences for a theory of knowledge which ultimately regards human nature as 
an existential-hermeneutical being, that is, an anthropological belief that the "source 
of vigor" lies within the subject, must necessary be a theory or philosophy of 
knowledge that is best able to understand the mental horizon of the subject 
concerned (in accord with Dilthey's and Lauridsen's view - see previous subchapter). 
C. Taylor stresses that subjective ontology, especially the point of intentionality ("Ich 
und du"- relation), he uses, however, the terms 'experience' (from Kant) and clearing 
(Lichtung; from Heidegger), has not been accounted for in mainstream (Iogical 
positivism) theories of science. Taylor states: 
'They all start from the intuition that this central phenomenon of experience, 
or the clearing, is not made intelligible on the epistemological construal, in 
either its empiricist or rationalist variants' (Taylor, 1997, p. 9). 
Further Taylor exa mine the problem of building a theory of knowledge lacking the 
important metaphysical presupposition that man is always a being-in-the-world: 
'Plainly we couldn't have experience of the world at all if we had to start with 
a swirl of uninterpreted data. Indeed, there would be no "data", because even 
this minimal description depends on our distinguishing what is given by some 
objective sources from what we merely supply ourselves' (Taylor, 1997, p. 11). 
The alternative to the mainstream, received theory of knowledge, which Taylor here 
so strongly yearns for, is a philosophy of knowledge which is metaphysically active, 
that is, a theory which takes the human quality of intentionality (or experience or 
clearing), i.e., subjective ontology, seriously, and makes science ultimately an 
endeavor directed at understanding and interpreting subjects. Or to put it in another 
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way, a Science of Man which perceives human beings as subjects, agents or self-
defining animals instead of objects, i.e., a science endeavoring to make dear, make 
sense of language, text or text-analogue. The alternative philosophy of 
sciencejknowledge specialized for the interpretation and understanding of subjects 
or text and text-analogue (behavior, products), that is, The Science of Man, is 
Hermeneutics (see e.g. Taylor, 1985b). 
The hermeneutical-phenomenological tradition is often said to origin from German 
philosophy. Central names are here: G.W.F. Hegel, Dilthey, Edmund Husseri, Karl 
Jasper, Martin Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas and the French philosopher Ricoeur. 
The cIassic difference between positivistic (natural) science and hermeneutical 
(social) science, originating from Giambattista Vi co, is that the former studies the 
part of reality which is not a product of man, that is, nature (res exstensa), while the 
latter is occupied with the part of reality created by man, that is, history and culture 
(res cogitans). J. G. Droysen elaborated on Vico much later and argued that natural 
science is about explaining the external world and that the science of man is about 
understanding the internal world of subjects; similar to Dilthey as we have seen 
(Krogh, 1996). 
Skjervheim illustrated the difference between objectivism and subjectivism by 
arguing that the former implied that the researcher played the role of spectator and 
the latter a participant (in Skjervheim, 2002). The spectator role is the traditional, 
mainstream-positivistic, subject-object relationship which discussed in Chapter Ill. 
The latter, participant, closeness to the study "object" is the hermeneutical subject-
subject relationship which will be discussed here. In this relationship, says 
Skjervheim, 'the other' or the study "object" is not a 'factum' or 'a pure physical 
object' (Skjervheim, 2002, p. 21) which exists exterior and independently for the 
researcher, thus enabling him to study the "thing" as an audience watches a football 
match from the stands, but as a subject with values, meanings, opinions, problems, 
hopes, feelings, in other words Existenz or a subject. 
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The distinction between these two fundamental different ways, moods or attitudes 
can also be described as 'dualistic' and 'monistic' respectively. 'Dualistic' because the 
knower is not a part of the known. 'Monistic' because the knower is a part of the 
known. The monistic position is anchored in subjective (hermeneutic) ontology 
postulating that when a researcher, that is, a being, meets the other being, two 
worlds or beings-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein) (Heidegger) or mental horizons 
(Ga damer) meet. In this meeting the individual mental horizon represent the 
marginal being of a being, that is, the pre-understanding (Gadamer) or the meanings-
relations (Heidegger) synonymous with the world or lifeworld (Husseri) of the 
subject, that is, the meanings, values, feelings constituting his personal world (see 
e.g., Lubcke, 1982). Therefore, in order for the researcher to know anything about his 
study "object", he/she must get access to the others' mental horizon. This 
necessarily means that he/she has to, in varying degrees of course, be able to enter 
the others' world and see it from within. Parallei to this the researcher also expands 
his own horizon, that is, his pre-understanding is supplemented with 'new 
understanding', and thus his/her world. In other words, in order for the researcher to 
understand his object of study, he must understand himself. Gadamer has beautifully 
described this concept of two horizons approaching each other, as a melting of 
horizons (Horizontverschmelzung), and it means that two, apparently, autonomous 
horizons merge together. 
An example illustrating that adequate knowledge about the other necessary 
prerequisite that researchers are able to, in varying degrees, enter into the lifeworld 
of the other and to experience (conceptually, emotionally) his world on the basis of 
his horizon, are the lessons to be taken from Synanon. The principle here is that 
onlya (cured) drug addict or alcoholic can fully understand, communicate with, help, 
and cure another drug addict or alcoholic (example from Maslow, 1966). This is 
maybe an extreme case, but principle similar ca ses can be found everywhere. For 
example, within the academia, it is a well-known fact that it is difficult to 
communicate with academics from other departments, schools and paradigms. It is 
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also a well-known fact that the application of business management principles (e.g., 
cost-benefit analysis) in questions concerning the development of social care services 
and natural ecosystems has brutal consequences for the people and creatures 
involved. This point is of ten emphasized in media debates by professionals and 
laymen representing the cultural and natural sides of society. Their general messages 
are that the language and the concepts economists use are faraway irrelevant and 
"non-humanitarian". Communication is perceived as impossible. 
The intimate relationship (emphasized in the examples above) between researcher 
and study-object which is a necessary precondition for the generation of subjective 
and phenomenological knowledge, is beautifully examined by M. Buber. Buber's 
concept of primary word 'I-Thou' and Il-It' means that the world appears for the 
human organism in two radical different ways. One can stand upon, e.g., another 
person as a Thou, as a closeness, or one can stand upon the other as an It, an object 
(Buber & Simonsen, 2003, p. VII). As we have seen, the general metaphysical trait of 
subjective ontology is monism. This implies that the objective distinction between 
researcher and what he/she studies, that is, the subject-object or Il-It' relationship is, 
in principle, abolished in favor of the subject-subject or 'I-Thou' relationship. In a 
monistic perspective relations are the primary traits of the reality. The 'I-Thou' way 
of relating to the world implies that a person stands in an intrinsic relationship to a 
'Thou' (in a Deep Ecology sense, lperson' must here be interpreted into meaning all 
living and non-living creatures, e.g., animals, plants, insects, mountains etc.) and that 
this relationship constitutes what it does mean to be a human. In other words: 
'an T first becomes an T in its relationship to a 'Thou'. It is not an T in itself' 
(Lubcke, 1983, p. 63). 
Martin Buber (1878-1965) is most famous for revitalizing the dialogical principle. The 
'I-Thou' relationship it characterized by openness, reciprocity, and a deep sense of 
personal involvement. The dialogue between the Il' and the 'Thou' is not thus simply 
a phonetic dialogue, but more a spiritual meeting or an emotional experience where 
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the T is constituted by his attitude towards the 'Thou'. Hermeneutical research has 
therefore inevitably a dialogical character; that is, the relation between researcher 
and the study object (subject, language, text, or text-analogue) is highly intimate and 
interactional. A dialogical relationship is thus necessary in order to reveal the truth 
because the very concept of truth is systemic dependent, or in other words, it 
requires consensus between different viewpoints. 
A.H. Maslow terms 'I-Thou' knowledge for 'experiential' -, 'Iove-', 'identification 
knowledge' and 'Being-Cognition' (Maslow, 1966, p. 52). Further he states about the 
'I-Thou' attitude: 
'More sensitive observers are able to incorporate more of the world into the 
self, i.e., they are able to identify and empathize with wider and wider and 
more and more inelusive cireles of living and nonliving things. As a matter of 
fact, this may turn out to be a distinguishing mark of the high ly matured 
personality .... love for the object seems likely to enhance experiential 
knowledge of the object, with lack of love diminishing experiential knowledge 
of the object, although it may very well increase spectator knowledge of that 
same object' (Maslow, 1966, pp. SD-Sl). 
As we have seen the Deep Ecology Man finds his meaning of life through a deep 
relationship, characterized by active and positive feelings, towards all natural living 
and non-living creatures in Nature. This is compatible with the 'I-Thou'-relationship 
which can be described as follows: 
'The I confronts its Thou not a something to be studied, measured, or 
manipulated, but as a unique presence responding to the I in its individuality' 
(Audi, 1999, p. 104). 
This way of relating to the world is radically different from the traditional subject-
object relationship and consequently this in turn has impacts for how we interpret 
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what good science is, such as choice of method, relevant research problems, etc. 
Ingebrigtsen and Pettersson argue that: 
'Only in 'I-It' relations would one regard those traditional analytical techniques 
to be applicable: one chooses to stand outside and observe' (Ingebrigtsen & 
Pettersson, 1979, p. 81, from Danish). 
A holistic perception of human personality and motivation necessarily implies that no 
isolated method could be regarded as more appropriate than another. The choice of 
method must be a logical consequence of worldview, image of man, problem 
statement, etc. In this relation the positivistic-analytical method will be included in 
addition to hermeneutics and phenomenology. A central point in Deep Ecology 
formal ontology is that a pure objective description of nature and man is superficial 
and highly reductive as discussed previously in this chapter. However, this does not 
mean that the positivistic-analytical tradition is discarded, it only means that its 
applicability must be evaluated in relation to the problem state ment; that is, the 
relevance of the analytical method must be "analyzed" in relation to what one is 
studying. This is because logical positivism, that is, precise and impartial observation 
of objective data suitable for descriptive claims and generalizations, is perceived as 
an epistemology which can throw light on the mysteries of life. This also means that 
objective-physical knowledge about the world or the "It" is not invalidated, rather we 
are aware that it is abstract/reductive. In other words, our understanding of science, 
and the unit y of life as such, takes on a hermeneutical character; we endeavor to see 
parts in relation to complex who/es, and vice versa. Following this line of reasoning it 
is questionable whether it is necessary to keep a sharp demarcation line between 
metaphysical speculations and science and subsequently between science and 
pseudoscience - as is commonplace today. 
Let it be said at once, the Deep Ecology perspective totally undermines that the 
positivistic-analytical tradition is the only concise and proper way to study, not just 
social phenomena, but also nature. The most obvious reason for this claim is the 
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acceptance, by Deep Ecology, that nature is inadequately described singly through 
primary qualities; i.e., those qualities which do not depend on who is observing 
them; i.e., intersubjective qualities; i.e., typically length, breadth, tallness, etc. 
Secondary and tertiary descriptions of nature stand on an equal footing with primary 
description as we have seen. In other words, in the natural sciences, subjective and 
phenomenological descriptions of nature must play a fundamental role; in fact it 
does 50 also today but this is not acknowledge because that would break-down the 
hard-core of the logical positivistic theory of knowledge (see. e.g., Polanyi, 1962). In 
other words subjective-phenomenological experiences such as "the skies are 50 
blue", "the horizon 50 red", "the fields are 50 green", "the smell is 50 fresh", "the 
birds sing 50 beautifully", "the view from up here is amazing" and "this little Arctic 
cloudberry tastes 50 fantastic", are all real descriptions of the concrete nature of 
reality. 
A central point in Deep Ecology is to feel joy and develop feelings for all that lives. An 
obvious example of joy and positive feelings towards nature is to see children playing 
outdoors and climbing trees. Do we really have to provide, in the traditional sense, 
objective and verifiable evidences for why we feel joy and experience freedom when 
going hiking in the mountains, or in the forest or rowing our bo at across the lake? 
Desjardins states that ethical attitudes and behavior are the: 
' ... real appeal of monism. Because I can do only one thing, ethics should give 
specific and unequivocal advice' (Desjardins, 2006, p. 264). 
Again we see that a system based on monism and not dualism undermines or 
actually totally eliminates the sharp border between metaphysics or ethics and 
science or objective knowledge. Aristotle reminds us that ethics involves practical 
reasoning through which we judge not what superficially constitutes the truth but 
rather what we should do. 
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Subjective ontology necessitates the use of methods able to capture complex 
wholes. This implies that hermeneutics and phenomenology must be an essential 
part of a researchers' toolkit in addition to quantitative techniques. In fact, I claim 
that a hermeneutic frame of reference is needed in order to synthesize all other 
individual methods; that is, to describe individual methods in relation to one another 
and in relation to the whole problem state ment. The gist of hermeneutics is to 
capture wholeness and totality, at the same time not losing focus on details and 
parts. Phenomenology seeks to capture spontaneous experience (the secondary and 
tertiary qualities). Hermeneutics synthesizes objective, subjective and 
phenomenological knowledge into holistic knowledge. 
The crux of the discussion in this subchapter is that scientific work is interpretative 
work. By this is meant that science reveals the truth about the human nature 
through interpreting social phenomena. This should not come as a shock when we 
remember that human beings are fundamentally interpretative animals making 
sense of their surroundings. Perception of science within the Ecosophical-
Hermeneutic Research Paradigm can now be summarized as followed: 
* Monism: subject and study-"object" are parts of the same reality. 
* Certain scientific knowledge has its genesis in interpretation. 
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5 Scientific ideal 
A researcher's scientific ideal is intimately related with his worldview and perception 
of science. In other words, what you think you look at will impact how you think you 
best should look at it and subsequently how you think you ought best to interpret it 
and vice versa. Thus, the researcher's scientific ideal is to promote and strengthen 
her/his worldview (consistency and coherence assumed); that is, her/his lifestyle or 
meaning in life. 
P. Lauridsen argues that Dilthey's humanistic psychology necessitated the need for 
new methods that could generate new knowledge aimed at helping the psychologist 
to understand the lifeworld (lebenswelt) of a person. He writes: 
'Here must be used other methods and these can be summarized in two 
categories: hermeneutic and phenomenology. Hermeneutic methods are 
methods for interpretation and phenomenological methods are methods for 
the description of consciousness phenomena as directly and immediately as 
possible. These methods are not intended to produce causal relationships and 
reach an objective description through the use of controlled observation, 
measurements and experiments, rather they intend to pave the way to a 
meaningful understanding of the above-mentioned facts, which differs from 
the empirical science objective facts by being subjective, that is not 
independent of the observer, but interpreted or described in accordance with 
his/her reference system or framework of understanding' (Lauridsen, 1977, p. 
21, from Danish, emphasis added). 
Lauridsen here provides evidence for the tight relationship between ontology and 
methodology. When man is perceived as "a creator of meaning", that is, a 
subjectivistic view, the researcher needs to reveal these meaning codes through 
understanding his mental horizon ('reference system', 'framework for 
understanding') and his spontaneous experiences of this world. 
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The central trait of hermeneutics is monism; that is, a subject-subject relationship 
between knower and known. This implies that knowledge about the other, whether 
it is a subject or an object, lies hidden in between the researcher (the '1') and his 
study object (the 'Thou'); i.e., knowledge about the study object, that is, 
understanding, prerequisites a mutual interaction between knower and known; it is 
not something which can be attained through remote and passive sensing. Obviously 
fundamental objectivism as an ideal goes out of the picture in that knowledge 
creation is a result of ameeting between (at least) two beings-in-the-world or 
subjects with different meaning-codes, feelings, pathologies, etc. (though it is more 
common in social science that the meeting is between a researcher and a text or 
text analogue - but as Wittgenstein puts it: 
'Und eine Sprache vorstellen heijSt, sich eine Lebensform vorstellen,30 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 11). 
Subjectivism inevitably implies that the criteria of universalizability also become 
irrelevant and even impossible criteria because different subjects will always 
experience things differently. It is therefore necessary to change the focus from 
intersubjective data to intersubjective meanings of the social reality, that is, what the 
subject evaluates as meaningful and meaningless; e.g., states of intrinsic quality, 
states of anxiety, loneliness, etc. (Taylor, 1985b, p. 31). A central ideal within 
hermeneutics is therefore 'to understand the other more adequately than he 
understands himself (Lubcke, 1982, p. 31). And thus to reveal, both to oneself and 
the other, what makes sense in his life, what he ascribes as meaningful and 
meaningless, that is, 'intersubjective meanings'. Consequently the researcher can 
stop here; i.e., after he has revealed the meaning-codes for that particular 
subjectjbeing. Or he could and he ought to move on and reflect upon these in the 
light of normative values (what ought to be) because ultimately the goal of social 
science is to understand individuals and societies and make them as healthy as 
30 Philosophische Untersuchungen §19. 
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possible; e.g., helping persons (children) to grow/mature into responsible and civil 
persons. This latter point is in accordance with the views of Ingebrigtsen and 
Pettersson (1979) who argue that the scientific ideal of a paradigm ought to promote 
a certain lifestyle. Hermeneutical science is thus normative science, that is, vaIue-
laden and teleologieal, that is, directed towards a goal; which is ever increased 
understanding of the meaning of life. 
From this short discussion we can outline at least two ideals within hermeneuties. 
First, scientific knowledge should generate information helping us (and others) to 
understand, that is, to reveal meaning behind human activities and products. The 
second ideal is a consequence of the first, namely a theory's ability to prediet or 
come up with prognosis inevitably shifts from objective and general to specific and 
loeal knowledge; e.g., relevant for a specific group/individual in society in a specific 
period/ era/situation. 
The proeess of revealing the meaning codes of social phenomena, however, is 
interpretation. This is supported by C. Taylor stating that: 
'Interpretation, in the sense relevant to hermeneutics, is an attempt to make 
clear, to make sense of, an object of study .... The interpretation aims to bring 
to light an underlying coherence or sense' (Taylor, 1985b, p. 15, emphasis 
added). 
The proeess of interpretation is a hermeneutieal circle (see fig. 12) where the parts 
are seen in relation to the whole and vice versa, and one owns pre-understanding, 
prejudices or historicity, that is, horizon, is seen in relation to the others (text, action) 
pre-understanding, historicity and horizon. This means that the hermeneutical-
phenomenological researcher interprets the social phenomenon (text, speech, 
activity, etc.) through interpreting the parts (words, sentences, physical parts) and 
the whole, in relation to his own personal history, including of course his literature 
review, and the others history/pre-understanding and in the utmost case the whole 
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world history. This is how a hermeneutical researcher can attain a better 
understanding of the other person than the other himself possesses. 
Researcher 
(with his 
Text or text-analogue 
(with his horizon) 
Researcher 
(with revised 
horizon) 
Text or text-analogue (understood more 
Deeply due to merged horizons) 
This implies then that no method alone can be regarded as more sufficient or more 
applicable than another. The use of quantitative methods can and will always play an 
important role, but mathematical and statistical preciseness (knowledge about the 
parts) in isolation is of little relevance when the aim is to reveal meaning-phenomena 
(knowledge about the whole). The reason behind this claim is the old but 
nonetheless important fact that objective/atomistic studies of complex structures (of 
e.g., persons, cultural systems, and natural ecosystems) are merely abstraetions of 
the concrete reality. This point has been emphasized most thoroughly by the British 
mathematician/philosopher Alfred N. Whitehead (1861-1947). It is important, 
however, to clearly emphasize that general (exact) knowledge as developed 
successfully through the analytical-mathematical method, is not a waste of time. To 
claim something in this direction should be diagnosed as a disillusioned thought. The 
production of general knowledge illustrates the genius of modern societies. 
However, if we fall into the trap of believing that objective knowledge is the only real 
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knowledge, we must certainly end up in what Whitehead has termed the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness: 
'the accidental error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete' (Whitehead, 
1967, p. 51). 
Whitehead further discusses the fallacy of the classical abstraction of dualism; i.e. 
the splitting of reality into two separate realities (body and nature as a material 
substance on the one hand and a rational (objective-calculative) mind on the other 
hand): 
'These sensations (discussion of the 'imaginaryi31 senses of humans) are 
projected by the mind so as to clothe appropriate bodies in external nature. 
Thus the bodies are perceived as possessing qualities which in reality do not 
belong to them, qualities which in fact are purely the offspring of the mind. 
Thus nature gets credit which should in truth be reserved for ourselves: the 
rose for its scent: the nightingale for his song: and the sun for his radiance. 
The poets are entirely mistaken. They should address their Iyrics to 
themselves, and should turn them into od es of self-congratulation on the 
excellency of the human mind. Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, 
colourless; merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, 
meaninglessly'(Whitehead, 1967, p. 54). 
Whitehead is here joking of course but effectively he describes objective ontology 
and the epistemological consequences of that position. The scientific worldview 
eliminates subjective sensation (color, smell, sound, felt heat and so forth) and 
spontaneous experiences (joy, beauty and so forth); that is, ethics and esthetics. 
Therefore the 'parts' must be studied not in isolation but in relation to the 'whole'. 
The crux of hermeneutic studies is to capture complexities and wholes. For example, 
a researcher who is asked to assess the impacts of petroleum activity, finds it 
31 Descartes used the term 'imagination' when he explained the bodily perception of reality. 
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necessary to study details, for example produced water's effect on cod fish, arctic 
algae, noise, geographical occupation, revenues for the municipality, quantity of 
work ours, etc, etc. But this partial physical knowledge does not provide any 
personal-subjective knowledge about what it means. A hermeneutical-
phenomenological study will ask these deeper research questions and re/leet upon 
the meaning-dimension for the stakeholders involved, that is, supplementing 
physical facts, 'brute' data, with psychic phenomena. 
The inclusion of values in social and natural science is in fact an unavoidable 
condition as already diseussed. Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn, 1996) and Michael Polanyi 
(Polanyi, 1962) have illustrated this convincingly. 
Hermeneutics, then, ought not to vainly attempt to escape values, but rather cherish 
them. This is in fact common practice even amongst natural scientists that through 
their studies develop strict environmental att itu des (see e.g., Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1991; 
Næss, 1999, p. 23). The best way to internalize social and moral values in the physical 
sciences is obviously through cooperation with social scientists; i.e., trans-
disciplinarily approaches. The consequences then, of objective studies, of, e.g., 
petroleum effects on microorganism, fowls, fish, etc., etc., is that this type of activity 
is of ten (at least in "The High North") irresponsible human activity which ought to be 
avoided as far as possible; i.e., in order to defend petroleum activity there must exist 
some vital needs which are best served, that is, gratified, through having access to 
some petroleum. Such ethical, vital needs can for example be the health and well-
being of humans and nature, that is, intrinsic values; e.g., health and well- being 
needs that are best secured through having personnei and equipments in emergency 
(e.g., ambulance transportation); food supplies; education; humanitarian targets, 
extraordinary esthetical experiences, etc. The crux of hermeneutical studies is thus 
that natural and social science emerge into life sciences or normative science. This is 
also the reason behind Næss' claim science without ethics is blind, ethics without 
science is empty. 
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The scientific ideal of hermeneutics can then be summarized as follows: 
* Develop (holistic) understanding 
* Reveal meaning/values 
* Localjpersonal knowledge 
* Interpretation of subjective/unique data 
6 Ethics 
The ethics of a paradigm will be closely interrelated with the respective scientific 
ideal and worldview. As we have seen earlier, internal ethics regards those norms 
and rules which science follows. We also saw that the internal ethic of modern 
science is determined by the criteria of intersubjectivity. The validity or internal 
ethics of hermeneutical arguments are challenging to evaluate, and it will be 
completely impossible to generate traditional objective knowledge; i.e., knowledge 
which is independent of the observer. The only way this issue can be approached is 
through a thorough reflection of a researcher paradigm (ontology, epistemology and 
methodology). 
Hermeneutic validity can more satisfactorily be understood as cammon consensus 
between research and the study "object". For example, the meaning content of the 
text, behavior or product is no longer hidden, but understood. Researcher and study 
object can reach a Socratic consensus through a thorough dialogue concerning the 
deepness of the premises on which we base conclusions: i.e., an argumentative-
communicative rationality. An argumentative-communicative rationality flows 
naturally when the other is perceived as a 'Thou' and not a stupid 'It' or ignorant 
thing. This is the crux of Popper's critical attitude which stresses that we ought to 
'overthrow' our solutions rather than 'defend' them (Popper, 2002, p. xix), because 
then we can ask deeper questions about the premises. Consensus is, however, not 
reachable unless one reflects on one's pre-understandings, horizon or frame of 
reference. Consensus thus happens as a hermeneutical circle which means that 
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validity is only achievable through 'more of the same', that is, more dialogue. This is 
in accordance with Taylor's interpretation of hermeneutical validity: 
'Ultimately, a good explanation is one which makes sense of the behavior; but 
then to appreciate a good explanation, one has to agree on what makes good 
sen se; what makes good sense is a function of one's readings; and these in 
turn are based on the kind of sense one understands' (Taylor, 1985b, p. 24). 
This is how we can understand that the concepts such as "the good life" and "the 
good society" are relative in time and space (e.g., western interpretation vs. 
indigenous peoples' interpretation). 
The external ethic of a theoryjmodel based on the hermeneutical ideal are two sides 
of the same matter. This is true for at least two reasons. First, the whole point of 
hermeneutical research is to regard the study phenomenon as a subject (with values, 
feelings, desires) and not as an object (pre-defined mechanism). A hermeneutical 
study always has, in some sense, a humanitarian point of departure. Secondly, 
without establishing a mutual relationship, let us call it a friendship, between 
researcher and study object understanding will never be thorough and deep. This 
means that in order to reveal the meaning codes (mental horizon) of our study 
object, that is, to actually obtain any knowledge, we must place ourselves 50 to 
speak, in the position of the other, that is, in an 'I-Thou' attitude. Without trust 
between researcher and study object, there can be no openness and without 
openness there can be no access to the other's lebenswelt. 
Summarized the internal and external ethics are characterized by the following 
criteria: 
* Internal ethic: argumentative-communicative validity 
* External ethic: Humanitarian. 
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7 Esthetics 
The esthetical dimension of a paradigm does not directly concern what we 
traditionally associate with esthetics, that is, art, beauty etc. It concerns how 
individual scientists prefer to present their work. As a rule, however, the holistic 
perspective on knowledge abolishes the belief in one rightly presentation form. The 
important part is that there exists a compatible, coherent link between choice of 
method and presentation st yle. A cIassic fallacy here places the emphasis on the 
quantitative aspect of a qualitative research study. 
Hermeneutical-phenomenological researchers have the freedom to use a wide 
spectrum of presentation styles. For example the Trumpeter Journal of Ecosophy 
frequently invites researchers to hand in papers in poetic and metaphoric form. 
Qualitative presentation styles such as noveis, essays, narratives, but also scenery 
art, music, paintings are much more suitable for the study of subjects than numbers 
and diagrams. This is because qualitative styles are far better at communicating 
subjective meaning codes such as existential needs, problems, values, etc. Geertz's 
(2000) method of studying cultures through 'thick descriptions' offers perhaps the 
best example here. But also, for example, severai of Ibsen's plays are examples of 
this, and not least E. Munchs' Scream (see e.g., Grelland, 2007). Quantitative styles 
can, however, be suitable for the description of "hard" social details, bearing in mind 
that the relevance of applying statistics must be clearly defended in relation to the 
phenomena one is studying; that is, one must defend why it is suitable to postulate 
an objective ontology. 
The presentation styles suitable for the hermeneutical ideal can be summarized 
using the following criteria: 
* First and foremost qualitative presentation styles, but quantitative st yl es can 
be preferable in some situations. 
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8 Some examples of 'normal science', 'puzzle-solving' and growth of knowledge 
within fields where traces of an ecosophical-hermeneutical research paradigm do 
occur. 
First of all, an ideal-typical ecosophical-hermeneutic research paradigm does not 
currently operate as a strict empirical research paradigm in the traditional sense, i.e., 
there are few, if any, great empirical scientific achievements, 'exemplars' of normal 
science, to my knowledge, fitting entirely a hypothetic ecosophical-hermeneutic 
alternative. Such a paradigm thus constitutes an alternative (normative) research 
paradigm (cf. discussion of the ex ante, normative use of the paradigm concept in 
chapter Il). However, as this sub-chapter will show, there exist traces of empirical 
research, normal science and accumulation of knowledge related to or in the 
periphery of the alternative paradigm. 
Ecological Economics 
During the last thirty years it is reasonable to claim that we have witnessed an 
explosive intrusion of 'new paradigms' into the Science of Economics. The driving 
forces behind this scientific "revolution" or these innovations are largely the 
recognition that our current global environmental and psychological problems 
(anomalies), such as climate change, loss of biological diversity, pathologies such as 
stress, identity crises, and so forth, cannot be solved through decision-making 
philosophies anchored in short term, uti lit Y maximization criteria. Some novelties 
that have occurred since the beginning of the 80s are: 'ecological economics' 
(Costanza, 1991; Daly & Cobb Jr., 1994), 'eco-management' (Welford, 1995), 
'environmental management' (Hopfenbeck, 1993; Spedding, 1996; Welford & 
Gouldson, 1993), 'corporate social responsibility' (Carroll, 1991; Fredrick, 1986; 
Freeman, 1984), 'third revolution' (Rugina, 1991), 'stakeholder capitalism' (Freeman, 
2002), 'circulation economics' (Ingebrigtsen & Jakobsen, 2007) and 'deep economics' 
(McKibben, 2007). 
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In 1988, one year after Dur Common future, the International Society for Ecological 
Economics (ISEE) was established. The next year the first issue of the journal 
Ecological Economics was published. In 1991 Robert Costanza edited the major 
influential book with the apposite sub-title: Ecological Economics - The Science and 
Management of Sustainability. The book elaborated on the overall goal of the ISEE 
which is to extend and integrate: 
' ... the study and management of "nature's household" (ecology) and 
"humankind's house hold" (economics). Ecological Economics studies the 
ecology of humans and the economy of nature, the web of interconnections 
uniting the economic subsystem to the global ecosystem of which it is a part. 
It is this larger system that must be the object of study if we are adequately to 
address the critical issues that now face humanity' (Costanza, 1991, p. v). 
Costanza's and the ISEE definition of ecological economics, as an interdisciplinary, 
holistic approach studying the mutual relationships between nature, culture and 
economy, signalizes strong intensions of establishing a scientific research paradigm 
within the science of economics anchored on 'hard cores' compatible with the 
Ecosophical-hermeneutic Research Paradigm as outlined above (e.g., the monistic-
holistic view of man and nature, extension of values beyond pure uti lit y). Daly and 
Farley agree with this: 
'In other words, ecological economics calls for a "paradigm shift" in the sense 
of philosopher Thomas Kuhn ... a change in preanalytic vision' (Daly & Farley, 
2004, p. 23). 
The extension of values or preanalytic change in ecological economics is transparent 
from how it understands 'efficient resource utilization' and economic growth or GNP. 
We remember from the discussion of the neoclassical paradigm within economics 
that production and consumption levels were defined and settled mainly on the basis 
of utilitarian criterias (willingness to pay and production costs). Daly and Farley 
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(2004), for example, argue that the concept of GDP, the growth maxim and the 
'ends' of economics should be replaced by more accurate and reflective targets such 
as 'qualitative development' and practical ecological wisdom (virtues), instead of 
utilitarian means. Their main thesis is that ecological economics needs a strategy for 
integrating ecology and economics, that is, the 'Steady-State Subsystem' (Daly & 
Farley, 2004, p. 51). The main idea of the 'steady-state' strategy is that population 
and capital stock is not growing and that human/economic systems are balanced 
with the total ecological system: 
'It says that the scale of the human sub-system defined by the boundary has 
an optimum, and that the throughput by which the ecosystem maintains and 
replenishes the economic subsystem must be ecologically sustainable' (Daly & 
Farley, 2004, p. 54). 
Ingebrigtsen and Jakobsen also argue that a paradigm shift is strongly needed in the 
science of economics. In their view it is necessary to supplement and change 
neoclassical economics along four paradigmatic dimensions: 1) from mechanical to 
organic ontology; 2) from linearity to circular value-chain; 3) from competition to 
cooperation; and 4) from value monism to value pluralism (chapter 3 in Ingebrigtsen 
& Jakobsen, 2007). 
Together these statements and perspectives point in the direction of a scientific 
paradigm within economics compatible with the ecosophical-hermeneutic paradigm. 
Especially plausible is the claim if we include the two latter authors' viewpoint on the 
epistemological and methodological implications of the new paradigm; i.e., how 
researchers ought to comprehend, synthesize and understand the interdisciplinary 
approach to economics: 
'To understand and comprehend the complexity of this interdisciplinary field 
of economics, we argue that a holistic and hermeneutic frame of reference is 
needed. ... Dur presentations are in accordance with the hermeneutic 
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tradition, in which totality is implicit in the parts and all the parts are 
represented in the whole. This reciprocal action results in a hermeneutic 
circle, in which the partial description and understanding must be seen in 
relation to a holistic description and understanding and the holistic description 
and understanding represent more than the sum of the individual parts' 
(Ingebrigtsen & Jakobsen, 2007, p. 3). 
Especially in the most recent writings of the two latter economists they urge the 
emerging need to adopt a hermeneutic research paradigm inspired by deep ecology 
within the science of economics. In their paper (2009) Moral development of the 
economic actor they outline the ontology and the ethics or the 'hard core' of an 
alternative research paradigm which they right ly term Neo-ecological economics. On 
the image or ontology of the economic actor, the 'cosmic man', characteristic for 
neo-ecological economics they state: 
'an economic agent solving problems based upon a sense of being part of the 
whole of life ..... In our opinion, the economic agent as interpreted through 
the metaphor "cosmic man" is more able to define, understand and salve the 
most urgent ecological and societal challenges of today (Ingebrigtsen & 
Jakobsen, 2009, p. 2783). 
There is also an increasing emphasis in scientific literature addressing sustainability-
issues in light of perspectives such 'complexity', 'network-appraaches', 'non-
reductionistic-methods' and interdisciplinarity (Bhaskar, Frank, Høyer, Næss, & 
Parker, 2010; Ehrenfeld, 2008; Taylor, 2001). Ehrenfeld (2008), for example, argues 
that the reductionistic method has disabled us to see new possible ways of living and 
instead we tend to solve sustainability issues through "new means same ends". This 
accord well with the enlarged view of values characterizing the alternative paradigm 
proclaimed in this chapter. Ehrenfeld uses causal loop diagrams from system 
dynamics to illustrate how the reductionistic method is centered on "quick fixes" of 
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symptomatic effects instead of fundamentally changing the causes creating the 
problems in the first place (see tab. 8). 
Problem Symptomatic Negative Side Fundamental 
symptom Solution Effects Solution 
Global Warming C02 trading R&D slips; Renewable 
irresponsibility energy 
Material use Ecoefficiency Ecosystem Industrial 
growth collapse restructuring 
Maldistribution Tak policy Irresponsibility; Cultural change 
gated cities 
Dissatisfactio; Commodity Addiction; loss of Self-
aliennation consumption competence development 
Conc/usion 
The examples discussed here represent traces of empirical research which is more or 
less compatible with an alternative ecosophical-hermeneutic research paradigm. This 
is evident because, first, ecological economics, neo-ecological economics and other 
interdisciplinaryjnon-reductive fields, emphasize the need to internalize a broader 
spectrum of values, new en ds (e.g., ecological, utilitarian and existential values) and 
methods in economics and environmental management research. 
108 
PART Ill: METHODOLOGY 
CHAPTER V: HERMENEUTIC REFLEXIVE METHODOLOGY 
llntroduction 
The philosophy of science position applied by the thesis is hermeneutics and not 
logical positivism or empiricism. This is because the writer's own paradigm is 
compatible, in essence, with the EHRP. From the roots of the hermeneutical 
epistemology follow a num ber of inextricable ontology implications which the author 
can indeed agree upon (e.g., the perception of man as a self-defining animal - cf. 
chapter IV). 
The commensurability is mainly because hermeneutical science endeavors at 
understanding subjects or text or text-analogue instead of, as in the case of 
positivism, explaining objects, and because the assumption of value-neutral research 
is a highly unrealistic or difficultjimpossible assumption to practice, especially within 
the science of man. Hermeneutic method is also a preferable method when the 
empirical data is in text-form, because it provides a frame for interpretation and 
validity check of these through emphasizing consistency as we shall see. The primary 
objective of hermeneutic reflection is to reveal information and knowledge about 
these texts which is not explicit articulated; e.g., knowledge in relation to ontology 
and epistemology. 
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2 Hermeneutic Refleetion: the art of sense-making 
Simple, double and triple hermeneuties 
Simple hermeneutics concerns individuals' interpretation of themselves and their 
own subjective or intersubjective social reality or mental horizon and thus their 
meaning dimension; i.e., the meaning they assign to their world (Alvesson & 
Skbldberg, 2000). 
Double hermeneutics is what interpretative social scientists are engaged in when 
they attempt to understand and develop knowledge about social phenomena. In this 
endeavor the interpreter strives to make sense of text or text-analogue which is 
already interpreted by interpretive beings (in contrast to natural scientists who most 
certainly interpret but interpret a non-interpreted reality) (Alvesson & Skbldberg, 
2000, p. 144). Gilje and Grimen have a similar understanding of double 
hermeneutics: 
'Social scientists must therefore of ten interpret and understand something 
already consisting of interpretations, i.e., social actors' interpretation and 
understanding of themselves, others and of the physical world. Social 
researchers must, in other words, conduct themselves in relation to a world 
which is already interpreted by the social actors themselves' (Gilje & Grimen, 
1993, p. 145. from Norwegian). 
From a hermeneutical perspective empirical data encompasses meaningful 
phenomena expressed through behavior (processes), results (products), expressions, 
articulations (i.e., literary, meaningful expressions) or text all originating from the 
self-defining animal (cf. Gilje & Grimen, 1993; Taylor, 1985b). This perception of data 
is radically different from the positivistic understanding of data as objectivejphysical 
externalities. 
The empirical data of this thesis, the various manuals and EIA reports, are massive 
amounts of text. The texts in the manuals are the product of individuals' 
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interpretations of how social and natural consequences ought to be assessed. The 
texts of the EIA reports are the product of individuals' interpretation of social and 
environmental consequences of an initiative. These interpretations must further be 
interpreted again, hence the double hermeneutics, but this time, by the social 
researcher; i.e., the writer of this thesis. This implies that social scientists have a 
crucial role in the process of interpretation, serving the role as co-creator of the 
empirical data; hence the unrealistic nature of the principle of value-neutrality. This 
is because this is historically and culturally situated; i.e., I-Thou relation to the text. 
In corollary, social science is always culturally and historically influenced, or includes 
a political-ideological dimension. Alvesson and Skoldberg state that this political 
dimension of social science encompasses: 
' ... the critical interpretation of unconscious processes, ideologies, power 
relations, and other expressions of dominance that entail the privileging of 
certain interests over others, within the forms of understanding which appear 
to be spontaneously generated' (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000, p. 144). 
This third layer is in Alvesson and Skoldberg termed triple hermeneuties. Triple 
hermeneutics attempts to reveal the ontology of a theory or the underlying, of ten 
hidden, dimension of social behavior or products. Alvesson and Skoldberg state that 
this is a criterion for 'good research', but they also stress that 'researchers should 
also avoid pandering to established thinking and dominant interests' (Alvesson & 
Skoldberg, 2000, p. 144). The paradigm discussions in chapter III and IV have strived 
towards this ideal of keeping the discussion "objective" and the arguments "va lue-
neutral". 
In relation to the hermeneutical interpretation of 'understanding', that is, 
'understanding' in light of ontology, triple hermeneuties endeavors to reveal the 
whole mental horizon, that is background knowledge and what Gadamer termed pre-
understanding of social phenomena (text, behavior, products, etc.) (cf. chapter IV). 
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In relation to the paradigm theory the triple hermeneutic aims at revealing the 
values or the worldview (ontology) underlying normal science. Triple hermeneutic 
analysis thus serves an important role for the analyses of this study because it 
attempts to reveal the ontology underlying manuals and reports; i.e., a meta-
analysis. 
3 A hermeneutic reflexive apparatus 
In the process of interpreting and understanding the text (empirical data), the 
horizon of the text interrelates with the horizon of the reader. This means, as we 
have already discussed, that the reader 'sees' the text in his own personaljsubjective 
way. For the purpose of not being too unnecessarily subjective, the writer of the 
thesis applies theories and concept that are accepted in different research 
communities. The conceptualization of the two paradigms constitutes his 
professionaljtheoretical horizon which is a significant part of the total horizon. The 
reflective apparatus of this study are presented in Tab.3. The criteria outlined here 
represent parts of the horizon of the reader (the author of this thesis). 
The process of interpreting the empirical data has thus swung between reading text 
and comparing it with the conceptual criteria mentioned in Tab. 3, in other words, 
making sense or cJearance of texts (cf. Taylor, 1985b). The meaning of the texts has 
thus been created through a dialectie relationship, as we have touched upon earlier 
in this chapter, between reader and text, that is, a dialogue between reader and text. 
The dialogue is similar to any other dialogue between self-interpreting subjects: a 
text reveals its meaning through, first and foremost, carefully reading the parts and 
the whole, and secondly through pondering questions upon the text and searching 
for answers to tentative claims. C. Taylor writes about this latter point of sense-
making: 
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'We have to be able to make for aur interpretations claims of the order: the 
meaning confusedly present in this text or text-analogue is clearly expressed 
here' (Taylor, 1985b, p. 16). 
Through this process of falsifying aur claims the in-/coherence of the text can be 
made clear. Or as C. Taylor puts it: 
'A successful interpretation is ane which makes clear the meaning original ly 
present in a confused, fragmentary, cloudy form. But how does ane know that 
this interpretation is correct? Presumbly because it makes sense of the 
original text: what is strange, mystifying, puzzling, contradictory is no langer 
50, is accounted for (Taylor, 1985b, p. 15). 
The process of making sense or clear or revealing the meaning of cloudy expressions 
is thus a hermeneutical circle. If ane stops and is una ble to make sense of the text or 
text-analogue, what is required is more of the same; i.e., more reading, more 
answering, more claiming and "knocking at the text" (see Fig. 13). Then the validity 
of hermeneutical analysis was also partly explained: 'This 'making sense of' is the 
proffering of an interpretation' (Taylor, 1985b, p. 27). The crux of hermeneutical 
validity is to ensure consistency between the parts and the wholes, 50 that the final 
interpretation of the text is ane harmonic whole: there are no illogical relations 
between the parts and the whole. Gilje and Grimen have termed this 'the holistic 
criterion' (Gilje & Grimen, 1993, p. 158, from Norwegian); C. Taylor speaks of it as the 
'coherence' of interpretation (Taylor, 1985b); and Gadamer explained the meaning 
50 famously: 
All details' harmony with the whole is the criterion of correct understanding. 
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Reader 
asking 
"kno 9uestion 
ckmg at the 
(with his horizon: 
conceptual criteria, 
see tab. 1) 
Text 
(with its horizon) 
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Tnaking I . 
"th c allns 
eTneaning' 
IS C/early ... " 
Reader 
(with insight into 
the text horizon on 
the basis of his 
own horizonj 
concepts) 
INSTRUMENTAl-RECEIVED RESEARCH ECOSOPHICAl-HERMENEUTIC 
PARADIGM (IRRP) RESEARCH PARADIGM (EHRP) 
REGIONAL 
* 
OBJECTIVE: THE PRIMARY 
* 
SUBJECTIVE (HOllSTIC): THE 
ONTOLOGY PROPERTIES CONSTITUTE THE REAL SECONDARY PROPERTIES DEFINES 
HUMAN NATURE THE HUMAN NATURE 
* 
VAlUE MONISM 
* 
INTENTIONALITY 
* 
SOCIAl REAlITY THUS EXISTS OUTSIDE 
* 
MAN: 'A CREATOR OF MEANING' 
THE HUMAN BEING, THAT IS, 
EXTERNAllY TO THE SUBJECT. * VALUE PlURAlISM 
* 
DETERMINISTIC: HUMAN BEHAVIOR * INDETERMINISTIC; SUBJECTS HAVE 
IS BEST UNDERSTOOD THROUGH THE A HIGH DEGREE OF FREEWlll 
CONCEPT OF INSTRUMENTAL 
RATIONAlITY. 
PERCEPTION 
* 
SUBJECT-OBJECT KNOWlEDGE. 
* 
SUBJECT-SUBJECT KNOWlEDGE. 
OF SCIENCE 
* 
CERTAIN/TRUE SCIENTIFIC 
* 
CERTAIN SCIENTIFIC KNOWlEDGE 
KNOWlEDGE IS DEDUCED FROM HAS ITS GENESIS IN 
OBSERVATION OF OBJECTIVE DATA. INTERPRETATIONS. 
SCIENTIFIC 
* 
INTERPERSONAl/OBJECTIVITY 
* 
DEVElOP A HOLISTIC 
IDEAL UNDERSTANDING NOT CAUSAl 
* 
OBSERVATION OF DATA OR FACTS RelATIONS 
* 
EVIDENCE BASED 
* 
REVEAl (INTER-)SUBJECTIVE 
* 
CAUSE-EFFECT EXPlANATIONS 
MEANING/VAlUES 
* 
lOCAl/PERSONAl KNOWlEDGE 
* 
VERIFICATION 
* 
INTERPRETATION OF SUBJECTIVE 
DATA 
ETHICS 
* 
INTERNAl: OBJECTIVITY, RELIABllITY, 
* 
INTERNAL ETHIC: 
VALIDITY, ETC. ARGUMENTATlVE-
COMMUNICATIVE VALIDITY 
* 
EXTERNAl: INSTRUMENTAL 
* 
EXTERNAl ETHIC: STRICT 
ENVIRONMENTAl AND 
HUMANITARIAN ETHIC. 
ESTHETICS 
* 
QUANTITATIVE: A lOVE FOR HARD 
* 
QUALITATIVE: ARTICULATING 
FACTS; MATHEMATICS/STATISTICS; AND EXPRESSING MEANING 
ANAlYTICAl CLAIMS; SYNTHETICAllY 
VERIFIABlE CLAIMS. 
115 
116 
PART IV: EMPIRICAL DATA 
- LINKING THE PARADIGM DISCUSSION TO NORWEGIAN EIA 
CASES 
The purpose of Part IV of the dissertation is to illuminate research question 2: 
What type of information/know!edge does Norwegian E!A-research 
encompass? 
CHAPTER VI THE CASE OF THE EARLIEST NORWEGIAN EIA MANUAL 
(T-746) OF 1990 
llntroduction 
Since the Norwegian Parliament adopted the first general legislation on EIA in 1990, 
as part of the Planning and Building Act (PBA), severai Manuals on EIA have seen the 
light of day. The first manual, T-746 i, was worked out by the Norwegian Ministry of 
the Environment pursuant with the PBA of 1990. In 1994 the T-746 manual was 
revised into the more comprehensive T-1015 ii manual. In 1997 the PBA was revised 
again and thus also the corresponding manual, T_l177 iii • In 2000 severai 
developments have occurred. Most important, however, is the establishment of the 
'!nstruction for Officia! Studies and Reports' (U!r. The instruction placed emphasis on 
EIA in relation to 'duty and content', 'assessments process' and 'demand and 
evaluation t32 • The document serves the function of being an overall EIA body. The 
concrete work with the individual areas, i.e., environmental, social, economic 
32 (Ministry of Govemment Administration and Reform, 2007, pp. 3-5). 
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impacts etc., are, however, not addressed in this document. In 2009 the PBA was 
revised again due to new EU standards and revision of the Biodiversity Act in 2009. 
The foeal ease here is the earliest manual on EIA of 1990 - T-146. The chapter 
interprets the text of the manual in light of the hermeneutic reflective apparatus 
outlined in tab. 3, chapter V. 
2 Ontology of nature 
In this sub-chapter the thesis studies which ontology of nature the manual uses as a 
point of departure. By this is meant how the T-746 manual interprets what the reality 
of nature is. 
In Appendix 4 (attached to this chapter), List of questions regarding the potential 
consequences of an initiative on environment, natural resources and society (from 
Norwegian), the T-746 manual questions the link between the initiative and nature: 
'Will areas of special value for the life of animals and plants be affected ... and 
other especially valuable natural areas ... such as protected and protection-
worthy natural areas, and naturaliandscape such as biotopes,33. 
Further the manual addresses ecological dimensions such as: 
'reproductive conditions', 'conditions for life' and the 'succession of species,34. 
Here the T-746 also reveals an understanding of nature as an organic process which 
evolves and adapts for its own sake. The understanding that nature and man are 
interrelated that is, a monistic ontology, is comprehensively illustrated by the 
statement: 
'releases of health damaging emissions into soil and earth,35. 
33 (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 1990, p. 64, emphasis added). 
34 (ibid.) 
35 (ibid.). 
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These statements reveal and ontology anchored in a Deep Ecologyjprocess 
worldview, that is, a monistic, holistic and organic interpretation of nature. The 
manual interprets nature as a living system of integrated who les whose parts 
mutually depend on one another and the whole; that is, everything hangs together. 
This is evident from the holistic description which the manual provides when it 
diseusses how changes due to the initiative is interrelated with nature; i.e. intrinsic 
relations. This is also evident from the ecocentric evaluation of plants and animals, 
i.e., assigning the life of animals and plants a value for their own sake; i.e., non-
anthropocentric values. 
The conclusion must be that the ontology of the T-746 manual on EIA dating from 
1990 interprets nature as a holistic system where all the parts are interconnected 
which together constitutes more than the mere sum of each individual part; i.e., a 
monistic and organic interpretation. 
Conclusion: holistic-organic ontology 
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3 Ontology of man 
The appendix of the T-746 encompasses a sub-chapter on '50eietal impacts' which is 
further divided into five categorieso These are: 
1) Business and employment 
2) Development and construetion of houses 
3) Economic conditions 
4) Social and welfare-related conditions 
5) Outdoor recreation and activity 
These five categories capture a wide spectrum of social-, existential conditions 
ranging all the way from more material related values/needs, represented by the 
three former categories, to more immaterial values/needs, represented by the twa 
latter categorieso The expressions here can therefore, with good reason, be 
interpreted as evidence for a subjective ontologyo This claim makes sense based on 
the following articulations in the manual (po66): 
'Will the initiative 000 affect social networks and the care services/needs?' 
'Will the initiative 000 affect health conditions?' 
'Will the initiative 000 affect different actors' opportunities to exercise different 
forms of outdoor life or outdoor activities in the local environment?' 
'Will the initiative affect different population's opportunities to experience 
wild animals and nature?' 
It makes sense to interpret these questions as expressions for an understanding of 
the human nature as subjects with an '1- Thou' attitude (or intentionality) towards 
both other subjects (two former expressions) and nature (two latter expressions)o 
The image of man can thus be classified as subjectivistic. 
Conclusion: subjective ontologyo 
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4 Perception of science 
How is the perception of science in the T-746 manual; or which theory of knowledge 
does the research question of the manual postulatejpresuppose? This is the question 
we discuss in the following sub-chapter. 
The research questions which the manual addresses in relation to environmental 
natural resources and society is clearly designed to reveal the objective and external 
social worldo The question is thus of a typical 'I-It' or subject-object charactero We 
shall here present some examples of this for every categoryo 
In relation to the first and third category, 'business and employment impacts' and 
'economic impacts', the manual addresses the following questions (po6S-66): 
'Will the initiative affect the demand for work?' 
'Will the initiative affect the demand for goods and services?' 
'Will the initiative have impacts for other industries? (000 structural, market 
related, change productivity)o' 
'Will the initiative have any regional/national economic impacts?' 
'Will the initiative have any effects on the local economy?' 
The questions here are design ed to gather information about an intricate and 
complex phenomenon, 'business and employment' and 'economy', through simply 
studying the surface of the conceptso This is evident because the questions focus only 
on easily observable aspects demanding little interpretation in their own; that is, 
they are most certainly quantifiableo Subjective aspects such as value, needs, desires 
and phenomenological experiences of work, such as feelings of mastery, the feeling 
of doing something purposeful, etco, etc., are left in the shadowo This is a bit strange 
bearing in mind the discussion regarding ontology aboveo 
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Knowledge about the second category, 'development and construetion of houses', 
approaehes the topic from a similar 'I-It', speetator perspective (p.66): 
'Will the initiative affect current development patterns and plans/guidelines 
for the future?' 
'Will the initiative affect the scope and localization of houses?' 
'Will the initiative lead to an increase in the need for infrastructure such as 
roads, water-supplies, etc.' 
'Will the initiative be easily operated through collective transportation or does 
it lead to an increase in private transportation?' 
Moreover, the questions here are design ed to gather knowledge about this 
important phenomenon from a purely superficial, objective perspective. These 
questions are of course important and ought to be assessed in relation to any 
development project, but, at least from a hermeneutical perspective, this is not 
enough to understand how the project will impact the people concerned, or more 
correctly, the inner eu/tura/ impaets. This point perhaps becomes clearer if we 
envisage the research questions concerning 'social and welfare related impacts'. 
The questions concerning the forth category are: 
'Will the initiative have effects on municipalities and local communities?' 
'Will the initiative lead to changes in settling-patterns, demography and 
communication which can affect social networks and the care services?' 
'Will existing buildings, business activities, houses or outdoor areas be 
affected by the initiative?' 
'Will the initiative cause changes in living conditions or environment?' 
'Will the initiative cause re-Iocalization of people or the loss of other 
businesses?' 
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'Will the initiative cause a change in demand or supply of public and private 
goods and services?' 
'Will the initiative cause a potential increase of conflicts between different 
cultures or stakeholders?' 
'Will the initiative cause impacts for the Saml culture?' 
'Will the initiative affect the health of the employees, user groups or others?' 
'Will the initiative affect the opportunities to exercise cultural or recreation 
activities?' 
'Will the initiative have any other effects of a social or welfare-related 
charaeter? Should a description be included of how the initiative can be 
facilitated so that social and welfare conditions are best looked after.' 
The long and comprehensive list of research questions here are indeed important in 
relation to assessing the social and welfare conditions of development projects. The 
theory of knowledge which these questions postulate, however, is the logical 
positivistic, subject-object relationship which satisfies itself with merely auditing the 
external social world. The question lacks to assess phenomena of an introspective art, 
that is, aimed at revealing subjective meaning and phenomenological experiences 
(e.g., in relation to health, welfare, environment, etc., etc.). The procedure of 
treating different categories partially instead of seeing economic-, social- and 
environmental impacts together as a whole is probably due to the reductionistic 
perspective resulting from precise !-It observation. 
The final fifth category, 'outdoor-life and recreation', is assessed using the following 
questions: 
'Will the initiative affect different populations' opportunities to exercise 
different types of outdoor-life or recreation activities in the local environment, 
or reduce the accessibility to natural areas, swimming sites, etc.?' 
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'Will the initiative affect the populations' opportunities to experience wild 
animals or nature?' 
Will the initiative affect the opportunity to exercise outdoor recreation 
activities?' 
The manual does here postulate an understanding of "outdoor-life" as something 
which simply is "out there" and not "in there", so to speak. This means that the 
quality of outdoor life is in principle the same whether it is exercised in Central Park, 
NY or Saltfjellet, Norway; i.e., a mechanical "quality". The point is that traditional, 
especially Norwegian, outdoor-life is so much more than merely having the access to 
physical areas where we can for example go off hiking. Outdoor-life happens "twice" 
as much inside us. Through traditional outdoor-life we experience something inside 
us which we find meaningful and of enormous value. These inner values must to a 
significantly greater degree be incorporated into environmental management if we 
are to base development on eco-friendliness and philanthropic values. In order to 
reveal these values, however, we must start by studying different phenomena not 
solely through using objective techniques but also through subjective and 
phenomenological methods. The first thing we can do in this respect is to change the 
manuals so that proponents can start asking the right questions, apply interpretative 
methods and so. 
Analogous to the focus on objective social impacts, the natural science part also 
concerns factual knowledge. The appendix (attached) lists major ecological impacts 
which a proponent of an initiative is required to assess: 
'type of emissions, including dust, sot, strong smells, large amount of steam, 
etc.'; regarding water: ' ... increase in acidification ... biological and chemical 
substances' ... ; regarding climate: ' ... C02, methane, nitrous, CFC?36, 
36 (ibid., , p. 63). 
124 
Knowledge about physical and chemical effects of an initiative is highly sophisticated 
and important information which can help us in decision-making processes. But 
without subjective evaluations it makes little sense. Natural science in relation to 
environmental impacts assessments should therefore, from a hermeneutical 
perspective, function rather like lighthouses, signalizing what the consequences of 
our activities can be, so that we in turn can decide what we ought to do. This is also 
the intention of the manual, but when subjective and phenomenological impacts are 
left out of the discussion/assessments, it makes little sense to discuss the physical 
impacts without discussing what these mean. Maybe the idea is that subjective 
evaluations are a political matter, which they must indeed be to a certain extent 
(e.g., the establishment of general norms and ru les), but the actual meaning 
dimension of the activity, that is, how work is experienced spontaneously, etc., can 
only be revealed through personal inquiries. Syntheses of this kind, that is, objective, 
subjective and phenomenological impacts, represent the crux of hermeneutical 
studies and are what the manuallacks. 
The discussion above reveals a clear perception of science compatible with the 
logical positivistic-analytical tradition. It thus seems that the most important criteria 
for developing truthful and scientific knowledge according to the T-746 manual is 
through the assessment of objective and value neutral facts about a fragmented part 
of the economy, society and ecology. This is not consistent with the ontologies of the 
manual. 
Conclusion: The received perception of science. 
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5 Scientific ideal 
As stressed severai times the components of a paradigm are tightly interrelated -
rather like a woven Turkish carpet. The scientific ideal includes the normative 
assumption a researcher/research community has towards how science should be 
practiced and progress. This may involve for instance following "an exemplar" or 
walking in the footsteps of one's master or supervising professor. 
The empirical data diseussed above revealed a logical positivistic theory of 
knowledge. The scientific ideal of this position we remember from Chapter III is the 
naturalistie ideal. The trait of this ideal, objectivism, is exactly what we observe in T-
746. Soda I, economic and environmental impacts (which in itself are ambiguous and 
extremely complex) are reduced to less confusable concepts, for example, "increased 
demand for goods and service", "expected years-of-Iabor", 'construetion of houses, 
emissions of C02, heat exposure, increased/decreased moisture etc., etc., etc. These 
impacts are of course important enough, but when focus turns exclusively towards 
the quantitative aspects of society instead of focusing on the 'wholeness' of what it 
means to be 'human', crucial information is neglected and left in the shadows. 
Corollary impacts are assessed from a reductionistic perspective which means that 
the interrelatedness between the impacts disappears. The awareness of this 
weakness is probably compensated through adding more and more questions about 
the objective, physical reality instead of turning inward to discover the psychic 
reality. 
Analytical sodal and ecological impacts such as those mentioned above are typically 
general or impartial and ought to be "value neutral". The analytical method is thus 
compatible with the ontological pre-assumption that nature is a commodity for 
human use, an assumption which must also originate from the analytical methods: 
the abstract, pure use-value picture of nature must be the work of the analytical 
method. Other intrinsic values of nature or humans are quickly regarded as far-
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fetched, religious or ideological in the light of the analytical method. Attempting at 
reducing intrinsic values into simpler objective parts and value neutral truths, that is, 
facts, is vainly. The major problem is that when, for example, the intrinsic value of 
nature is reduced into facts about all the parts which all the ecologists, poets, etc., in 
the whole world are able to chart down, for example, ecological facts about trees, 
birds, animals, mushrooms, berries, crops, grasshoppers, wind streams, the 
reflection on the water, the midnight sun, landscape silhouettes, etc. 37, the relation 
between these facts and what it actually means, is neglected. This is because 
scientific information based on the mainstream analytical methods is detached from 
valuesjfeelings. If our relation to nature were to be defined on the basis of isolated 
facts about nature, the whole meaning of the experience, i.e., our feeling towards 
nature, would also disappear. The statements Science without ethics is blind and 
ethics without science is empty or in other words 'Scientific information: has little 
relevance except in relation to evaluation' (Næss, 1999, p. 22), describes this point 
well. 
Conclusion: naturalistic ideal. 
6 Ethics 
The ethical dimension of research is important because researchers have a special 
role in society both with regard to individuals, collectives and the environment. The 
research question we work with in this subchapter is: how is the internal and 
external ethic of the T-746 manual? 
The internal and external ethical dimension is closely related to the scientific ideal 
described above. Internal ethics concerns norms and rules for how research is 
conducted. The manual thus interprets internal ethics in accordance with the 
naturalistic ideal. 
37 This is for example endeavored in 'Ecosystem and Human Well-being' Vol. 1, Chapter 2: Analytical 
Approaehes for Assessing Ecosystem Condition and Human Wel/-being, p. 37 (Hassan, et al., 2005). 
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The external ethic, that is, the inbuilt responsibility of a theory or model remains 
rather absent in this manual. This is due to the objective ideal emphasizing precisely 
value-neutrality, and thus people and places being perceived as things or objects. 
The whole purpose of ethics is to neither treat subjects nor objects merelyas objects 
or means but as sources of meaning. 
Conclusion: instrumental-utilitarian ethic. 
7 Esthetics 
Esthetics concerns the researchers' attitude towards presentation st yl es of scientific 
work. For example, literary st yl es contra mathematical/statistical styles. 
The T-746 does not state directly how impacts ought to be presented in an EIA 
document. The fact that it does not say anything about esthetics could, however, 
imply that it assumes a certain language or st yle. This claim is plausible in light of the 
following statement: 
'It must be emphasized that the disclosure in the message and possible 
consequential assessments ought to be decision relevant' in relation to 'those 
areas where impacts may become significantd8 (from Norwegian). 
These 'areas' are those mentioned under ontology and the research questions 
emphasized under the perception of science (see also appendix). This point in the 
direction of a pluralistic presentation styles. The fact that the manual does not state 
explicitly the need to include narratives or qualitative styles, however, point in 
direction of quantitative styles. 
It is also an objective assumption to believe that impacts for various stakes (e.g., 
economic, psychological, ecological) can be presented in a universal language 
'relevant' for decisions. The subjectivistic traditions centre on relativity; what is 
relevant depends on the affected subject, and not on some universal stimulus. This 
38 (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment 1990, p. 63). 
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together with the general reductionistic ideal of the manual points clearly in 
direction of quantitative-statistical styles. 
Conclusion: Quantitative-descriptive presentation st yle. 
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Appendix to chapter VI 
'APPENDIX 4' OF THE T-746 MANUAL OF 1990, pages 63-66. 
'CHECKLIST FOR AN INITIATIVE'S CONSEQUENCES ON ENVIRONMENT, NATURAl 
RESOURCES AND SOCIETY 
The type of consequences needing to be emphasized in an assessment and other 
potential impacts will depend on the individual initiative. In this appendix a checklist 
is presented which may be helpful with respect to recognizing which impacts need 
to be studied. The question list must be adapted to the individual initiative and will 
not be exhaustive for all types of initiatives. 
It has to be stressed that the information in an assessment and the impacts has to 
be decision relevant. They must shed light on the effects of the initiative to the 
extent necessary in order to decide whether and on what conditions realization is 
possible. This means that any requirement for environmental impact assessment 
does not automatically bring with them extensive studies concerning all potential 
impacts, but for those areas where the effects can be significant. 
THE INITIATIVES' CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 
Air: 
- Will the initiative result in increased air pollution? 
- Will the initiative lead to harmful air emissions? 
For both questions the proponent is asked to specify the type of emissions, including 
dust, soot, heavy smells, large amounts of steam etc. 
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Water: 
- Will the initiative result in increased acidification (eutrophication) of water bodies? 
Proponents are asked to assess the changes in the load of organic matter and 
nutrients. 
- Will the initiative lead to hazardous emissions into groundwater or surface water? 
Consider both biological and chemical substance. 
- Will the initiative cause major releases of cooling water, discharge of oily water, 
etc.? 
- Will the initiative affect the drinking water supply? 
Climate: 
- Will the initiative lead to an increase in emissions of greenhouse gases such as C02, 
methane, nitrous oxide and CFC? 
- Will the initiative affect local climate conditions (cold-air-streams, temperature 
changes 
etc.)? 
- Will the initiative cause emissions that can provide more fog than before? 
Noise and radiation level: 
- Will the initiative result in increased noise or vibration? 
Consider both increased continual stress levels and the possibility of periods of 
severe pressure. 
- Will the initiative result in increased emissions or annoying light? Consider 
different types of radiation and the rapid use of or intensity of light. 
Plant and animallife I genetic resources: 
- Will the areas of particular value to animal and plant life be affected (or registered 
protection worthy areas important for particular animal or plant life)? 
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Proponents are asked to specify which natural elements will be affected or lost and 
what importance they have in a local, regional and possibly national and 
international context. It is also necessary to look at areas and relationships that go 
beyond the actual influential area. 
- Will the initiative affect the reproductive conditions of wild game or fish? 
- Will the initiative affect the hunting or fishing conditions? 
- Will the initiative result in changes in the environment that may affect the living 
conditions of speeies of plants and / or animals in a fundamental way? 
- Will the initiative result in emissions to air or water that may affect the genes of 
speeies? 
- Will the initiative affect the genome of species directly? 
Particularly valuable natural environments: 
- Will the initiative affect or influence protected, protection worthy or other 
particular important natural environments? 
See also the questions regarding flora and fauna. 
Natural and culturallandscapes: 
- Will the initiative lead to the loss of whole landscapes or landscape elements? 
Factors considered in this context include line draw, biotopes, waterways and 
boundary zones. 
- Will the initiative represent a large-scale intervention which will affect the physical 
environment of the surrounding area to a significant extent? 
- Will the initiative change the historical content of the landscape? 
Cultural heritage: 
- Will cultural heritage and culturallandscapes be in danger of being lost as aresult 
of the initiative? 
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- Will special protection worthy cultural heritage, cultural environments or cultural 
landscapes be affected by the initiative and thus be in need of special protection? 
Other conditions: 
- Will the initiative lead to the emission of hazardous substances into the soil? 
- Will the initiative result in the production or waste which is difficult to destroy or 
store properly? 
- Will the initiative result in 50 large amounts of waste that it leads to deposition 
problems that requires some specific treatment, etc.? 
- Will the initiative result in increased risk of explosions, accidental releases of toxic 
gases 
etc? 
- Will the initiative change the stability of either the soil or the snow (e.g., 
deterioration of 
masses, erosion with effects on both land and in rivers, landslides or avalanches)? 
INITIATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF NATURAl RESOURCES 
land resources: 
- Will the initiative lead to changes in the agricultural resource base or operating 
conditions of agriculture? 
Matters that are considered in this context are those related to the conservation of 
soil, and changes due to competing land use, water facilities, groundwater lowering, 
pollution etc. 
- Will the project lead to changes in the reindeer husbandry operations basis? 
Water, including groundwater: 
- Does the initiative hinder current or future use of water resources? 
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Cf. the general questions concerning water pollution. 
Minerals and masses: 
- Does the initiative hinder current or future use of known occurrences? 
Marine resources: 
- Does the initiative involve the use of marine resources to such an extent that it 
causes major consequences for the environment? 
AN INITIATIVE'S SOCIETAL CONSEQUENCES 
The assessments of social and societal consequences of EIA required initiatives will 
include various leveis: regional and local. Larger initiatives may also have 
consequences at a nationallevel. The main issues an impacts assessment will be 
concerned with are the following. 
Business and employment: 
- Will the initiative affect the demand for labor? 
The proponent is asked to describe both what kind of labor that is demanded and 
the effects it causes on the labor market both during the development and the 
operation ph ase. 
- Will the initiative affect the demand for goods and services? 
Here goods and services are noted down during development and operation 
- Will the initiative have impacts for other industries? 
Here the kind of impacts one is talking about (structural, market related, change 
productivity) are noted down. 
Development and construetion of houses 
- Will the initiative affect current development patterns and plansjguidelines for the 
future? 
- Will the initiative affect the scope and localization of houses? 
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- Will the initiative lead to an increase in the need for infrastructure such as roads, 
water-supplies, etc. 
- Will the initiative be easily operated through collective transportation or does it 
lead to an increase in private transportation? 
Economic effects 
- Will the initiative have any regional/national economic impacts? 
- Will the initiative have any effects on the local economy? 
One is here thinking of both changes in revenues and expenses for the municipality 
as a consequences of the initiative and from potential governmental transactions. In 
addition come consequences in relation to the municipality's administration, 
planning- and development capacity. 
Sodal and welfare related conditions 
- Will the initiative have effects on municipalities and local communities? 
- Will the initiative lead to changes in settling-patterns, demography and 
communication which can affect social networks and the care services? 
- Will existing buildings, business activities, houses or outdoor-areas be affected by 
the initiative? 
- Will the initiative cause changes in living conditions or environment? 
- Will the initiative cause re-Iocalization of people or the loss of other businesses? 
- Will the initiative cause a change in demand or supply of public and private goods 
and services? 
- Will the initiative cause a potential increase of conflicts between different cultures 
or stakeholders? 
- Will the initiative have impacts on the Sam! culture? 
- Will the initiative affect the health of the employees, user groups or others? 
- Will the initiative affect the opportunities to exercise cultural or recreation 
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activities? 
- Will the initiative have any other effects of soeial or welfare-related character? 
Should include a description of how the initiative can be facilitated 50 that soeial and 
welfare conditions are best looked after. 
Outdoor-life and recreation: 
- Will the initiative affect different populations' opportunities to exereise different 
types of outdoor-life or recreation activities in the local environment, or reduce 
accessibility to nature areas, swimming sites, etc.?' 
- Will the initiative affect the population's opportunities to experience wild animals 
or nature?' 
- Will the initiative affect the opportunity to exercise outdoor recreation activities?' 
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CHAPTER VII: THE CASE OF LATEST NORWEGIAN EIA MANUALS AFTER 
2000 
llntroduction 
In this chapter the lotest Norwegian manuals on EIA will be discussed in relation to 
the hermeneutic-reflective apparatus outlined in Tab.3, Chapter V (analogous to the 
discussion in Chapter VI). 
The main official document in Norway relating to the development of an EIA report is 
the 'Instruetion for Officiol Studies and Reparts' (UJ)v. The 'Instruction' was la id down 
by The Royal Decree of the 24th of June 2005. The purpose of 'The Instruction' is 
stated in the preface: 
'The purpose of these instructions is to ensure the proper preparation and 
administration of all work relating to official reforms, amendments to 
regulations and other measures. They shall contribute to ensuring cooperation 
and coordination in administrative procedures, the high quality of the studies 
and an effective process of communication between the body submitting the 
matter and consultative bodies,39. 
The Ul document is thus an overall controlling document for the conductance of an 
EIA and shall especially ensure that all relevant stakeholders are included actively in 
the EIA process, and that the actual research within an EIA is of high quolity. The Ul 
document is directed towards the ministries and at their underlying responsibilities. 
This implies that work with the actual assessment of impacts is not directly 
addressed in the 'Instructions', rather it transfers this responsibility to the affected 
Ministry. This is probably because each ministry knows their field best and is 
39 Ul, 2005, preface. 
http://www.regi .. ringpn.no/u pl Dad/FAD /Vr,d I f~gg/Stat5forva Itn i ng/Utred n i ngsi nstru kst! n t!ng. pdf 
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therefore most adequately able to outline relevant impact in relation to their stakes. 
An immediate question, however, to the procedural outlined here, is how the criteria 
of cooperation and coordination of different impacts are achieved when ministries or 
stakeholders are preparing their individual concerns in isolation? 
This chapter discusses the content of the individual manuals on EIA as they are 
worked out by the responsible Ministries of State. In total these include in all six 
manuals (see Tab. 4), the following reflective study has selected three of these. The 
manuals chosen here are (1) "Environmental Impact Assessments" (2000) for the 
Ministry of the Environment, "Health and Well-being in EIA" (2001) for the Ministry 
of Health and Care Services (2001) and "Social Economic Analysis" (2005) for the 
Ministry of Finance. These three policy pa pers are chosen specifically because 
together they address both the ecological, cultural/social and economic 
sides/impacts of an initiative, and because this information is crucial in order to 
answer the research question. 
Ministry of the Environment Environmental impact assessments vi (2000) 
Ministry of Children, Equality and Assessment of impacts for social inclusion 
Sociallnclusion (1999ti 
Ministry of Local Government Guidelines for loeal governmental EIA (1998;VUi 
and Regional Development 
Ministry of Health and Care Health and Well-Being in EIA (200lr 
Services 
Ministry of Trade and Industry Impact assessmentfor Business (2000t 
Ministry of Finance Social Economic Analysis (200Sr 
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2 The paradigm governing the manual on EIA after The Royal Norwegian Ministry 
of the Environment 
Ontology of nature 
This sub-chapter endeavors to illuminate the ontology of nature of the manual 
developed by The Royal Norwegian Ministry of the Environment (from now on 
referred to as "ME"). 
In the introduction of the manual it is stated that: 
I ••• whether a case could have significant consequences for the environment, 
the responsible authority should consider whether the case comes into 
conflict with key environmental policy objectives,40 (from Norwegian). 
The manual further refers to Governmental Report No. 26 from 2006, The 
Government's Environmental Policy and the State of the Environment in Norway, as 
one of the key bodies for environmental policy. In the preface of this report it is also 
stated: 
IThe report ... is the Government's most important document for a 
comprehensive presentation of their environmental policy,41xii (from 
Norwegian). 
50 what is the ontology of nature, that is, how does this report interpret what nature 
is? One answer can be found in Chapter 6: Conservation of biodiversity and outdoor-
life. The statement here speaks for itself: 
IBiodiversity, the variability among living organisms, can be divided into 
ecosystem, speeies and genetie diversity (see the Convention on Biological 
Diversity). For management purposes, it is essential to take into account the 
dynamic interactions between different components of natural systems. There 
40 T -1349, i ntrod uction, ,-"",,,,,,-,,-,-,-,-,-=:.:.=,-,=.:.:..:n",,,-,,"",,,"~t..=""-'-'-""'-"-"=..!==.:.:"-,,,,,,=-,-,-==<..,,-,,""--,-,,-
St.meld. nr. 26 (2006-2007) Regjeringens miljøpolitikk og rikets miljøtilstand. 
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is now growing awareness of the importance of ecosystem services, which 
cover the whole range of goods and services supplied by biodiversity. They 
include provisioning services (e.g. food, fibres, medicines), regulating services 
(e.g. climate regulation, water regulation), cultural services (e.g. spiritual 
benefits, education, aesthetic valuel and supporting services that maintain the 
conditions for life on earth (e.g. soil formation, pollination, primary 
production)'42. 
The statement here articulates ontologies compatible with Deep-Ecology and 
subjectivism. This is made evident from at least two cases. The first is the recognition 
that human beings and ecosystems are fundamentally One Unit y, i.e. a monistic view. 
The second case is the recognition that the trait of natural ecosystems is best 
understood and explained in terms of relations not atoms. 
(onelusion: Holistic-organic and subjective ontology. 
Ontology of man 
This subchapter elaborates more on the ontology of man of the manual on EIA for 
the ME. 
The image of man in this manual can be revealed from the research questions 
addressed in the appendix of the manual. 
Appendix I (attached to this chapterl of the manual contains a checklist consisting of 
two chapters. Each chapter addresses 8 and 10 research questions respectively. The 
first chapter addresses problems in relation to environmental- and health damaging 
pollution. The 8 questions are exclusively of a physical-objective art; that is, nature is 
perceived as a constellation of physical atoms, that is, they are designed to evaluate 
all environmental impacts on a purely physical-objective scale such as: al water 
quality, bl releases of phosphorus and nitrogen, cl oil, dl (02, S02, etc (see Appendix 
42 White Paper Nr. 26 (2006-2007): The Government's Environmental Policy and the State of the 
Environment in Norway, p. 70, box 6.1, from Norwegian, emphasis added. 
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1). These 8 questions strongly indicate both formal and regional objective 
ontologies, since it signalizes that man is only concerned with the physical-chemical 
environmental effects of an initiative, because values of a non-physical art, i.e. 
subjective meaning codes/values, such as esthetical, ethical and religious 
experiences are totally ignored. The image of man traceable in the checklist is thus 
that of an instrumental actor needing to be controlied through external forces, that 
is, man is not perceived as a morally responsible being whose quality of life depends 
on meaningful experiences of the world. 
An attempt to evaluate environmental impacts, that is, meaningful ecological values 
solely through changes in physical and chemicals conditions, must indeed postulate a 
clear ontology of man which is reductionistic and compatible with the IRRP. 
"Subjective-impacts" are left behind in the first chapter of the manual. 
Objective/physical effects, i.e. atomistic knowledge, are of course relevant and 
important, but when this constitutes the only information about environmental 
impacts, the picture of the whole is lost, that is, how human beings are affected as 
subjects, that is, what environmental degradation actually means for the 'mental 
horizon': the lebenswelt of a human being; i.e., the psychic "effects". 
Chapter 2 of the appendix bears evidence of a quite different ontology of man, that 
is, man as a moral-meaning-oriented being, that is, man as a subject. Here problems 
in relation to whether a project will conflict with valuable areas, the use of these and 
biodiversity are addressed: 
2.4. Will the initiative have significant consequences for, or for sites close to, 
critical habitat for protected or endangered species? 
2.5. Will the initiative lead to the spread of organisms that do not naturally 
belong in, and / or may harm the local habitats / ecosystems? 
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2.6. Will the initiative affect the harvest and other uses of living resources 50 
that species or populations are cut off or threatened? 
2.7. Will the initiative have significant consequences for valuable areas for 
fishing, hunting, or recreation, or impede the general traffic or access to such 
areas? 
The ten questions (see appendix to Ch. VII) are here design ed to cover how ethical 
and esthetical values or meaning codes could potentially be affected or relate to the 
project. Here both values in relation to biodiversity, esthetics and cultural 
experiences of nature are addressed. The intuitive concern for ecological values here 
is probably due to the fact that the manual postulate a subjective ontology as point 
of departure. 
Chapter 2 of the appendix is thus an attempt to supplement the pure physical-
objective values, addressed in Chapter 1, with subjective and phenomenological 
values. The conclusion must therefore be that the manual also interprets the 
ontology of man in accordance with the subjective ontology. 
Conclusion: Subjective ontology. 
Perception of science 
The research question asked here is: how is the perception of science in the manual 
on EIA after ME? This question is most important because it sheds light on how 
environmental impacts are studied. In the previous sub-chapter we saw that the 
problem identjfication of the manual centered on objective, subjective and 
phenomenological data. This sub-chapter endeavors to illuminate which 
epistemological theory the manual applies and thus promotes for proponents for 
studying social-environmental phenomena (objective, subjective and 
phenomenological impacts). 
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In the chapter: "What should an environmental assessment contain?" 43 the 
following informative state ment is made: 
'The consequences of a case should be numerical as far as possible. 
Qualitative descriptions and arguments will be a temporary necessity. It 
should, therefore, in each case be considered which consequences that should 
be quantified, how this should be done, and what consequences should be 
hand led by means of qualitative assessments'44. 
From the quotations above it is evident that the manual recognizes the need to 
include both quantitative and qualitative methods. The need to use both 
quantitative, objective, 'I-It' and qualitative, subjective, 'I-Thou' means of inquiring 
data and knowledge is compatible with hermeneutie epistemology. 
The manual, however, seemingly from the quotation above, puts more emphasis on 
the need to quantify environmental impacts. From a subjectivistic point of view, 
hermeneutic-phenomenological description or qualitative impacts obtained through 
participatory studies are equally important as physical-quantitative impacts. 
The research questions addressed in Chapter 2 of the appendix of the manual (see 
Appendix 1), are typically interpretative questions whose purpose is to reveal 
meaning and build holistic understanding of the impacts which an initiative may 
impose. This inevitably means that the researcher ought to be involved or close to 
the study phenomenon. Therefore the need for qualitative methods seems rather 
more reasonable than what the manual recognizes. 
43 (The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2000, p. 2). 
44 Ibid., from Norwegian. 
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This in addition to the fact that the manual does not recognize the need to synthesize 
quantitative and qualitative knowledge, that is, to study the 'parts' in relation to the 
'whole', but instead promotes that the majority of knowledge ought to be of a 
quantitative nature and that qualitative data ought to serve the function as mere 
supplements, points in the direction of a dominating positivistic perception of 
science. The reason why the manual does not put considerable emphasis on the 
need to synthesize knowledge about the 'part' in relation to the 'whole' is probably 
because of the objectivistic ideal. This means that subject and phenomenological 
knowledge do not meet the rigid criteria of objectivity. The result of not synthesizing 
factual knowledge with ethical and phenomenological knowledge is blind science, 
that is, a whole lot of data, "facts", which do not hel p us understand what we ought 
to do. 
It is therefore plausible to conclude that the perception of science in the manual is 
the positivistic, subject-object theory of knowledge. 
Conclusion: The received perception of science. 
Scientific ideal 
The total absence of guidelines and procedures for synthesizing facts and values in a 
hermeneutical manner represents evidence of a positivistic-reductive ideal. The 
hermeneutical alternative implies that analytical statements are synthesized into a 
holistic picture which encompasses both value priorities and 
phenomenologicaljexperience values; i.e., intrinsic values. The general lack of 
information regarding how to synthesize quantitative and qualitative information 
signalizes ignorance towards hermeneutical methods. 
This is also areasonable claim because of the dominant focus placed on quantitative 
methods and the general lack of any type of system for gathering personal 
knowledge. 
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Maybe the strongest evidence for claiming that the scientific ideal of the manual is 
not the hermeneutical ideal is the total absence of any normative predicaments, that 
is, a system for regulating ecological footprints. Normative predicaments or systems 
are characterized by fundamental norms and values. For example statements such as 
"a project should this and that, a project should not this and that." 
Conclusion: Naturalistic ideal. 
Ethics 
The consequence of an objective knowledge theory and the general unwillingness to 
both include values and to synthesize them with facts, both signalize a reactive 
attitude towards external responsibility. An instrumental attitude towards 
environmental responsibility is also directly expressed in the manual. The manual 
here discusses the content of "What an environmental assessment ought to include": 
'An account of how the environmental impacts of a case can be remedied,4s. 
The reason why the manual finds it necessary to substitute the degradation of 
environmental values with remedies (e.g., of an environmental, cultural or economic 
art) is probably because impacts are predominantly studied through objective-
physical methods or "lenses", thus leaving any value evaluation behind. The 
consequence of this in turn, is a pure material-physical perception of what nature is 
(ontology) which in turn leads to the perception that natural resources are 
substitutable (as the quotation strongly signalizes). 
Conclusion: instrumental-utilitarian ethic. 
45 Ibid., from Norwegian, emphasis added. 
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Esthetics - Presentation styles 
As discussed in the perception of science the manual emphasizes the need to include 
both quantitative-statistical figures and qualitative descriptions. This invites 
proponents to include a wide range of presentation st yl es; e.g., statistical patterns 
and thick descriptive narratives. 
Conclusion : Pluralism in choice of esthetics. 
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3 The paradigm governing the manual on Health and Well-being after The Royal 
Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services (MHCS). 
The following manual is obviously of extreme importance in relation to research on 
human-existential conditionsjimpacts of large scale national development projects. 
The sub-chapter attempts to reflect upon the manual in the light of the hermeneutic 
reflective apparatus presented in Tab.3, Chapter V. The meta- or paradigm analysis 
directs attention at those a priori presuppositions which the manual takes as point of 
departure, that is, the ontological, epistemological and methodological fundament. 
Ontology of man 
The ontology of man of the manual developed by the MHCS can be interpreted from 
how it interprets the concept of 'health': 
'Health and well-being represent the frame for life and welfare' and 'are 
amongst those foctors we volue the most in our existence . ... Health is a state 
of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity .... Health is the ability to master everyday 
demands .... individuals' and groups' ability for responsibility, participation, 
solidarity, mastery and contral over one's own life and situation' (Ståvi, 2001, 
pp. 11,14,15, emphasis added). 
Here we find evidence of an ontology of man in accordance with subjective ontology. 
This means that 'man' is perceived as a hermeneutical being with existential meta-
needs (e.g., responsibility towards others) and a free will (the need to master one's 
own unique, indeterministic destiny). This is especially evident from the orientation 
on the inner and ethicol life of a subject here expressed through "self-control", 
"mental and social well-being", "solidarity" and "responsibility". These are all 
features surpassing objective ontology. 
Further the manual emphasizes the relationship between conservation of natural 
environments and health by launching a model (Fig. 14) describing how human 
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health and wellbeing are both physically and psychologically dependent on 
jinterrelated with 'nature: 
'conservation of natural environments is ultimately all about our future 
health, and that securing flora and fauna is thus about securing our health .... 
In addition to the usefulness future generations will have of access to pure air, 
pure water, and original biological diversity etc., many today will enjoy - and 
through that experience well-being - handing over our natural heritage to 
future generations' (Ståvi, 2001, p. 12)46 
Conservation of natural environment 
Lang run 
Securing natural habitats, 
Flora, fauna 
Air pollution, 
emissions, 
nois 
Conservation of health 
and well·being 
l 
Indoor environment, 
noise 
Short run 
The manual here provides precise descriptions of subjective, monistic ontology, that 
is, man as a being-in-the-world and not as a self-enclosed ego. The quotation is also 
evidence of the enormous potentialjcapacities latent in human beings to learn and 
develop and expand their mental horizon and thus experience higher states of 
46 (Ståvi, 2001, p. 12, ch. 1.1, from Norwegian) 
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meaning. The description here is also truly in tune with the interpretation of man as 
an ecocentric actor, that is, human or "my" health ultimately depends on nature's or 
"your" health, not only today, but also with reference to future generations. 
Further the manual states about the concept of 'health' and 'well-being': 
'The absenee of noise, local air pollution, radiation, toxic gases, and accidents 
in addition to access to dean water are important prerequisites for a good 
health and well-being. Also aur experienee of the physieal environment, that is, 
esthetieal relations, affeet us ... The prerequisites which are important for the 
social environment and the population's activities encompass organized and 
unorganized, formal and informal, networks between human beings and 
places where networks can prosper and grow' (Ståvi, 2DD1, p. g, from 
Norwegian, emphasis added). 
Here the empirical material provides evidence of subjective ontology. This is evident 
because the quotation interprets that human health and well-being is ultimately 
constituted through the 'I-Thou' attitudejrelationship between both man and man 
and man and nature. 
The last example which we shall interpret is a 'two-dimensional' model from the 
manual whose purpose is to illuminate the complexities associated with health and 
well-being. The model illustrates that 'good' and 'bad' health and well-being depend, 
"paradoxically", on both objective (physical) and subjective (psychological) qualities 
(see fig. 15): 
'A health concept of this kind elucidates the apparent paradox that a human 
being can have good health objectively speaking, but still experience low 
quality of life or miss-well-being' (Ståvi, 2DD1, p. 16, from Norwegian). 
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The conclusion must be that the manual holds a subjectivistic ontology of man, that 
is, man as a subject whose health and well-being depends on both material (physical) 
and immaterial (psychic) conditions. The reasoning we see here points in the 
direction ofthe Maslowian interpretation of human needs/values (cf. Chapter Ill). 
Conclusion: Subjective ontology. 
Good 
Mental 
wellness 
Bad 
Bad healthj 
Miss well~being 
Unhealthy Physical state 
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Well-being 
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Perception of science 
Now after the ontology has been revealed we turn to the question of how the 
manual interprets what scientific knowledge is. The reflection here aims at 
elucidating how the MHCS interprets that an EIA ought to go on and conduct the 
Science of Man, that is, how to produce knowledge about human health and well-
being impacts. 
The manual states in relation to the concept of 'well-being' that it is much more 
complex and 'diversified' than the concept of 'health and corollary: 
'Health and well-being is of ten fragmentary and partially inadequately 
iIIuminated in various types of decision making assessments' (Ståvi, 2001, p. 7, 
from Norwegian, emphasis added). 
Here the manual emphasizes the ambiguities related to social research on 
phenomena such as health and well-being. This is probably because the concept has 
a fundamentally subjective nature. In light of this reasoning the manual alarms the 
reader about an important epistemological consequence: 
'The word "well-being" has not been "academized" to an equal extent. "WeII-
being" must be perceived to be even more diversified than the concept of 
"health", at the same time as the large individual differences make an 
objective definition extremely difficult. There is therefore in this context not 
made an attempt to provide any clear-cut definition of the concept of well-
being. When well-being is still included in this report it is to assure an 
expanded understanding of the concept of health as the basis for the factors 
that ought to be considered in this type of impact assessments.' (Ståvi, 2001, 
p. 11, from Norwegian, emphasis added). 
The recognition here that an objective definition of well-being is extremely difficult 
and probably impossible, accords with the hermeneutical theory of knowledge. This 
is because hermeneutics postulates that well-being or the 'meaning-horizon' of a 
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subject is system dependent, that is, it depends on his pre-understanding and 
personal horizon and lebenswelt. From a hermeneutical perspective it is therefore a 
fallacy on its own to attempt to provide a "clear-cut" definition of well-being. This is 
because a pluralistic perception of the concept is rather closer to the truth than any 
clear cut definition can ever be. 
The result, however, despite the fact that the manual recognizes the severely 
limitations of 'objectifying' the concept of 'well-being', is precisely to fall into the 
trap that one has warned oneself so fretfully against; that is, to produce 
fragmentaryjreductionistic knowledge. This claim is evident from the statement 
made by the authors in the summary of the manual: 
'The essentials of an impact assessments will be to examine the external 
factors that provide the basis for social environment and activity' (Stå vi, 2001, 
p. g, emphasis added, from Norwegian). 
The statement here points in the direction of an interpretation of science compatible 
with the objectivistic definition of science. From the statement it is clear that the 
manual perceives that the only way to generate certain scientific knowledge about 
'health' and 'well-being' is through detached observation of the external social 
world, that is, objective studies, that is, 'I-It' knowledge. This is despite the fact that 
the manual recognizes the subjective and immaterial nature of the concept, and the 
problems related to "academizing" the concept. 
The reason why the manual perceives that the only way to inquire knowledge about 
the phenomenon is through 'external factors', is probably due to the enormous 
influence the positivistic tradition has had during the last 50-70 years (cf. discussion 
in Chapter III and IV). The fact that the manual recognizes the severely limitations of 
objectifying the concept of 'well-being' is, however, probably because of the 
subjectivistic ontology which the manual takes as point of departure. 
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The manual does in fact discuss that since 'health' is such a complex phenomenon, it 
is very difficult to conceptualize it and therefore also to study it in a scientific way. 
The manual then concludes that since scientists are not able to generate holistic 
knowledge about the concept: 
'We therefore depend on others in society, both private and public, taking 
into account the health and well-being in the exercise of their responsibilities' 
(Ståvi, 2001, p. 15, from Norwegian). 
It is strange that a manual with professional competence in health and well-being 
studies cannot present methods and guidelines on how to produce adequate 
scientific knowledge about health and well-being. Instead the manual puts fate in the 
hands of manager's own intuition, which may be excellent; but still it is rarely wise, 
not to mention responsible, to manage a project without being prepared. And on the 
other hand, is it not the case that knowledge about the concept ought to be 
constitutive for which projects we regard desirable/not-desirable? i.e., the projects 
contributing to meaningfuljmeaningless development? 
The claim that the perception of science of the manual is in the logical positivistic 
tradition is utterly reasonable from the last empirical evidence and from the 
discussion of the scientific ideal in the next section. The claim that the ontology is 
anchored in the existential tradition also becomes clearer now. Why should the 
manual otherwise promote a humanistic culture perceiving human health and well-
being as constituted by an ongoing process between social actors whose mutual trust 
represents the driving value; that is a true 'I-Thou' meeting. From a subjective-
hermeneutical perspective, well-being is system dependent and knowledge about 
this system is only possible when under open and free conditions, that is, in an '1-
Thou' meeting. First then is it possible to enter the other's world and make sense of 
it; that is, to understand what the other feels meaningful and not meaningful; that is, 
to understand how the concept of health and well-being is interpreted by the unique 
person. This method of inquiry or attitude is exactly what the manual promotes in 
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the quotation above. Masiowaiso argues that the most adequate role of a therapist 
is to develop an authentic friendship with the client. This is because, amongst other 
needs/values, health and well-being prerequisite the gratification, to various degrees 
(depending on one's profile cf. Chapter Ill), of the need for social contact and 
friendship. It is this simple one may say. It is also tempting to draw the obvious 
conclusion that projects which contribute to meaning and well-being focus strongly 
on social relations, that is, on fostering friendships. 
Conclusion: The received perception of science. 
Scientific ideal 
In this part the study presents empirical data of the concrete methods, models and 
theories which the manual recommends for the study of (man) the phenomena of 
'health' and 'well-being'. 
In the summary of the manual the following state ment is made: 
'Regarding documentation of every single factor that influences health and 
well-being, it is stated how the current situation can be documented and how 
the possible consequences can be analyzed and evaluated, irrespective of the 
type of plan and action. ... It is a fundamental principle that the 
documentation is well structured, and makes a clear distinction between facts 
and judgments, 50 that the material is verifiable' (Ståvi, 2001, p. 8, from 
Norwegian, emphasis added). 
The empirical data presented here can hardly be interpreted otherwise than in the 
direction of meaning that the scientific ideal governing the manual is the logical 
empirical ideal. This is because the manual emphasizes the need to produce 
objective, universal, that is, truth claims which can be applied independently of 
context and history; and verifiable data about single external factors which are 
'complex cause-effect relations' (Ståvi, 2001, p. 8). These criteria represent the gist 
of the naturalistic ideal (cf. Chapter Ill). 
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In Chapter 9, Assembly - Overall assessment of the possible impacts for health and 
well-being, the manual launches a mathematical modeljformula which describes the 
total health threat picture (see Fig. 16) both in the short, medium and long term 
(Ståvi, 2001, p. 101). This is a typical model built up around the positivistic 
philosophy of knowledge. The manual also stress the difficulties of converting 
consequencesinto'price~: 
'The main reason for this is because there exists a vast empirical knowledge 
gap for estimating the costs of most health and well-being effects' (Ståvi, 
2001, p. 102) . 
The examples illustrate that health and well-being impacts ought to be described 
objectively through the language of mathematics. 
L( (AxO) k+(AxO) m+(AxO) 
1+(AxO)a)-(NxO) 
A= Significance 
N= utility 
0= Scope/volume 
k= Short term 
m= Medium temr 
1= Long term; diffuse effect 
a= effects during development phase 
The manual here interprets that subjects should be studied as objects whose nature 
can be understood through observing an external social world; that is, spectator 
knowledge. This type of knowledge can only be mere superficial knowledge about 
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the 'parts' that constitute health and well-being, such as material conditions (e.g., 
physical freedom to move around, absenee of poisonous gasses, economic 
conditions, facilities, number of head per department, structure of demography, etc. 
etc.). Consider for example the research questions the manual asks in the proeess of 
producing knowledge about the phenomena 'social network': 
'How plausible is it that the initiative will lead to changes in living 
environments 50 that the moving frequency will be changed?; Which spatia I 
changes does the initiative lead to and how does this affect the accessibility of 
the people to meet? Will the use of these areas be affected by noise, 
pollution, etc.?' (Ståvi, 2001, p. 73, from Norwegian). 
Material conditions are of course important and to a certain degree vital for human 
health and well-being, but they are far from the 'whole'. The "factors" that build 
health and well-being from a hermeneutical perspective, are the inner social values, 
the immaterial values, such as (the quality of the relation between the "heads" in the 
department, the proeesses behind the economic salary, spiritual freedom to not do 
what is against one's will, etc. etc.) What is laeking from a hermeneutical perspective, 
in other words, is subjective and phenomenological knowledge aimed at revealing 
the meaning dimension and spontaneous experience. A hermeneutical approach will 
use knowledge about external conditions as supplementary information. The 
corollaries of focusing only on the external sides lead to aremote, superjicial and 
cold description of social networks. 
Conclusion: There can be no dispute regarding the conclusion that the current 
scientific ideal of the manual is the naturalisticjscientific ideal. 
Ethics 
The internal ethic of the manual is that associated with the scientific ideal of the 
manual. 
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The external ethic has not been illustrated and discussed directly, but the careful 
reader will probably already have comprehended the situation. This is mainly due to 
the intimate relationship between the components of a paradigm. 
The external ethic is rendered adequately transparent by the following state ment: 
'It is a fundamental principle to ensure that documentation is properly 
structured and that faet and evaluation are distinguished from one and 
another, 50 that the material is verifiable' (Ståvi, 2001, p. 8, from Norwegian). 
The method for assessing health and well-being impacts emphasizes the need to 
make a sharp distinction between 'facts' and 'judgments', limit the studies to 
'external factors', ensure verifiability, etc. (cf. scientific ideal). In other words the 
methods and models promoted are purely scientific and thus objective and 
superficial, that is, subjeets and objeets are treated like things/objeets and the ethics 
thus remains objective or value-neutral; i.e., non-existing. 
Conclusion : instrumental-utilitarian ethic. 
Estheties 
Esthetics is an important part of scientific activity because it represents the medium 
between the scientist and the community (Iayman) 50 to speak. In other words, the 
knowledge (expressible and tacit) of a social phenomenon obtained by the 
researcher through careful and painstaking studies is brought forward to decision-
makers and others through esthetics. 
As a consequence of the dominating focus on objective health and well-being 
components, statistics encompass the preferable presentation st yle of the manual. 
The manual provides severai examples regarding how statistics can be used to 
analyze the social impacts. The example shown below are all taken from the manual 
addressing different social phenomena such as demography, unemployment rates, 
social care rates, social problems, crime rates, etc.: 
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From a hermeneutical perspective the hard data presented here constitutes 
knowledge of the 'parts', i.e. the superficial social conditions. This becomes clear 
remembering the discussion in the manual concerning ontology which stressed the 
problems of objective studies due to the individual or subjective nature of the 
concept of health and well-being. Through these figures the manual ends up in the 
fallacies of fragmentation which it 50 fretfully warned itself of. Hermeneutics can 
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help us understand the problems of partial analytical (fragmenta ry) knowledge, that 
is, to synthesize objective, subjective and phenomenological knowledge into holistic 
knowledge. 
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4 The paradigm governing the manual on Sodal Economic Analysis after The Royal 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance. 
In this sub-chapter the thesis discusses the a priori assumption underlying the 
Manual on Social Economic Analysis (now MSEA) for The Ministry of Finance. The 
MSEA is perhaps the most important manual of all the manuals mentioned in Tab. 4 
above. This is because the economic aspects of a project contribute to the actual 
realization of the project (cf. the Instruction). Therefore the image of man and 
science prevailing here is probably constitutive and defining for the whole project 
both in theory and practice! 
Ont%gy of man 
In Chapter 2.1 the manual states the purpose of a MSEA: 
'The main purpose of economic analysis is to identify, high/ight and 
systematize the consequences of actions and reforms before a decision is 
made. These include, amongst other things, costs in relation to the official 
budgets, revenue and co st changes for private households and private 
industry in addition to effects on the environment, health and safety,47. 
As indicated here, the manual on SEA endeavors to cover all economic, social and 
environmental impacts of a project. This is probably why it is considered sa 
important. 
The Ministry of Finance does not express which image of man, or nature for that 
matter, the MSEA takes as point of departure. In order to reveal the ontology it is 
therefore necessary to deduce this from methods and thearies applied by the 
manual. 
The manual launches three main socio-economic-analysis-models which can be 
applied in order to determine whether or not a project is socio-economic beneficia/o 
47 (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2005, p. 8, from Norwegian). 
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These are: 'Cost-benefit analysis' (CBA), 'cost-efficiency analysis' (CEA) and 'cost-
effect analysis' (CIA) 48. 
On CBA the manual states: 
'In a cost-benefit analysis all effects are valued in Norwegian Kroner as far as 
possible. The Krone values are then used to weigh the importance of the 
different effects in one another. If one summarizes the estimated value of all 
effects of a project and the sum is positive, the project is classified as socio-
economically beneficial'49. 
In a CBA all costs and benefits are measured in monetary units and the most 
economic rational alternative is chosen. In the CEA, however, the alternative is fixed; 
the question then is how to reach the given alternative in the most cost efficient 
way. The CIA builds on the assumption that different means may have different 
effects and we can thus not simply choose the alternative with the lowest costs. 
The three analyses clearly prerequisite that all sides of a project, that is, norms and 
values, needs, experiences, feelings, etc., etc., are converted into monetary values. 
Thisfundamental principle is also highlighted in the manual: 
'The main principle ... is that the Krone-value of a positive effect ought to be 
equal to what the population is willing to pay for it. That a project is socio-
economically beneficial therefore means that the population is willing to pay 
at least as much as the project costs'so. 
The gist of the models is then, an attempt to develop a model which can produce a 
purely instrumental, almost "physical", picture of the situation where all positive and 
negative effects are given a minimum or maximum price. This is of course a strong 
abstraction of the persons within the population because it removes any sense of 
48 Ibid., p.10 
49 Ibid., p.9 
50 Ibid. 
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subjective evaluation. It is also an even stronger abstraction to assume that all 
subjects in the whole society behave in this manner. From a hermeneutical 
perspective a person who prefers egocentric utility above everything, i.e. a person 
whose motivation and persona lit y is best understood through instrumental 
rationality, is an immature being who has not had the time, support or capacity to 
develop himself (such as a young child for instance). The manual also recognizes 
these problems: 
'it is not obvious that the monetary size captures welfare effects as a whole. 
The analysis purely measures money, that is, the willingness to pay and not 
welfare. The benefits of a project will vary from person to person and there 
are no professionally accepted methods to measure and compare the benefits 
between people ... The results of the analysis must be interpreted with 
discretion and conclusions must be based on ethical and political 
evaluations,51. 
It is strange, when reading this, for many reasons, why mainstream economists do 
not make more of an effort to develop models and theories capturing the ethical and 
political sides of the economic actor when they themselves recognize the need and 
value of such approaches. Instead they apparently go on with their abstract analyses 
which are so far from actual social life. It must be boring for a devoted economist to 
know that his analyses do not accord to social lifejreality and that politicians must 
evaluate whether his professional work is of value or a waste of time. The 
economists should rather have been a physicist. The most severe problem, however, 
is the irresponsible attitude of these modelsjresearchers. Busy politicians rarely have, 
I assume, the time, skiIIs nor the right to evaluate the work of external, "value-
neutral" professional parties because this would be an attack on free democracy. 
The various three models here postulate objective regional ontology, whose 
personality and motivation is characterized by instrumental rationality. This is 
51 Ibid. 
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evident from the three models because it juxtaposes economic, sodal and ecological 
values into pure instrumental values; that is, all values are converted into prices. 
Conclusion: objective ontology. 
Perception of Science 
In this sub-chapter the thesis discusses the epistemology positioning of the MSEA. 
The methods applied in the manual on Sodal Economic Analysis (SEA) - cost-benefit 
analysis (C BA), cost-efficient analysis (CEA) and cost-effect analysis (CIA) - offer an 
attempt to measure the costs versus the benefits of the various alternatives. The 
process of establishing correct benefits and costs is an issue involving advanced 
mathematics (see Fig. 23) and the inclusion of severai high ly debatable assumptions; 
one assumption obviously being that man behaves as an economic rational actor. 
The manual provides a simple example of how the present value of a project can be 
determined (box 2.6). The example here illustrates clearly how a theory based on 
objective ontology is perceived as true or scientific knowledge. The example 
considers socio-economic impacts of transforming an area into a national park. The 
total willingness to pay is estimated at 100 million Norwegian Kroner, while direct 
costs of construetion are 50 million NOK. Additional costs to be included are related 
to those already making a living in this area. The total economic value of these 
economies (hunting and gathering activities) is 20 millions. The example then 
concludes with the following calculation: 100-50-20 = 3D, which means that the 
present value amounts to 30 million Kroner. The project should then be initiated. 
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50 which perception of science can we draw from this example? First it must be said 
that the example is a brilliant illustration of how the objective-instrumental ontology 
of man works in practice. The illustration culminates when the example speedily 
states that those working with traditional economies in the area can find something 
else to do because they generate only 20 percent of the total willingness to pay. 
Secondly, the epistemological position here is truly characterized by an 'I-It' relation 
between the researcher (subject) and study objects (both man and nature). The 
models here represent attempts to stand outside the actual project, that is, both the 
humans involved (those working in the area and those who are "willing" to pay) and 
the environment, and conduct experiments in which both man and nature are 
perceived as "roiling bronze balls". The result of this is an extremely simplistic picture 
of the total picture, that is, of the economic, social and environment consequences. 
From a hermeneutical point of view, the process of deciding whether or not to 
construct a national park should have been approached otherwise. Firstly the 
economist should have recognized that here we are dealing with subjects not an 
object. The consequence of this "flash of awareness" is to develop a mutual dialogue 
between all stakeholders which ought to be based on communicative-argumentative 
rationality. 
The manual, however, includes one chapter which discusses 'Methods for 
systematizing non-price effect,s2. Here it is stated: 
52 (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2005, p. 29, chapter 4.5, from Norwegian). 
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'Through the carrying out of a socio-economic analysis, all effects ought to be 
valued. Nevertheless, those responsible for the project will be left with effects 
that are neither professionally nor ethically possible to express in money,53. 
As a solution to these "non-priced-values" the manual offers the following model 
(see Fig. 24)54: 1) Determine significance of the 'actual environment, area or object' 
by building a qualitative description ranging from 'Iow' to 'high' significance. The next 
step 2) is to determine the scope, that is, to what extent the initiative will impact the 
environment or the object. Here also a qualitative scale should be developed ranging 
from 'little' to 'large' positive and negative scope. The last step 3) is to determine the 
consequences found through evaluating the significant-factor in relation to the 
scope-factor. The result is a 3xl matrix ranging from a very positive value (++++) to a 
very negative value (----). The last part of the decision-making model is to count "+" 
against "_,, in order to determine the "best" and "worst" alternative. 
What can we then say about the perception of science this model builds on? The 
content of the model can include everything from objective quantifications to 
subjective and phenomenological interpretation (e.g. narratives, poems, etc.); i.e., 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Finally the model endeavors to juxtapose the 
different knowledge (objective, subjective and phenomenological) into "plusses" and 
"minuses"; that is, to turn qualitative knowledge into quantitative knowledge. The 
result of this is an objectification of subjective and phenomenological 
datajknowledge which is doomed to fail because qualitative data cannot be 
transferred into quantitative data; i.e., it cannot be made universal or general. How 
can, for example, data of subjective and phenomenological charaeter, such as "I like 
this job because I feel that I am mastering it well", be transferred into single 
objective factors? The holistic alternative must endeavor consensus between effects 
rather than weighting objective "+" and "-". 
53 {ibid. }. 
54 {ibid., , pp. 29-31}. 
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The conclusion must be that the perception of science in the MSEA is in general 
logical positivism; i.e., subject-object tradition. 
Conclusion: The received perception of science. 
Intet omfang 
positivt 
Middels 
lite 
positivt 
negiltlvt 
Stort 
negiltivt 
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Scientific ideal 
The scientific ideal is clear from the discussion on the perception of science. The 
different tools for analysis (CBA, CIA, and 50 on) are purely 
quantitative/mathematical models suitable for studying the external social world 
synonymous to the objects we study in the natural sciences. The science of social 
economics is therefore without dispute the naturalistic ideal used by the physical 
sciences. This is in accordance with the economists H. Daly and J. B. Cobb Jr. who 
state that: 
'Outside the physical sciences no field of study has more fully achieved the 
ideal form of academic discipline than economics' (Daly & Cobb Jr., 1994, p. 
25). 
Daly and Cobb term the tendency to convert all values into monetary means as 
IIImoney fetishism'" (1994, p. 37). 
N. Georgescu-Roegen phrased it nicely writing: 
'It is beyond dispute that the sin of standard economics is the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness' (Georgesc;:u-Roegen, 1971, p. 320). 
Conclusion: Naturalistic ideal. 
Ethics 
The manual on social economic analysis (SEA) by no means assumes any ethical 
responsibilities beyond the purely instrumental, meaning that it does not endeavor 
to internalize intrinsic values in the suggested methods and modeis; the CBA, CEA, 
CEA (cf. perception of science). The external ethic is thus non-existent. All these 
models endeavor to juxtapose intrinsic social and ecological values into expressed 
prices, that is, instrumental (economic) values. This was illustrated in the overview of 
ontology and the perception of science in which the manual also recognized the 
"money fetishism". A footnote in the manualliterary articulates the point: 
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' ... the interpretation of value used in this manual, is thus a numerical value 
expressing willingness to pay,55. 
The use of anti-ethical models in this manual is unfortunate. This is very worrying 
bearing in mind the vast potential consequences which EIA-research can bring for 
nature and society; for example in relation to decision about whether to initiate a 
large global project or minor local developments. To exercise the principle of value-
neutrality in social research can thus be compared with playing Russian roulette. This 
is because an anti-ethical model or theory endeavors to describe the effects of a 
project for all concerned stakeholders without speaking, without having a dialogue, 
without listen ing, without sensing, without meeting, without knowing and 
understanding stakeholders as subjects. Næss provides the following illustrative 
example of applying a utilitarian ethic when deciding whether or not to build a 
highway: 
'When 100,000 people can travel a little faster, thus increasing their happiness 
from level + 1 to + 2, what weight can be given to a small number of elderly 
people seeing their homes being torn down which results in lasting despair or 
resentment, representing level .;. 9 or .;. lO? Maybe the problem is 
approached, greatly simplified, through something like: .;. 10 times 20 is .;. 200, 
the transition from + 1 to + 2 for 100 000 gives + 100,000. This number minus 
200 gives + 99 800. The highway thus provides increased happiness! It should 
be built!' (Næss, 1999, p. 42). 
This example is similar to the one presented under the perception of science. The 
reason why the manual promotes research that is ethical blind is probably because 
the internal ethic of the positivistic ideal strives to develop value-neutral knowledge, 
assuming that any external ethical evaluation is unnecessary or "already taken care 
of" through the use of objective methods. 
55 (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2005, p. 29). 
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The reason for these economic models finding it necessary to simplify human 
nature is probably because neoclassical economics have strived so hard to live up to 
the classical scientific ideal of the natural sciences - in fact N. Georgescue-Roegen 
calls neo-classical economics 'a sister science of physics' (Georgesc,:u-Roegen, 1976, 
p.4) - thus rejecting any ethical or metaphysical speculation. Or to quote C. Taylor: 
'It seems easier and safer to cut all the nonsense off at the start by declaring 
all self-realization views to be metaphysical hog-wash' (Taylor, 1985b, p. 214). 
Economists have simply been overrun by the "Real Scientists", the physicists, who 
demanded that if a discipline were to be regarded as a scientific discipline it needed 
to be "objective". Subsequently the long-believed ultimate goal of scientific work 
was to explain the Natural Laws that govern nature, sociology or economics for 
which Galileo's and Newton's Laws served as ideals. In order for the science of 
economics to fit this rigid mechanical recipe for science, it was necessary to make the 
abstraction or assumption that human nature is purely rational. 
Conclusion: instrumental-utilitarian ethic. 
Es thetics 
Fig. 25 is an example taken from the manual on SEA illustrating how the social-
economic benefits of a project ought to be presented. The figure illustrates the 
relationship between costs and benefits over a period of four years for two projects. 
The presentation st yle is purely mathematical because all values (ecological, social 
and economic) are converted into pricesjutility. The table clearly presents that 
project "A" has the highest yearly utilityjbenefits. The benefits of this type of 
presentation styles are that they leave little doubt as to which alternative is the most 
beneficial; i.e., it is very easy for politicians to make a decision. The fallacy on the 
other hand concerns it being extremely superficial. Fig. 26 below is another 
presentation st yle typical for social economic analyses based on the manual. Here we 
see a 'decision tree' which calculates different present value relative to 
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uncertainties/risks in how individual preferences may develop. Again instead of 
conducting a dialogue with the parties, the model seeks to explain mechanistic 
behavior. 
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This subchapter illuminated the urgent need to use a broader spectrum of 
presentation st yl es in order to capture the holistic picture of ecological, social and 
economic impacts. 
Conclusion: Quantitative-statistical presentation styles. 
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Appendix to chapter VII 
'APPENDIX I' to the Manual on EIA, T-1349, after the ME (2001). 
1. Will the initiative contribute to environmental or health pollution? 
1.1. Will the initiative lead to significant impacts on water quality in inland or marine 
areas, sa that the ability to maintain speeies, ecosystems, human health and well-
being is reduced? 
1.2. Will the initiative lead to a significant increase in emissions of the nutrients 
phosphorus and nitrogen to inland or marine areas? 
1.3. Will the initiative lead to significant discharges of oil? 
1.4. Will the initiative lead to significant emissions and use of chemicals, affecting 
health or the environment? 
1.5. Will the initiative lead to the finalization of significant amounts of waste or to 
the emergence of significant quantities of hazardous waste? 
1.6. Will the initiative lead to a substantial increase in emissions of greenhouse 
gases, or to the production and consumption of ozone depleting substances? 
1.7. Will the initiative lead to substantially increased emissions of sulfur dioxide, 
nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds and ammonia; sa that nature's critical 
levels are exceeded? 
1.8. Will the initiative contribute to substantially increase local air pollution? 
1.9. Will the initiative contribute to a significant increase in noise? 
2. Will the initiative lead to infringement of valuable land and the use thereof, or 
affect biodiversity? 
2.1. Will the initiative cause significant interference, close routing or other 
influences that cause cultural heritage to be lost, damaged or have reduced quality? 
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2.2. Will the initiative affect the landscape significantly, including cultural and 
historicallandscape features and aesthetic qualities, in rural areas and / or in the 
towns and villages? 
2.3. Will the initiative have significant consequences for, or for areas close to 
national parks, conservation areas, nature reserves, protected waterways, natural 
monuments, sites proposed for protection, intervention-free areas, or endangered 
or vulnerable / challenging habitats? 
2.4. Will the initiative have significant consequences for, or for sites close to, critical 
habitats for protected or endangered species? 
2.5. Will the initiative lead to the spread of organisms that do not naturally belong 
in, and / or may harm the local habitats / ecosystems? 
2.6. Will the initiative affect the harvest and other uses of living resources so that 
species or populations are cut off or threatened? 
2.7. Will the initiative have significant consequences for valuable areas for fishing, 
hunting, or recreation, or impede the general traffic or access to such areas? 
2.8. Will the initiative have significant implications for areas close to homes, schools 
and kindergartens, and thus affect the access to free play and aims to establish a 
coherent green structure? 
2.9. Will the initiative have significant implications for other existing national plans 
regarding environmental protection, national land use policy, national codes and 
regulations, county plans and county sub-plans, or conflict with the goals of 
aesthetics and accessibility for the public? 
2.10. Will the initiative have significant implications for areas with high potential for 
food production or of major importance for the reindeer? 
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CHAPTER VIII THE CASE OF VESLEFRIKK FROM 1987 
llntroduction 
In this chapter the thesis diseusses the case of the Environmentallmpacts Assessment 
of Veslefrikk, conducted in the late 80's, in the light of the hermeneutic-reflective 
apparatus outlined in Tab. 3, Chapter V. 
The Veslefrikk project is an oil-field located in the south-east of block 30/3, 
approximately 145 km. west of Bergen. The main oil reservoir is located 3000 meters 
below sea-Ievel. Shareholders in the project are Det Norske (50%), Unocal Norge 
(22,5%), Norsk Hydro (10%), Deminex Norge (15%) and Svenska Petroleum 
Exploration (2,5%). 
2 Ontology of man 
Evidence of regional ontology can be deduced from Chapter 5, Deliveries of goods 
and services, of the EIA report. Chapter 5 represents the main social dimension of the 
assessment and places emphasis on the following categories: 
5.1) Total investments on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) 
5.2) Impacts for Norwegian businesses 
5.3) Contract- and purchase-philosophy 
5.4) Local impacts 
Category 5.1 studies the total investment profile of the NCS in monetary units and 
the corollary effect of investing in the Veslefrikk project (see fig. 32). 
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Category 5.2 illuminates that the development phase of the Veslefrikk project will 
cost approximately 3.4 billion Norwegian Kroner which Norwegian supply industry 
can compete for. 
Category 5.3 encompasses qualification criteria with regard to efficiency and quality 
which potential suppliers must satisfy. 
Category 5.4 emphasizes the economic effects in the local regions and states that: 
'Economic effects come in the form of increased order/volume and increased 
workload associated with increased revenues. Increased workload will in 
varying degrees lead to increased employment. Employment effects will 
depend on the degree of utilization capacity in the affected industries,S6 . 
The social values emphasized in these categories are exclusively concerned with the 
pure instrumental (economic) values of the Veslefrikk project. From the empirical 
material presented above there can be no disputing the fact that the EIA report takes 
as its point of departure an objective-instrumental ontology of man. This is obvious 
because the report simply does not put any emphasis on studying non-instrumental 
social value. In other words, human beings and the whole social dimension of the 
project are converted into non-cultural things. 
In Chapter 3.4, however, the assessment does emphasize safety issues in relation to 
personneI. Here it states that: 
'Safety for personnei, environment and investments is of great importance for 
the design of the installations,S7. 
The focus on designing platforms not directly endangering personnei and 
environments represents a willingness to internalize some cultural and 
environmental values however. 
56 Statoil, 1987, p. 37. 
57 Statoil, 1987, p. 15. 
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In Chapter 4.3, Biological and fish conditions, the assessment takes into account the 
interests of the fishing industry in terms of coordinating the two industries. 
In chapter 4.4, Other use- and prevention interests, the assessment also takes into 
account the values associated with shipping traffic in the area of Veslefrikk in 
addition to cultural heritages such as Stone Age settlements and sea graveyards. 
The assessment also includes environmental standards S8 in relation to pollution: the 
amount of oil in drilling discharges ought to not exceed 10 grams per kilo; produced-
water ought to not exceed 40 milligrams per liter; waste is to be sorted and stored in 
"approved" places; emissions to air must be minimized and prevented. These 
standards also represent the internalization of intrinsic ecological values. 
Also in Chapter 4.7, Oil spill prevention, the Veslefrikk project incorporates some 
intrinsic ecological values. The assessment emphasizes the need to prevent oil spilIs 
and states that: 
'The effort should be concentrated on those areas where oil spilIs will be of 
most severe damage for the ecology and economy,S9. 
The focus on internalizing intrinsic social and ecological values on these areas is the 
closest we come to subjective ontology. The dominating values and motivation of 
Veslefrikk thus is instrumental. 
58 Statoil, 1987, p. 25 
59 Statoil, 1987, p. 29. 
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Value-chain analysis 
If the values associated with Veslefrikk are put into a traditional value-chain model, 
the figure illuminates what kind of values (instrumental and intrinsic) and where in 
the project the different values are internalized. Fig. 27 illustrates that the main 
driving values for the Veslefrikk Project are the generation of instrumental values; 
hence an objective-instrumental ontology of man. The small amount of intrinsic 
values in the production phase represents the environmental standards with regard 
to pollution, the willingness to offset resources for oil spill prevention, and to take 
into account commercial fishery interests and cultural heritage. The willingness to 
design platforms which are not purely efficient but also "safe", from a physical health 
perspective for the employees working on Veslefrikk is also represented here. From 
an ecosophical and subjectivistic point of view it is necessary to internalize intrinsic 
ecological and cultural values through the whole value chain. 
Conclusion : Objective ontology 
VALUE CHAIN 
INPUT PRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION CON$UMPTION OUTPUT 
INSTRUMENTAL VALUES 
INTRINSIC VALUES 
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3 Perception of science 
In the following section the thesis diseusses the perception of science, that is, the 
theory of knowledge underlying the social science part of the assessment. 
The perception of science underlying the social science part of the assessment can be 
deduced from Chapter 5 and 4.3 of the report. In Chapter 5 we saw that instrumental 
or economic values dominated the social impacts of the Veslefrikk project. A 
probable reason for the assessment being one-dimensional oriented is that the 
concept of 'business impacts' and 'Iocal interests' are objectified. The reasoning 
behind this claim comes from the fact that the assessments study social or human 
impacts solely from an objective, spectotor or l-It perspective, instead of establishing 
a dialogical (hermeneutie; interpreting) relationship between the researcher 
(subject) and the study objects; e.g., employees, business leaders and environmental 
stakeholders as such. 
The advantage of objectification is that it makes complex and comprehensive cases 
tangible and easy to handle. Consider for example Category 5.1 from the discussion 
on ontology in the previous subchapter. The research here attempts to reduce 011 the 
socio-economic impacts of Veslefrikk down to one objective quantity: 'total 
investment of NOK'. The reason why the research here chooses to make 
instrumental values a superior objective quantity, and not, for example, an intrinsic 
cultural value, e.g., love, or better a bolonced torget, is probably because only 
information deduced from pure observation can be classified as scientific. The reason 
why the report tri es to reduce all impacts into one objective size in the first place is, 
however, probably because oil and gas projects of this kind are so vast in size, both 
materially and socially, that decision-makers and proponents find it hard to 
comprehend them alternatively. To put it nicely: "it is very difficult to ever 
understand all the consequences which a project of this magnitude may have - both 
in the short and long term." The total, long range, versatile ecological and 
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psychological consequences are by far unknown; and the 'I-It' perception has only 
the capacity to explore the surface of these. 
The claim that the theory of knowledge of the social science part of the assessments 
is the positivistic theory becomes more nuanced, if we look doser at the research 
concerning the impacts for the fish industry. These studies are conducted in Chapter 
4.3, Biological and fishery conditions. The purpose of Chapter 4.3 is to gain an 
overview of the potential effects which Veslefrikk may have on the fish industry. The 
inquiry into the fisheries focuses on five categories: 
1) Bottom fauna 
2) Fish resources 
3) Consume and ring net fishing 
4) Trawling 
5) Aquaculture 
Regarding 'bottom fauna', the research is centered on describing the species and the 
quantities of these for the area surrounding Veslefrikk. 
Regarding 'fish resources', the research describes species, quantity of spawning 
conditions, and the trends relating to these. 
Regarding 'consume and ring net fishing', the research describes a) volume of 
different fish species, b) location, c) fishing seasons and d) fishing equipment for 
each species (see fig. 30). 
Regarding 'trawling', the research describes the quantity of catch rates during the 
period from 1976 till 1985 and the geographical concentration of different species 
(see Fig. 28 and 31). 
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Regarding 'aquaculture', the research describes the quantity of production of salmon 
and trout in Hordaland, Sogn og Fjordane and Møre og Romsdal during the last 
couple of years (1984 and 1985). 
The knowledge above allshares one characteristic in common, it all concerns 50-
called "value-neutral" observations in which the researcher has played the role of an 
objective speetator, i.e., a subject-object perspective. The reason why we can call 
them "50-ca lied" value-neutral observations is because these observations are 
apparently va lue-laden since they to a high extent aim at describing the commercial 
consequences. 
Studying the fish industry from a pure subject-object angle results, however, as we 
have seen above, in a whole lot of facts. The assessment thus becomes a superficial 
assessment of pure technical-instrumental conditions such as: fishing methods, 
production in tones, sea son variation and geographical location of different fish-
stocks, etc., etc. These facts do represent of course crucial information in relation to 
describing the potential effects Veslefrikk may have on the fish industry, but still only 
illustrate "the top of the iceberg"; at least from a hermeneutical perspective. 
The subject-object theory of knowledge does not reveal what the Veslefrikk project 
actually means for the affected fisherman, that is, the subjective and 
phenomenological impacts. These non-factual impacts can only be understood 
through involved and participation studies in which the social researcher plays the 
role of an active and empathic fellow human being, that is, a subject-subject 
relationsh i p. 
It is strange to notice that knowledge of potential impacts on the 'fish industry' is 
collected simply through superficial observation-studies of how the O&G 
infrastructure physically hinders the different waysjtechnologies of fishing. This is 
despite the fact that fishing in Norway has a long tradition and has represented an 
important activity in relation to the Norwegian identity. Subjective and 
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phenomenological informationjknowledge of how development affects the internal 
social world of real fisher-men is not addressed in the report. This is probably 
because narratives of this sort are considered subjective and do not therefore fulfill 
the rigid criteria of natural science. Another reason is probably the practical and 
financial challenges related to in-depth studies. A third reason is probably because 
the instrumental image of man is simply satisfied with assessments covering the 
main positive and negative material-instrumental (external) impacts of a project. 
Conclusion: The received perception of science. 
4 Scientific Ideal 
From the discussion on the perception of science it is evident that the social science 
section of the assessment is oriented around the ideals of objectivity, detached 
observation, reductionism and verification instead of revealing subjective meaning 
codes, wholes and processes. This point in the direction of a scientific ideal of the EIA 
report on Veslefrikk which is very similar to the naturalistic ideal described in 
Chapter Ill. 
Conclusion: Naturalistic ideal. 
5 Ethics 
The internal ethic of the social science part of the assessment is the criteria 
characteristic for the naturalistic ideal: verification. This is clearly shown by the 
exclusive use of naturalistic method: hypothetical-deductions and empirical 
descriptions. 
The external ethic of the report must be considered non-existent or to a large extent 
instrumental. This is evident from the objective point of departure the 
researchjknowledge takes. The research simply endeavors to describe the objective 
sides of development, what can happen and what will happen, not how development 
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ought to be. This is probably because the internal ethic also legitimates the morality 
of social science results based on the naturalisticjpositivistic ideal. 
An example illuminating the intimate relationship between the theory of knowledge 
and external ethic can be drawn from the part of the assessment endeavoring to 
evaluate the potential consequences for the fisheries and nature as such, that is, to 
put a value on actual negative effects. In Chapter 4.8, Evaluation of consequences, 
we can trace how the evaluations of the effects are made superficial and even value-
neutral. Consider the following example of how the report evaluates the effects of a 
large oil spill on coalfish larva: 
'Veslefrikk is centrally located in an area where the coalfish larva is drifting 
and an oil spill during the spring may impact a whole year-dass of coalfish. In 
the meantime our knowledge of the concentration and extent of coalfish larva 
is inadequate 50 that it becomes difficult to identify overlapping-areas 
between oil-flakes and larva-distribution which in turn makes it difficult to 
calculate the loss of coalfish in an accurate percentage'60. 
The statement here represents a typical l-It evaluation of environmental values. This 
means that the loss of coalfish larva, a whole year dass, is reduced to an objective-
instrumental size, i.e. an end-mean reduction; a focus on consequences instead of 
qualitative motivation or the meaning of such behavior. This is probably because the 
positivistic theory of knowledge only captures the objective (economic) or physical 
dimension of a potential oil spill, here emphasized as the 'overlapping-areas', and 
not the moral or subjective dimensions. The example above is not a unique example. 
The same evaluations are used for cod, herring, haddock, seabirds (see fig. 33), 
plankton, aquaculture and more (see pp.31-33): 
60 Statoil 1987, p.32, from Norwegian. 
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61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
'Haddock also spawns in the Tampen-area. But spawning occurs more spread 
out over the whole northern part of the North Sea meaning that the larva will 
be more spread out and the effect of an oil flack less,61. 
'Other fish-species and stocks can also be affected by an oil spill from 
Veslefrikk. Norwegian-Atlantic herring, cod, coalfish and haddock have 
important spawning localities outside the Møre-coast while the North Sea 
herring spawns off Shetland and the larva thus drifts through the southern 
areas ofthe North Sea,62. 
'The chance that an oil-spill from Veslefrikk will destroy part of a whole class-
year for these species does, however, decrease with the distance from 
Veslefrikk because the concentration of oil in the sea is reduced according to 
the time the oil flack is in the sea,63. 
'For seabirds the effect of the oil flack will first and foremost affect the auks. 
Apart from the breeding season they are always located on the sea and only 
travel with the seasons. We know, however, too little about these 
concentrations and the extent of these in the northern part of the North Sea 
to identify the overlapping areas between oil flack and auks,64. 
'Aquaculture, seals and life in the shoreline can also be affected by an oil spill. 
The aquaculture industry is at present experiencing strong growth in the 
county of Sogn and Fjordane, but because of the consistency of oil when it hits 
the shoreline, it will not present a real toxic danger for the fish. It can, 
however, create problems for equipment, taste and stress-related 
problems'65. 
65 Ibid., p.33. 
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From an ecocentric-subjective point of view, and from the intensions in the manual 
of 1990, an EIA report ought to ensure the intrinsic interests/needs/values of natural 
ecosystems and existential beings. This in turn prerequisites a hermeneutical and 
phenomenological science which endeavors to understand how projects relate 
ecologically with natural ecosystems and psychologically with the mental horizon of 
the people involved. 
Conclusion: Instrumental-utilitarian ethic. 
6 Esthetics 
The esthetics of the environmental impact assessment report on Veslefrikk is 
compatible with the ontology of man and the theory of knowledge which the social 
science is based on. This implies presentation st yl es suitable for the presentation of 
objective facts. The figures from the report below provide examples of this. 
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The presentations above are of course important because they articulate factual 
conditions. But they provide us with little information or knowledge about the inner 
social values/impacts. This means that !-It knowledge does not reveal how the 
subjects working in the fish or oil industry or environmental representatives evaluate 
or experience the proposed project. Pure factual knowledge gives us no information 
about what the Veslefrikk project actually means for subjects (e.g., in relation to the 
human needs and values such as physiological or psychological satisfaction). To base 
impact assessments entirely on mathematics is an extreme fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness; i.e., to paint an extremely superficial picture of the situation. 
Conclusion: Mathematical-quantitative esthetics. 
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Appendix to chapter VIII 
The ecological and social dimension of the EIA report on Veslefrikk 
4.0 Environmental situation in 
the area of Veslefrikk 
4.1 Meteorological and Wind; temperature; snow and ice; wave data; 
oceanographic conditions wind/stream conditions; 
4.2 Bottom conditions 
4.3 Biological and jishery Plankton; bottom-fauna; fish-resources; 
conditions consume and ring net fishery; industrial trawl 
fishing; sea-mamma Is; aquaculture; sea-bird: 
nutrition availability and stock development in 
the North Sea; sea-birds and vulnerability; 
behavior; season; nutrition habits; stock 
situation; restitution time. 
4.4 Other use and conservation Shipping; cultural heritage; exploitation of 
interests bottom-masses and minerals; military 
operations 
4.5 Pollution Release of emissions during normal operation; 
drilling; produced water; use of chemicals during 
drilling and production; waste; emissions to air; 
accidental releases of emissions; 
4.6 Dispersion calculation Speediest drift time; slowest drift time; 
maximum volume of oil spill; minimum volume 
of oil spill 
4.7 Oil spill prevention 
4.8 Consequence assessment Normal operating conditions: produced water 
and drilling mud; start up and pipeline 
operation: 
5.0 Supply of goods and services 
5.1 Total investments on the NCS Total investments on the Norwegian Shelf 
represent a measure of investment 
temperature in petroleum projects. The 
measure is important because it indicates the 
size and the trend of the Norwegian Oil 
Economy. The measure, however, only 
illuminates changes in Norwegian Crowns 
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(eeonomie/instrumental values) and not real 
eultural (intrinsie) values. 
5.2 Consequences for Norwegian Reeonstruetion of "West-Vision", pipeline 
enterprises deliveries, ete., eneompasses a total amount of 
3.4 billion NOK (1986). Norwegian suppliers are 
preferred. 
5.3 Contract- and purehase 
philosophy 
5.4 Local consequences The EIA report states that the loeal employment 
rate in the region in whieh the administration 
and supply base is loeated, will range between 
0.5-1.5. 
5.4.1 Operation and supply bases 'The number of new jobs will be very limited' 
(p.37). 
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CHAPTER IX THE CASE OF GOLIAT FROM 2009 
llntroduction 
In this chapter the thesis reflects upon the current, state- of- the - art, EIA report on 
Goliatxiii from 2009, in light of the hermeneutic-reflective apparatus outlined in Tab. 
3, Chapter V. 
The Goliat project is an oil and gas initiative located approximately 70 km. north of 
Sørøya in the county of Finnmark (see fig. 34). The shareholders are Eni Norge (65%), 
(operator), Statoil Hydro AsA (20%) and Det Norske Oljeselskap AsA (15%). 
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2 Ontology of man 
The ontology of man underlying Chapter 14: Societal condition - consequences and 
preventive/mitigating measure. 
The ontology of man underlying the Goliat project can be deduced from Chapter 14 
of the report: Societal conditions - consequences and preventions/mitigation 
measure. This chapter covers research on the social/cultural impacts directly 
associated with the Goliat project (see fig. 35). In other words, Chapter 14 endeavors 
to assess/study the social-psychological values/impacts that the Goliat project is 
expected to result in. 
Chapter 14 of the assessment focuses on the following 6 categories: 
14.1) Social profitability 
14.2) Local and regional deliveries to Goliat 
14.3) Social effects, nationally and in Northern Norway 
14.4) Evaluation of future effect of development of other associated fields -
regionally and locally 
14.5) Social effects regionally and locally - Finnmark and six municipalities 
14.6) Consequences for cultural heritage 
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Category 14.1, 'social profitability', addresses the total investment costs and 
expected revenues for the Goliat project. The report gives the following description 
of social profitability: 
'Revenues, costs and net cash flow are estimated for the production of oil-
and gas resources in the Goliat field .. .'66 
Category 14.2, 'Iocal and regional deliveries to Goliat', addresses the expected 
demand for goods and services in different markets. 
Category 14.3, 'social effects, nationally and in Northern Norway', addresses the 
employment expectations Goliat is in need of. 
Category 14.4, 'evaluation of future effects of development of other associated 
fields', addresses the opportunities to connect the infrastructure of Goliat with other 
potential developments in the future. 
Category 14.5, 'social effects regionally and locally', addresses the economic effects 
in terms of employment (year of labor) during both business phases, that is, 
development and operation, and estimates for potential distribution of deliveries of 
goods and services between six municipalities (Hammerfest, Loppa, Hasvik, Kvalsund, 
Måsøy and Nordkapp). 
Category 14.6, 'consequences for cultural heritage', addresses potential negative 
effects on cultural heritage that the different installations associated with Goliat may 
expose. 
Conclusion 
Category 14.6 represents the only intrinsic/cultural value which is planned 
internalized directly to the Goliat project. All the other "social" categories are 
centered on fundamental economic or instrumental values. This means that the 
chapter should instead have been termed "Economic conditions" instead of "Societal 
66 Eni Norge (2009), p. 204, from Norwegian. 
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conditions", because social values are more or less totally absent from the discussion 
and assessment. The result is that the Goliat project is grounded on a fundamentally 
objective and instrumental ontology of man. The whole social aim seems to spin 
around economic values. 
Conclusion: objective ontology. 
The ontology of man underlying Chapter 8: Environmental impacts and prevention 
and mitigating measures. 
Chapter 8, Environmental impacts and prevention and mitigating measures, studies 
how the realization of the "social" (economic) values discussed above relates to 
environmental values. The relationship between social and environmental values is 
studied through the following relations 67 : 
1) Emission to air 
2) Regular emission to sea 
3) Physical disturbance 
4) Seismic 
5) Waste management 
Regarding 'Emissions to air' the mitigating measures are centered on technical 
solutions and the use of alternative energy resources (for complete list see Tab. 5 in 
the appendix attached to this chapter). 
Regarding 'regular emission to sea' the mitigating measures are aimed at the 
reinjection of as much produced water as possible and the purification of these (see 
Tab. 6 of the appendix attached). 
67 Ibid., p.103. 
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Regarding the physical disturbances of the Goliat project, these matters are related 
to the anchor that keeps the drilling rig in position during drilling operations. Other 
disturbances come from pipelines and ca bles buried on the seabed 68 • 
Seismic activities on Goliat are forbidden in the period 1st of January till 1st of May. 
This is due to the negative consequences seismic activity has on the environment -
especially for fish 69 • 
The production of waste during the development and operation phase is hand led 
through DLF 5' (The Norwegian Oil Industry Association) 'waste management 
systems' whose: 
'The primary focus is to avoid the generation of waste. Secondarily comes the 
focus on the maximum degree of reuse, recycling and recovery and the safe 
handling of residual waste,lO. 
Conc/usion 
We see that through Chapter 8 of the EIA report, we observe many good examples of 
how the Goliat project has been plan ned to internalize intrinsic natural ecological 
values. The reason why these initiatives are needed in the first place, however, is 
that the project is fundamentally ecologically "hostile" because the primary social 
objective or value underlying Goliat rests on instrumental values alone. In addition 
the concern taken here are purely physical and technological concerns meaning that 
ethical and esthetical concerns are absent. The ontology of man prevailing in 
Chapter 8 is therefore also objective and instrumental. 
Conclusion: Objective ontology. 
68 Ibid., p.132-133. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., p.134. 
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The ontology of man underpinning Chapter 9: Environmental risk management of 
acute oil spil/s. 
Chapter 9, environmental risk management of acute oil spilIs, is about predicting the 
possibilities of oil blow-outs and oil spills and making predictions about possible 
environmental and social consequences. Concerning 'environmental risk 
management' the report states that: 
'Risk management in this phase of the project consists primarily of identifying 
the hazardous- and accident situations, making them specific in the form of 
events and identifying risk mitigation measures. This is done by identifying 
measures to eliminate potential events or initiatives that provide better 
control and protection against the occurrence of events,71. 
The assessment presents 11 events identified as situations needing attention. These 
are mainly centered on the drilling operations (see Tab.6 in the attached appendix). 
Conc/usion 
Also in this chapter we see good examples of how intrinsic ecological values are 
incorporated, but the fundamental principle remains here: minimization of the 
negative environmental impacts which the one-dimensional focus on economic 
values generates; i.e., economics first, nature second; i.e., a reactive attitude 
towards environmental values. The ontology of man is thus instrumental. 
Conclusion : Objective ontology. 
71 Ibid., p.136. 
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The ont%gy of man under/ying Chapter 10: Di/ spill preparedness. 
Chapter lO, oil spill preparedness, is an additional planning chapter for ensuring 
some environmental responsibility and internalization of values in the execution of 
the Goliat project. The preparedness encompasses four 'barriers': 
'A barrier consisting of a fixed amount of emergency response resources with 
a fixed capacity, efficiency and response time, which together will capture and 
remove a portion of the pollution. Oil let through one barrier, is captured by 
the following. Together they will constitute a significant protection of 
environmental sensitive resources in affected areas 72. 
The four barriers constituting the preparedness strategy are 73: 
• Barrier 1: Fighting pollution in open sea and close to the pollution source. 
• Barrier 2: Collecting oil in the drift path (between the source and the 
coast). 
• Barrier 3: Fighting pollution from the coast and the shoreline. 
• Barrier 4: Reconstruction of the shoreline. 
The Goliat project will in this regard establish an 'Oil Protection Organization' with 
the responsibility for oil spill protection on the Goliat field. The organization is to 
have the task of mobilizing resources, recruiting and educating personnei and 
developing oil spill scenarios 74• 
72 Ibid., p.1S6. 
73 Ibid., lS9. 
74 Ibid., p.1S7. 
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Conclusion 
We have seen that the three latter chapters (8, 9 and 10) diseussed here have been 
oriented towards enhancing the environmental performance or the internalization of 
environmental values into the Goliat project. The assessment does, however, 
endeavor to internalize intrinsic values into the Goliat project for the purpose of 
mitigating potential "side-effects" that might occur as a result of exclusive focus on 
pure instrumental values. Thus, one tri es to incorporate, indirectly, intrinsic values in 
the execution of the project, so that the negative sides of the one-dimensional focus 
on anti-social and anti-ecological values are masked, that is, to treat natural values as 
substitutable; analogous to, for example, an enterprise willingness to finance the 
construetion of a cinema, sculpture or school in the local community after 
recognizing that years of poor business practice have destroyed the local pond. 
Also the nature of the responsibility of these chapters is exclusively a technological 
concern. 
The underlying ontology of man must therefore be classified as objective because 
environmental performance is regarded as something deserving lower priority than 
instrumental performance. 
Conclusion : Objective ontology. 
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Further we shall see that the EIA report also finds it necessary to come up with 
external initiatives for mitigating potential socia//eu/tura/ hazardous side-effects, i.e., 
internalization of intrinsic humanistic values. 
Ont%gy of man under/ying chapter 12: Existing business activities, consequences 
and preventive/mitigating measures. 
In Chapter 12, existing business activities - consequences and preventive/mitigating 
measures, the assessment emphasizes the need to internalize the interests of those 
businesses/stakeholders present in Finnmark. These are: 
1. The fish-industry 
2. The aquaculture industry 
3. Shipping industry 
4. Tourism industry 
s. Agricu Itu re 
The assessment plans to safeguard the values and interests of the fish-industry 
through the following initiatives: 
1. Oil and gas installations on the sea bed are planned buried in order not to 
hinder trawling. 
2. Minimizing the dumping of stones and seismic investigations. 
3. In case of an accidentallarge oil spill: establish an organization for oil spill 
preparedness and financial compensation for the loss of direct (fish 
resources, equipment, loss of fishing areas) and indirect (reputational) 
resources. 
With regard to the aquaeu/ture industry the report states that: 
201 
'Beside the installation of electric ca bles from land to Goliat, the development 
will not lead to activities which will affect the coastal zones where the 
aquaculture industry operates,75. 
The values and interests associated with the aquaculture industry are plan ned 
safeguarded through the following initiative: 
1. An electric ca ble is planned buried under the seabed. 
2. Financial compensation in case of oil-spills. 
Regarding the latter initiative the assessment estimated the economic effects to be: 
'For a typical salmon farm the economic damages for fish and equipment are 
estimated at 26 million Norwegian Kroner .... In the municipalities where the 
probability of an oil spill is largest there are 33 salmon farms and 20 cod 
The consequence of Goliat on the shipping industry is mainly associated with the 
danger of vessels colliding out at sea. The report estimates that a collision between 
passing ships will happen eve ry 540000 year, a collision with oil/gas field installation 
once every 1100 years, a collision with crude carriers once eve ry 1650 years and a 
collision with fishing boats once eve ry 37 000 years! 
Regarding the tourism sector the report states that the Goliat project will promote 
the interests and values of the sector through: 
' ... operations -centre and helicopter- and supply base in Hammerfest mean 
the regular use of hotels in the municipality,77. 
The report also refers to a study of the reputational effect of an oil spill on the 
tourism sector in Wales, which concludes that once the: 
75 Ibid., p.19lo 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., p.193. 
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'Oil was gone; the spill was relatively easy forgotten,78o 
The report also refers to a study which explains that the tourism sector experiences 
20-50 % reduced activity during the first year of an oil spill, and still significant 
reduction after 4-5 yearso The report states, however, that the negative effects of an 
oil spill can be compensated through: 
'Business and service travelers are relative ly unaffected; their presence could 
even increase in the short term because of the dean-up worko This thus 
creates local demand which offsets the decline in tourismo The region where 
the oil spill occurs also gains increased publicity, which helps to prevent any 
weakening reputationo 000 the loss of reputation for the region depends on the 
information provided in connection with oil spill. A well thought-out media 
strategy is thus an important emergency initiative,79o 
The assessment estimates that Nordkapp and Honningsvåg will experience a 20-30% 
decline in tourism during the first year of an oil spill. The tourist product which will 
be affected most severely is "bird-cliff-safari" on Gjesvær which is high ly exposed to 
oilspillso 
Conclusion 
The crux of the stakeholder responsibility assessed in Chapter 12 of the report is, as 
we have seen, to safeguard the objective and instrumental valueso This is clear from 
the empirical data on the different stakeholder shown above and maybe most 
transparently from the examples taken from the tourism sectoro The data is 
therefore evidence of an objective-instrumental ontology of man because values in 
relation to the different sectors are purely instrumentally (economic) centeredo 
Conclusion: Objective ontologyo 
78 1bido 
791bido 
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Ont%gy of man under/ying Chapter 15: socia/ responsibi/ity - strategies for 
enhancing the positive effects /ocal/y and regional/y. 
'50eial responsibility' is defined in the report: 
' ... shall eontribute in a positive way in relation to ethics, working eonditions, 
human rights, environment and loeal value-ereation,80. 
Implementation of the Goliat projeet endeavors to take responsibility beyond the 
seetors mentioned above in six ways: 
1. Deliveries during operation - prequalifieation of the supply industry. 
2. Longitude studies - social effeets, eeology. 
3. Waste-management of drilling disposais. 
4. Edueation eenters - for future Goliat employees. 
S. Emergeney - in relation to oil spilIs. 
6. General competenee development - from primary level to higher 
university leveis. 
Regarding the first category, Eni Norway states that they will cooperate with loeal 
and regionalsuppliers and officials in order to maximize loeal and regional supply 
eontraets, and to support initiatives whieh ean strengthen competenee in the region. 
The strategies towards these goals are: 
1. Develop loeal/regional resourees for oil spill preparedness. 
2. Alloeate resourees for researeh and edueation (from lower to higher 
edueation). 
3. Facilitate the opportunities for eommuting and combining different jobs 
amongst the employees. 
4. Researeh and development; longitude studies of the effeets of petroleum 
aetivity in the Barents Sea. 
80 Ibid., p.220. 
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Regarding Longitude studies, Eni Norway plans to support research programs on the 
long- term social effects of petroleum activity, biodiversity, environment and 
maritime research. 
Regarding waste-management, Eni Norway plans to find cooperating partners who 
can hel p them realize their waste-management policy mentioned earlier in this 
chapter. 
Regarding education centers, Eni Norway plans to educate people in Finnmark about 
petroleum competence. 
Regarding emergency, Eni Norway plans to develop a contract regime and strategies 
for the utilization of local fishers for the task of oil spill preparedness. 
Regarding general competence development, Eni Norway plans to support education 
at all levels in Finnmark, especially within the areas of natural science, technology 
and petroleum related knowledge. 
Conc/usion 
The social responsibilities assessed in Chapter 15 and illustrated here, are good 
examples of responsibility surpassing pure instrumental responsibility. In this chapter 
Eni Norway supports intrinsic humanistie and ecological values especially through 
supporting unconditional research and education. The ontology of man can 
therefore in this case be categorized as subjective and humanistie because Eni 
Norway endeavors to support local culture for its own sake. 
Conclusion: Subjective ontology. 
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The ontology of man underpinning Chapter 17: Saml interests - consequences and 
preventive/mitigating measures. 
In this chapter the report plans to take responsibility for enhancing the positive 
effects for the Sam] culture. For this purpose the following is planned: 
• Business development 
• Education and research 
• Longitude studies 
• Cooperation with the fisheries 
Regarding 'business development', the report states that it will support initiatives 
which can contribute to increased value-creation in traditional Sam] economies, Sam] 
tourism and support the Sam] Youth Association. In relation to the support of Sam] 
tourism the report states that it is important to put weight on 'quality and loeal 
values,81. 
Regarding 'education and research', the report states that it will support and 
motivated Sam] youth to take oil and gas related education and to support Sam] 
research institutions. 
Regarding 'longitude studies', Eni Norway plans to support research on the long-term 
social and environmental effects for Sami culture. 
Regarding 'cooperation with the fisheries', Eni Norway plans to initiate cooperation 
with Sam] fisheries and the Sam] Parliament, with the particular aim of conflict 
resolution and building mutual interests. 
Conc/usion 
Also in this chapter we see evidence of social responsibility surpassing instrumental 
values, that is, initiatives whose purpose is to support intrinsic Sam] cultural values. 
81 Ibid., p.232, emphasis added. 
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Conclusion: Subjective ontology. 
Value-chain analysis 
If the values discussed in this chapter are placed along a traditional value-chain 
model, the figure illuminates where instrumental and intrinsic values are incorporate 
in the Goliat project. This has been done in Fig. 37. 
Fig 37 illustrates that the Goliat project is mainly driven by the instrumental 
(economic) values associated with the oil and gas resources. This was revealed from 
the analysis of Chapter 14, "Societal Conditions", in the report which showed that 
the Goliat project is mainly motivated by economic values. The figure, however, also 
reveals that the project endeavors to enhance and promote intrinsic cultural and 
ecological values, and also where this happens in the value chain. The intrinsic values 
of the production phase encompass ENI Norway's willingness to evaluate different 
alternative locations for the purpose of minimizing the negative impacts upon 
natural ecosystems, environmental risk management initiatives in addition to the 
development of an organization for oil spill preparedness. Cultural values include the 
willingness to take into account the interests of stakeholders, other business sectors 
and the Saml people. The figure also illustrates that a significant part of the social 
responsibility and the enhancement of intrinsic values happens outside the value 
chain. These also make up an important part of the social dimension of the report. 
These initiatives mainly involve the funding of research and education in addition to 
business consultancy and pre-qualification of the regional supply industry. 
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VALUE CHAIN 
DISTRIBUTION CONSUMPTION OUTPUT 
INSTRUMENTAL VALUES 
INTRINSIC VALUES 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES EXTERNAL TO THE VALUE CHAIN: 
"Resources for education and R&D 
"Business consultancy 
" Pre qualification of the local/regional supply industry 
The figure shows that intrinsic values are only incorporated fragmentarily, without 
reference to the whole - and thus without meaning. To a high degree the focus is 
aimed at minimizing negative effects originating from the dominating, one-
dimensional focus on instrumental values through the whole value chain. The ethical 
responsibility must here be classified as profit and strategy motivated, in that the 
driving force behind this petroleum project is ultimately the instrumental values 
hidden approximately 350 meters below the sea bed and the number of jobs, or more 
precisely the salaries, generated as a consequence of these values. 
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3 Perception of science 
This subchapter is an attempt to describe the perception of science underlying the 
social science part of the EIA report on Goliat. This means that we shall see which 
theory of knowledge underpins the social research of the assessment. 
The perception of science under/ying Chapter 13: Status description - societa/ 
condition. 
If we begin with Chapter 13, Status description - societa/ condition, which is probably 
the most important chapter because the social values/condition assessed here are 
constitutive for how the initiative is direct/yeva/uated, that is, whether the project is 
categorized as "good" and "desirable" or "bad" and "undesirable" social 
development. The reason why the chapter is constitutive is because it serves as 
background information/knowledge for the direct (instrumental) impacts of Goliat as 
interpreted in the previous subchapter. The following interpretation of the image of 
science helps to make our understanding of the paradigmatic components governing 
the report more nuanced. 
Chapter 13 of the report emphasizes 5 categories: 
1. Population and demography 
2. Labor market, employment and competence 
3. Infrastructure and public services 
4. Business development 
5. Status of cultural heritage 
The first category, popu/ation and demography, studies population figures in the 
county of Finnmark. The major finding here is the fact that Finnmark has experienced 
a decrease in population of 3,7 % during the period 1992 until 2008. Another 
important discovery relates to the population growth of 400 persons in Hammerfest 
from 2002 until 2008. The study also discovers an increase of 10-15 % in young 
peoples' willingness to live and work in Finnmark due to the petroleum industry. 
209 
Category 2, labor market, employment and competence, mainly studies employment 
figures in the County of Finnmark. The studies provide thorough quantification of the 
various sectors in which all employees working in 2000 are counted and compared 
with the numbers for 2006. The major findings are that total employment in the 
County of Finnmark increased by 2,6 % in this period, meaning 900 new jobs. The 
main sectors experiencing an increase are business & consultancy and health & social 
care services. At the same time the number of employees working in the fisheries 
and industry has decreased by 229 and 926 jobs respectively. 
The third category, infrastructure and public services, studies capacities in relation to 
airports, harbors, ferries, buses, highways and broadbands in the six municipalities 
(Hammerfest, Loppa, Hasvik, Kvalsund, Måsøy and Nordkapp). The major finding 
here is the fact that the vast distances in the County of Finnmark constitute a serious 
challenge for relative fast transportation of personnei and goods. 
Category 4, Business development, is a very short study in which the development of 
The Snøhvit Project is described. The findings here are that local deliveries in 
Hammerfest to The Snøhvit Project constitute 1,5 billion Norwegian Kroner and that 
general business activity increased by 37 % from 2002 until 2004. The Snøhvit 
Project has also led to an increased interest for southern supply-industry to open 
local offices in Hammerfest. 
Category 5, Status of eultural heritage, presents where and what type of cultural 
heritage is physically located in the influence area. The major findings here amount 
to the fact that many cultural sites do exist (both known and unknown). 
Conclusion 
The conclusion must then be that the assessment of 'societal condition' in the EIA 
report on Goliat takes the logical positivistic theory of knowledge as point of 
departure for the studies. Thus the knowledge generated is purely empirical 
descriptions of the physical social reality. This is probably one reason why the Goliat 
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project is fundamentally centered on instrumental values - as we indeed saw in the 
analysis of ontology. From a hermeneutical perspective, l-It knowledge constitutes 
important information about social phenomena, but this alone is insufficient in order 
to understand the social consequences. One therefore needs to supplement 
objective knowledge with subjective and phenomenological, that is, assess all three 
types of impacts. 
The result of studying 'Society Conditions' from a subject-object perspective is that 
the life of the culture and human beings in Finnmark is objectified. The outcome of 
this in turn is an abstract and superficial descriptionjexplanation of a static condition, 
as well as some prognoses about the future. In itself the information is of little 
relevance for understanding the people and the communities of the North. 
The corollary of "l-it" research is that the impact-analyses in the EIA report on Goliat 
are also necessarily superficial. The consequences concern only the objective and 
instrumental sides of work. The whole picture of what it means to work and the 
cultural values of work remain not assessed. 
Conclusion: The received perception of science. 
The theory of knowledge underlying Chapter 11: Status description - existing business 
activities. 
The empirical data which we shall analyze and discuss here is found in Chapter 11, 
Status description - existing business activities. This chapter is the underlying study 
for Chapter 12, existing business activities - consequences and preventivejmitigating 
measures, which we analyzed in the section on ontology above. Remembering that 
the ontology was instrumental for all sectors, this was, however, especially evident in 
relation to consequences for the tourism industry. Further analysis of the theory of 
knowledge can hel p us understand how and why this was possible. 
The assessment endeavors to study impacts for the following business sectors: 
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1. Fisheries 
2. Aquaeulture 
3. Shipping 
4. Tourism 
5. Agricu Itu re 
The assessment of the fisheries studies four phenomena. First it explains that in 1991 
the fishing industry employed 2500 people, whereas fifteen years later the number 
had declined to 1300. About three quarters of these were full-time employees. 
Finnmark has 1.5% of Norway's population and 10% of all fishermen. 
Secondly, the study also explains the seasonal catch variation for different fish 
speeies (see Tab. 8 in the attached appendix if interested). 
Thirdly, the study explains that three major fishing areas surround the Goliat project 
(see Fig. 38) and it provides yearly catch-rates for these areas. For example in Area 
03 the total amount (tones) of fish caught was 118926 in 2000, 121 269 in 2001, 339 
101 in 2002, 59 997 in 2003,81221 in 2004, 70439 in 2005 and 44884 in 200682 • 
Fourthly, the study illustrates where the pipelines system (infrastructure) will collide 
with a rich fishing area. For example is it explained that between 1100 and 2300 tons 
of fish is caught in the direct area of Goliat, and that a particular good area for 
catching cod, the so-called "Lofoten junior", is located 10-20 km. south of Goliat. 
82 Ibid., p.175. 
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The assessment of the aquaeulture sector studies three phenomena. Firstly it 
explains where different maritime farmers are located geographically between 
Hasvik and Måsøy and Nordkapp and Gamvik. 
Secondly, the study also shows that the majority (70) of the farms are salmon farms 
and 8 cod farms. Nationally the fish farms in Finnmark constitute 6.5 % of all farms in 
Norway. 
Thirdly, the study also illustrates the production of salmon from 1994 until 2006 in 
weight and value, and the total quantity of employees working within the 
aquaeulture industry in Finnmark: 237 (2008). 
The assessment of the shipping industry explains that there are ten shipping routes 
within 10 nautical miles of the location of Goliat. Annual traffic constitutes approx. 
490 passing ships or 9 passing pr. week, or 1.3 passing per day. Of these 490 were 
ships and 150 were tankers. 40 % of the tankers were of a size 50-150000 dvt., and 
40 % were 50-25000 dvt., 20% were less than 25000 dvt., and only one ship was 
larger than 150000 dvt. 
The assessment of the tourism sector studies three phenomena. Firstly it explains 
that Finnmark had, in 2006, 415 employees working within the tourism-related 
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industry. 300 or 70 % of these were located in Hammerfest, 64 in Nordkapp, whereas 
other municipalities held 10-12 positions each. 
The study also reveals that the density of hotels has declined in 
Hammerfest/Kvalsund/Hasvik and Alta/Loppa by 18.1 % and 9.8 % respectively, while 
the other regions have experienced an increase from 2006 until 2007. 
The study also explains that Nordkapp has 200 000 visits pr. year and Honningsvåg 
approximately 300000. Most of these tourists travel by sea during the period May -
September. 
The Agriculture sector is not studied because: 
'With the exception of reindeer herding, there is almost no agriculture in the 
area affected,83. 
Conc/usion 
The social science applied here shows one and the same characteristic: so-called 
value-neutral studies in which the researcher has played the passive role of purely 
auditing the surface of social phenomena; that is, external social phenomena. 
Objective descriptions are of course important in relation to impacts assessments, 
but in isolation it makes extremely superficial picture of the situation, at least from a 
hermeneutical perspective. 
Conclusion: The received perception of science. 
Perception of science underpinning Chapter 16: Sam! interests - Status description. 
The research concerning Saml interests studies the following social phenomena: 
1. Sam! culture. 
2. Reindeer herding. 
3. Coastal and fjord fishing. 
83 Ibid., p.183. 
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4. Traditional subsistent activities. 
The study of the eultural phenomenon reveals that language, literature and songs are 
constitutive for culture. It also reveals that a central feature of indigenous cultures is 
that: 
cultures' existence is directly related to peoples livelihoods' {Eni Norge, 
2009, p.22S, from Norwegian)84. 
Further the study concludes that: 
'Eni Norway's conclusion is that the Goliat development will neither have any 
significant positive nor negative effects for Sam] culture, if nothing beyond the 
development is done. The measures described in Chapter 17.5.2 {{Measures 
for enhancing positive consequences" can contribute to the creation of more 
positive effects also for the Sam] population,85. 
The study regarding reindeer herding explains that the herding requires grassing 
areas and that 4S % of Norway's geographical area is suitable for reindeer. The study 
also explains that these areas are divided into 80 reindeer herding districts owned by 
various Siidaer (reindeer executives or families). The study further concludes that: 
'Regardless of alternative development options, the Goliat project will have 
medium to huge negative impacts. This is first and foremost because 
development will occupy territories for summer herding which are already 
scarcely distributed along the coast of Finnmark,86. 
The study concerning coastal and fjord-fishing explains that infrastructures and 
facilities of Goliat are not located outside the zone determined by the Sam] 
Development Fund. The study further concludes that: 
84 Ibid., p.22S. 
85 Ibid., p.228. 
86 Ibid., p.229. 
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' ... it is impossible to make a distinction between the participation in fishing 
activities based on ethnicity. The size of the equipment, the boats and the 
crew constitute the main difference between the different groups 
participating in the fisheries, not ethnic origin,87. 
The study regarding traditional subsistent activities, explains that these activities are 
mainly exercised on the east side of Finnmark by the elder population. The study also 
explains that agriculture forms an important part of the material fundament for the 
Sam! population. The study further concludes that the effects of Goliat will equal 
zero because: 
'The main reason for this is that the operation industry is not located in areas 
where subsistent activities are exercised' (En i Norge, 2009, p.230, from 
Norwegian)88. 
The assessment also suggests that the following mitigation measures ought to offset 
the negative effects: 
1. An el-cable is planned buried in order to reduce the disturbance to 
reindeer. 
2. The use of helicopters to transport female reindeer during birth. 
Conc/usion 
The conclusion must be that the perception of science underlying the studies with 
regard to the Sam! interests' is the detached, logical positivistic tradition. This is 
evident because the informationjknowledge about the different phenomena are 
purely descriptions of external social reality, that is, what can be directly observed 
through l-It techniques. In other words, the studies here merely reveal the external 
and physical dimension of Sam! culture. The subjective and phenomenological 
dimension is absolutely absent and neglected. Social reality is thus objectified or 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid., p.230. 
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regarded as "things". This in turn creates problems because the inner lives of 
subjects are ignored. What is left is a superficial explanation or "scanning" of the 
social environment. Superficial explanations in turn are problematical and of little 
use because they do not reveal how the whole person might become affected by the 
initiative. 
Conclusion: The received perception of science. 
4 Scientific Ideal 
The studies conducted in the report and discussed above under the perception of 
science are objective-analytical studies. This is evident from the empirical-descriptive 
and hypothetic-deductive methods prevailing through the report and discussed 
above, in addition to the total lack of interpretative methods such as hermeneutics 
and phenomenology. 
The claim that the scientific ideal is the naturalistic, objective-analytical ideal is 
probably most evident from the exclusive focus on quantifying the instrumental 
(economic) values of the project, of existing industry and those which can be 
expected in Finnmark and the six municipalities. This information is in addition to 
being in tune with the objective-instrumental image of man also compatible with the 
norms of the scientific ideal. This is because the data fulfills the criteria of inter-
subjectivity and verifiability which are hallmarks of analytical method. The economic 
facts provide good objective measures of social impacts because they are simply 
neutral in the sense that they represent identical/mechanical sizesjeffectsjvalues for 
all members of society. In other words, when all the subjective pros and cons in 
relation to the project are cleared away, what is left is the tangible objective core of 
society. The focus on the instrumental sides of society also thus represents a 
reductionistic approach to human nature. Together these norms point in the 
direction of the naturalistic ideal. 
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The reason for the one-dimensional focus on the objective and instrumental 
(economic) consequences of Goliat is probably that the instrumental image of man 
and the compatible value-neutral image of science endeavors to explain the pure 
realness of social developments; that is, the tangible and physical consequences. The 
result is an objective picture of the situation as an abstract and atomistic picture. The 
holistic social consequences of development are thus ignored. In order to reveal the 
inner life and intrinsic values associated with development projects it is necessary to 
supplement analytical studies with interpretative studies. 
The major challenges of turning EIA reports from an objective study to an ethical 
study probably relate to the current need for commensurable sizes, that is, a simple 
measure which either speaks in favor or against development; i.e., objective sizes. 
Conclusion: Naturalistic ideal. 
5 Ethics 
Internal ethics concern the norms for how scientific work ought to be conducted. For 
the naturalistic scientific ideal the internal ethic is fairly simple to determine. This is 
because the rigorous criterion of objectivity demands that only knowledge deduced 
from detached observation and thus is universal and verifiable deserves to be 
referred to as "science"; all other forms of knowledge are termed 'pseudoscience'. 
The external ethic of the Goliat report differs for the various chapters. 
Chapter 14 regarding the social consequences of Goliat is totally dominated by an 
instrumental ethic. This is evident because the whole concept of 'culture' is 
juxtaposed into a definition which is purely instrumental (economical). All 
consequences in Chapter 14 are measured in terms of monetary values (Kroner); all 
human ambitions and motivation are also calculated in terms of Kroner. 50 there can 
be no disputing the external ethic here. 
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Chapters 8-10 addressing the consequences for environmental values endeavor to 
study by using the analytical ideal how we can avoid environmental disasters. The 
consequence is a practical ethic calculating what to do and what not to do. This 
implies that nature first of all is objectified (values beyond instrumentality are 
eliminated), and secondly that we try to control nature similarly to how a puppeteer 
pulls the stri ngs in a puppet show. 
The chapters covering the various existing businesses in Finnmark (Chapters 11 and 
12) and the chapter concerning Sam] interests, all reveal an objective perception of 
culture and thus a purely instrumental or end-mean reductive ethic. 
The chapters emphasizing social responsibility and strategi es for enhancing the 
positive effects of Goliat, reveal a clear subjective perception of culture. Through 
these chapters (15 and 17.5.2) we see a willingness to support culture for its own 
sake, that is, for the purpose of humanistic and ecological values. 
Conclusion: Instrumental-utilitarian ethics are dominating. 
6 Esthetics 
The esthetics of the report also corresponds with the chosen ontology of man, the 
perception of science and the ethics. Corollary, statistic and mathematical 
presentation forms are used to exhibit the various social and ecological impacts and 
societal conditions. Below a more or less random selection of examples from the 
report are presented. 
Concl usion: Qua ntitative-statistica I presentation styles. 
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Appendix to chapter IX 
• An energy solution based on power supply from countries in 
combination with gas turbine at the facility is assumed to contribute 
to the achievement of national objectives and international 
commitments and to reduce emissions from the field. 
• A gas turbine is assumed for heat recovery. 
• A gas turbine at the facility will be installed with 10w-NOx technology 
to minimize 
NOx emissions. 
• Further technical measures to reduce air emissIons from energy 
production constitute some of the further work in the retail phase. 
• Optimization of energy consumption and minimizing air emissions will 
focus on the operational phase and are discussed in the field of energy 
management system. 
• Both high-and low-pressure flare gas will be recycled back to the 
process instead of being fia red. 
• There will be no continuous pilot flame on the facility. 
• All energy consuming equipment at the facility will be electrically 
powered -to be supplied by shore power and independent of gas 
available in the process at any time. 
• The compressors and the larger motorized units will be controlled by 
wayof speed control (VSD) contributing to more efficient operation. 
• In addition to the exhaust heat from the gas turbine being utilized, it 
is planned to install electric heaters. This contributes to the energy 
system of the facility which is largely based on C02-emission 
equipment. 
• The planned installed separation technology contributes to more 
efficient oil-water separation and thereby reduces the total heat 
demand. 
• Measures of VOC recovery by tankers are assumed to transport oil to 
reduce emissions from unloading and transport. 
• The potential for LNG operation of supply vessels will be considered. 
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• A technical solution has been design ed that will fulfill the 
requirement for 95% re-injection of processed water by a 
good margin. The design of strategies for operations will 
focus on the highest possible degree of reinjection and 
minimum discharges (if at all). 
• There will always be a greater number of pumps available 
for injection of processed water than that required for 
normal operation. 
• As a result of the injection being used as pressure support, 
more water injectors will be available and well availability 
will be high. 
• Collecting tanks for temporary storage of processed water 
provides a buffer against discharges. 
• Treatment of processed water will always be operational 
50 that unpurified water is prevented having to be 
discharged into the sea. 
• The choice of chemicals will be focused on the chemical's 
intrinsic properties 50 that chemicals with minimal 
environmental risk will be chosen. All chemicals that may 
be released are categorized by SFT as category green or 
yellow. 
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Theme Description Consequence 
Drilling program Drilling basic pilot gas wells Reduce the risk related 
before commencement of to basic gas incidents. 
drilling operations on each 
template. 
Drilling program Dril14 pilot hoies to determine Reduce uncertainty 
the exact depth and position of related to 
the various segments reservoir target and 
of reservoirs, including the events related to this. 
depth of the top of the Increase the 
reservoir, gas-oil contact, and productivity of wells. 
oil-water contact. 
Well design Sensitivity assessments have The wells are designed 
been implemented on the principle of 
for blow-out rates for each minimizing the 
well type, with a focus on well consequences given an 
diameter and penetration of event, without affecting 
reservoirs. productivity of the 
wells. 
Well design Events (exhaust) shall be The wells are designed 
normalized as quicklyas in such away that a 
possible. relief well is to be 
drilled as quickly, 
efficiently and easily as 
possible. 
Well design Well-specific risk analysis is Drilling programs fluid 
used to characterize the well's strategi es and 
inherent risk characteristics. operational 
Risky operations and conditions should be 
sequences identified. optimized to reduce the 
risk of loss of 
well integrity. 
Well design The cement around the casing Reduce the risk of 
shall withstand design pressure hydrocarbon leakage 
load and be gas tight. The and migration of oil at 
cement around the casing the wellhead. 
through 
Realgrunnen / ringed seal 
segments to penetrate up and 
through these reservoirs. 
231 
Well-and The well material requirements Risk for well integrity 
completion design are based on the extended life issues 
and integrity of the well, to and the need for 
reduce the effects of corrosion, interventions 
temperature, chemicals and reduced. 
oxygen that can occur during 
operations. 
Completion- Risk for completion solutians The chosen solution 
strategy has been implemented, which provides a gain in 
makes recommendations on relation to the risk of 
selected completion strategy. leaks and barrier failure. 
Completion- Minimize the need for well Selected completion 
solution interventions, particularly solution 
well work-overs and minimizes the need for 
replacements of "Christmas well interventions and 
trees". provides a significant 
lifetime gain in relation 
to 
basic design. 
Simultaneaus Reduce the likelihood offalling An operation manual 
operations objects or other hazardous for simultaneaus 
incidents that can damage the operations shall be 
sea bed frames and reduce carried out befare 
security. commencement. 
Completions- Installing sensors and Sensors will be installed 
solution monitoring procedures in 
for early detection of failure in sub-sea installations 
the barriers. that 
require monitoring and 
control of existing 
barriers. 
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• Cad and cod fishing off Vest-Finnmark/Troms/Vesterålen 
during the period November-March/ April. 
• Spring cod fishing off the coast of Finnmark during the 
period March to June. 
• Haddock lang-line fishing off the Finnmark coast in the 
summer and autumn. 
• Net fishing of coalfish in West Finnmark - Lofoten during 
the period September to January. 
• Sein ing coalfish out of West Finnmark and Troms in the 
spring, summer and autumn. 
• Greenland halibut fishery during the period J u ne-August 
along the edge of the boat with conventional equipment . 
• Winter capelin fishing in the Barents Sea and the coast of 
Finnmark and Troms during the period January-April. 
• Net fishing for lumpfish during the period April-June. 
• Fishing for crab off the coast of Eastern Finnmark during 
the period September to December. 
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PART V: CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS ON HOW TO MOVE 
FROM ATOMISTIC TO HOLISTIC EIA-RESEARCH 
Fremskritt hva er det? At vi kan kjøre fortere på veiene? 
Nei, fremskritt det er legemets nødvendige hvile og sjelens nødvendige ro. 
Fremskritt er menneskets trivsel (Knut Hamsun). 
CHAPTER X: HOLISTIC EIA-RESEARCH: ONTOlOGICAl, EPISTEMOlOGICAl 
AND METHODOlOGICAllMPLICATIONS 
llntroduction 
This chapter attempts to answer the third research question of the thesis: 
What paradigmatie implications do the findings in this thesis have for EIA-
research: ontologically, epistemologically and methodologically? 
Before continuing to answer research question 3, however, the thesis recapitulates 
the four empirical chapters. 
2 In-/coherence within Norwegian manuals and EIA research 
The earliest manual, T-146, of 1990 
Chapters VI and VII in Part IV of the thesis attempted to interpret the earliest (1990) 
and the latest (>2000) Norwegian manuals on EIA in light of the conceptual 
framework outlined in Table 3 in the chapter on methodology (V). 
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Interpreting the earliest manual from 1990 proved that the fundamental 
understanding of the reality of nature and human nature were in accordance with 
ecosophical and subjective ontologies respectively. This is a plausible interpretation 
because the manual emphasizes the need to explain how human interventions in 
nature relate to specific (plants, animals, organisms, etc.) and general (landscapes, 
biotopes, ecosystems, etc.) ecological components or how "everything hangs 
together". The manual thus also explicitly articulates and expresses the many and 
intricate intrinsic values inherent in any natural ecosystem. The meaning of the text 
discussing the intrinsic values of nature seems to lie in the wish for the proponent 
and the authorities to acquire a comprehensive 'understanding', as opposed to an 
'explanation', of the relations between the initiative, cultural and ecological systems. 
The reason for this claim that a hermeneutic approach to knowledge is tacitly 
expressed is simply because the manual requires us to gather knowledge of impacts 
in the light of both a mechanistic explanation (cause-effect) and the purpose or 
meaning explanation of what it actually means, in value terms. 
The image of science underlying the earliest manual of 1990 is, however, interpreted 
to be the received, naturalistic image of science. These interpretations are deduced, 
albeit perhaps not always and adequately in accordance with the 'principle of 
charity', from the research question raised and addressed by the manual itself. The 
problem identification here is clearly influenced by the objective ideal endeavoring 
the generation of subject-object or 'It' -knowledge through observation of data or 
facts. The result is an exclusive focus on material and economic impacts such as 
change in demography, settlement structure, house development, demand and 
supply of private and public goods and services, occupation of land, release of health 
damaging emissions, etc., etc. The demand for supplementing empirical descriptive 
knowledge with knowledge of an introspective art, as discussed under the ontology 
of the manual above, is thus seriously lacking. This means that the EIA-research or 
the problem identification of the earliest manual is unable to produce subjective and 
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phenomenological knowledge or what the initiative actually means, in value terms, 
for society and nature. 
Correspondingly, the external ethic of the research is laeking or exclusively 
instrumental/utilitarian (end-mean reductive) because of the objectivistic ideal's 
emphasis on 'Wertfreiheit' or value-freedom. A serious and normative consideration 
is thus laeking at all levels (individual ~ society and eco-component ~ eco-systems) in 
the manual. 
Not surprisingly the manual favors that environmental, social and economic impacts 
are presented in mathematical or quantitative-descriptive styles. This makes sense 
when the perception of science is the com mon received view: facts ought to be 
precise and numerical in as far as possible. The manual is thus seriously in lack of 
esthetics capable of expressing and articulating the /lsoft" or /Ideep" environmental 
and subjective impacts of initiatives. 
The earliest manual of 1990 is consequently characterized by an internal 
inconsistency or incoherence between ontology, epistemology, methodology, ethics 
and esthetics, where ontology is anchored in deep-ecology and subjectivism, while 
the perception of science, the scientific ideal, esthetics and ethics are all anchored 
within the Instrumental-Received Research Paradigm. 
The latest manual on EIA according to the Ministry of the Environment 
From the empirical material presented in the appendixes to chapter VII in addition to 
the interpretation and discussion of these in the same chapter, it is plausible to claim 
that the ontologies of the manual are in accordance with the Ecosophical-
Hermeneutie Research Paradigm. The reason for this claim is deduced from the 
evidence showing an indisputable monistic fundamental understanding of natural 
ecosystems and human systems. A monistic view on man and nature was clearly the 
case from Chapter 6 of the Governmental Report No. 26 from 2006 emphasizing the 
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need to incorporate the dynamic interactions of natural eco-systems into human 
management control systems. 
The presupposed ontology of man was deduced from the research questions listed in 
the appendix to the manual. The questions were interpreted as evidence of a 
subjective-humanistic fundamental understanding of the human nature. This was 
because the questions addressed in Chapter 1 and 2 are in sum design ed to assess 
both physical and chemical change in addition to environmental ethical and 
esthetical changes. Chapter 1 is exclusively design ed to generate a descriptive 
account of how initiatives are expected to bring along physical and chemical or 
factual changes in local and global ecosystems (e.g., pollution, C02, 502, etc.). 
Chapter 2 is design ed to illuminate how initiatives are expected to affect the 
qualitative or ethical and esthetical dimensions of nature. It is particularly articulated 
that a concern for natures' intrinsic values and human experience ought to be 
incorporated. 
The epistemology and methodology is interpreted to be governed by the IRRP. This is 
because the manual articulates and expresses a general or dominant image of 
science as an activity characterized by observation of facts or data. Evidence from 
the manual supporting this view is the statement demanding that scientific results 
ought to be numerical or quantitative in as far as possible. It is difficult to see how it 
is possible to articulate and express knowledge concerning the problem identification 
addressed in Chapter 2 of the appendix, i.e., value and esthetical impacts, in 
numerical-quantitative terms. In addition the lack of guidelines concerning the 
dialogical, or how to synthesize descriptive and interpretative information about the 
parts into a coherent whole or into a coherent understanding of environmental 
impacts, constitute a firm base of evidence for categorizing the image of science 
governing the manual as the received image of science. 
As a consequence of the dominating willingness to quantify environmental impacts, 
questions concerning the ecological and social side-effects of an initiative are left in 
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the shadows, at least those beyond utilitarian concerns. A utilitarian ethic is 
manifested in the widespread use of remedies in EIA, as held to be sound practice in 
our manual. 
In line with the 'principle of charity' in the hermeneutie method, we can bend 
towards interpreting the esthetics of the manual as being pluralistie because 
qualitative styles are tautological mentioned together with quantitative-descriptive 
styles. Maybe it is correct to state that by 'qualitative' the manual means qualitative 
empirical (sense impressions) descriptions of facts or data exclusively, and not 
qualitative arguments and assessments of spontaneous experience and conscious-
proeesses. 
The manual on EIA after the ME is, as we see, also characterized by incoherenee 
between the different paradigmatie elements. 
The latest manual on Health and Well-Being in EIA according to the Ministry of 
Health and Care Services (MHCS) 
The meta-analysis revealed that the manual on health and well-being in EIA holds an 
interpretation of human nature as being fundamentally existentialistic and 
ecocentric. The reason for this claim is deduced from, amongst others, the monistic 
interpretation of the concepts of human and natural 'well-being' as basically 
complementary; i.e., the well-being of society correlates with the well-being of 
nature (cf. fig. 14). The meta-understanding or the ontology of man of the manual is 
thus cardinally compatible with the monistic ontology outlined under the 
Ecosophical-Hermeneutic Research Paradigm. 
The image of science in the manual, however, puts strong emphasis on the need to 
distinguish between subjective judgments and evaluations on the one hand, and 
scientific facts/data on the other hand. The manual therefore recommends, as we 
have seen, a reductionistic research strategy for proponents meaning that studies 
are restricted to the external/physical factors related to well-being; i.e., those effects 
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which are interpersonal and verifiable. The consequences of the proposed research 
strategy are that knowledge is limited to describe the superficial and preliminary 
aspects of social life. For example problem identification in relation to the effects on 
'social networks' is reduced to fit a method characterized by observation (e.g., spatial 
conditions, noise, pollution, etc.). For the purpose of comprehending and 
synthesizing the total health treat picture of physical factors the manual also 
proposes a mathematical equation (cf. fig. 16). 
It seems surprising that the manual chooses to study subjective impacts and 'well-
being'-matters by way of natural scientific ideals. Surprisingly since the manual 
reflects upon and underlines that the concept of well-being cannot be objectified 
and made interpersonal in the traditional sense, and that EIA-research has 
historically defined and treated the concept inadequately and fragmenta ri ly. The 
manual thus concludes, in despair (!), that the scientific endeavor is inadequately 
equipped to sufficiently evaluate health and well-being impacts. 
Subsequently, the proposed research strategy generates modeis, theories and 
hypothesis which are of the type 'cause-effect' or mechanistic explanations. Useful 
enough as they are, mechanistic explanation are value-neutral thus saying little 
about subjective evaluations, experience and esthetical sensibility; i.e., the inner life 
of subjects. The external ethical responsibility of EIA-research is thus limited to 
safeguarding the physicaljchemical-instrumental (utilitarian) sides of individuals and 
society. 
In accord with naturalistic ideals the manual encompasses a wide sample of 
quantitative illustrations of how health and well-being impacts ought to be 
presented and communicated. 
The manual on health and well-being after the MHCS is, as we see, also characterized 
by a notorious incoherence between the highest meta-Ievel and the lower 
paradigmatic elements. 
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The latest manual on Social Economic Analysis according to the Ministry of Finance 
(MF) 
In contrast to the two latter manuals discussed above, the manual according to MF is 
characterized by an objective-instrumental ontology. The three different versions of 
the Cost-Benefit Model assume that all values, economic, social and environmental 
can be expressed in utilitarian values and converted into Norwegian Kroner. The 
models evaluate projects with a positive net-value, that is, benefits surpass costs, as 
social-economically beneficia I, and this means that the population is "willing" to pay 
at least as much as the project costs. The manual is aware of the abstraction, 
economic/utility maximizing image of man, presupposed by these modeis, but states 
that it leaves all ethical and esthetical concerns to decision-makers. 
The image of science these models is anchored on can only be the received image 
endeavoring observation of facts or data or in this case 'willingness to pay' or 'price'. 
The social-economic analyses are good examples of research based on subject-object 
or spectator or 'I-it' perspectives. In other words, the manual on SEA cares little 
about the 'Thou' even though the models aim at describing the 'total value' picture 
of projects. 
The external ethic of cost-benefit models is thoroughly instrumental or utilitarian 
because it attempts to put a monetary value on everything that is conceived relevant 
to the project. 
The esthetics of these models is quantitative-statistical oriented because empirical 
input is or is converted into a numerical size. 
In contrast to the three manuals discussed above the manual according to MF is, due 
to the objective point of departure/ontology, characterized by coherence between 
the different elements (the value of coherence ~ incoherence will be discussed in the 
next sub-chapter). 
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The EIA report on Veslefrikk of 1987 
In the EIA report on Veslefrikk we saw that the dominating values behind the 
Veslefrikk project were instrumental (economic) and the share of intrinsic ecological 
and humanistie values minimal (cf. fig. 27). This was evident because nearly all 
articulated and expressed social motivation behind the project was the generation of 
Norwegian Kroner. The amounts of social and ecological values are reduced to a 
minimum only to safeguard the lives of personnei and the physical-chemical quality 
of the ecosystem in case of catastrophic emergencies. The analysis therefore 
concludes that the image of man in this EIA-report is based on the objective-
instrumental view. 
The theory of science underlying the value-assessment of the EIA-report on 
Veslefrikk is at least partly responsible for the "quantificationism" here. This is so 
because social and ecological issues addressed in Chapter 5 and 3 of the report 
(business impacts, local impacts, fishing, aquaeulture, etc.) are objectified and made 
measurable or quantifiable. The reason for this must be that the researcher studying 
these phenomena takes the role of speetator or observer, i.e., a subject-object 
relationship, and from this "neutral" position knowledge about reality is produced 
through the observation and description of facts and data. There is of course nothing 
wrong with empirical-descriptive knowledge, but it merely makes up an abstract and 
lifeless interpretation, as is evident, when impacts for the fisheries are juxtaposed 
into purely material consequences. 
The external ethic of Veslefrikk represents illustrative cases about how ethics based 
on the received epistemological view is interpreted. Mechanistic explanation models 
produee quantitative-physical knowledge of, in this case, the moving patterns of 
various fish and birds speeies. The research of the report locates and prediets severai 
occurrences of fish and animal life; a factual basis which could, however, have been 
used for determining good and sound environmental ethics (in order to make good 
evaluation we need good facts). Instead the report attempts to argue that a sound 
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ethical code can be deduced from purely physical conditions, that is, the overlapping 
structure of oil spill, infrastructure etc. on the one hand, and fish and birds on the 
other side. By doing this the report converts a normative question concerning what is 
the right and good thing to do into an empirical (sense-impression) matter, thus 
ignoring the argumentative and reflective nature of normative/ethical questions. 
The research carried out on the Veslefrikk project is presented in tables and figures 
thus making the esthetics of the report quantitative. 
As was the case with the manual on SEA, 50 also is the conclusion regarding the EIA 
report on Veslefrikk. The research of the assessments report is characterized by 
coherence between ontology, epistemology, methodology, ethics and esthetics. All 
paradigmatic elements of Veslefrikk lie within and are thus efficiently described by 
the instrumental-received research paradigm. 
The EIA report on Goliat of 2009 
Paradoxically the ends/needs for which the Goliat project is meant to realize and 
satisfy are termed 'social' when they in fact are 'economic'. This was evident from 
the meta-analysis of Chapter 14 'Societal Conditions', showing that what ENI Norway 
is really assessing here are the regional (Finnmark) economic effects that are 
expected to spin off directly from the development and operation phase. ENI Norway 
interprets in other words that 'social conditions' and 'economic conditions' are the 
same thing and that the former does not included anything that the latter does not. 
Five of the six thematic areas constituting the chapter on 'Societal Conditions' 
concentrate exclusively on financial and beneficial issues. The only cultural 
component of ENl's analysis of "social" consequences involves the mapping of pre-
historical sites. The meta-analysis therefore concludes that the dominant driving 
values behind Goliat are economic, thus signalizing that a strong reason for stating 
that ontology of man is the objective-instrumental image of man which governs the 
Instrumental-Received Research Paradigm outlined in chapter III ofthis dissertation. 
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Chapter 8,9 and 10 of the report address the ecological aspects of the project. These 
chapters include assessments which mainly attempt to answer the research 
question: how to eliminate and minimize the physical and chemical changes which 
Goliat causes to natura I ecosystems? The means of handling these challenges and 
enhancing the environmental performance of Goliat, are exclusively of a 
technological kind. The means are beyond doubt effective and illustrate well how a 
large industrial project can incorporate intrinsic ecological values. The reason that 
they are needed in the first place is to minimize the effects of actions made solelyon 
instrumental grounds. The analysis must therefore conclude that the ontology of 
man underlying these three chapters is objective. 
Chapter 12 addresses the important concern of 'stakeholder responsibility', that is, 
how the fish-, aquaculture-, shipping-, and tourist industry, in addition to agricultural 
interests, may be directly or indirectly affected by the project. The meaning of the 
stakeholder responsibility as articulated and expressed in the report is clear cut: to 
coordinate and safeguard the commercial/instrumental (economic) stakes of the 
"players" mentioned above. This is beyond dispute a crucial part of any form of 
stakeholder responsibility. However, if the principle of economic compensation is not 
nuanced and balanced with other values/concerns, the outcome can quickly become 
misleading and counter effective. This was for example the case in Goliat's 
interpretation of the responsibility towards the tourism industry, in which ENI 
managed to draw the conclusion that hazardous oil practice may turn out to benefit 
these sectors through increasing the amount of hotel stav-over nights and restaurant 
visitors in the affected locality! 
Chapter 15 and 17 address social and Sami responsibility. In these chapters it is 
possible to trace a subjective ontology of man. The image of man as a subject with a 
multifaceted motivation can be inferred from ENl's intensions of supporting 
research, education, learning and competence development in general for all ages, 
social cIasses and ethnic belonging. 
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The ontology of the EIA-research on Goliat is therefore, as we have seen, 
characterized by an internal incoherence: in Chapters 8, 9, lO, 12 and 14 we find 
evidence of an objective-instrumental ontology of man, while Chapters 15 and 17 
use a subjective ontology of man. The incoherence here needs to be elaborated on in 
more detail. This will be further handled in the next subchapter. 
The analysis of the perception of science revealed that the various social and 
business impacts were studied from the traditional l-It perspective, meaning that the 
received image of science steers the social research. The claim raised here is 
deduced from the empirical material showing that the report satisfies itself with 
studying the various social and economic phen omena (population, demography, 
competence, cultural heritage, business sectors, etc.) through quantitative and 
empirical descriptive studies. The social science section of the report is thus occupied 
with explaining cultural and economic life in Finnmark through counting 'hard' facts -
from an observer point of view. Useful as empirical descriptions and quantitative 
patterns are, they bring us little information about the actual psycho-social and 
culturallife of subjects, i.e., the meaning and purpose a subject finds in the economy, 
culture and nature. 
Not surprisingly the external ethic of the research characterized by objective 
ontologies (8-10, 12 and 14) is also characterized by instrumental or utilitarian ethics. 
This means that the knowledge gathered in these chapters is useful for determining 
an ethic or for designing human and ecological responsibility policies aiming to 
safeguard and ensuring the economic rightsjinterests of stakeholders. In Chapters 15 
and 17, however, it is possible to trace a non-instrumental ethic from ENl's intension 
of supporting intrinsic human and ecological values (education, research, 
competence development, etc.). 
The external ethic of the Goliat report is therefore also characterized by internal 
incoherence. 
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The esthetics of the report accords with the objective ontology of man and nature 
and the subject-object perspective from natural science. We see that the various 
hard facts collected through quantitative studies are presented as mathematical-
statistical figures (cf. fig. 39-57). Presentation of 'soft' or qualitative data is in this 
report absent. 
The EIA-research of the Goliat report represents an interesting development within 
Norwegian EIA-research. This is because the latest state-of-the-art assessment 
includes elements of the Ecosophical-Hermeneutic Research Paradigm (EHRP), as 
well as elements of the Instrumental-Received Research Paradigm (IRRP). The 
research is as we have seen characterized by a double internal incoherence. More 
about this in the following section. 
3 Concluding remarks on empirical findings and the value of in-/coherence 
The conclusions discussed here are illustrated in Tab. 9 presenting the systemic 
relations between ontology, image of science, ethics and esthetics. We see that at an 
ontological level the manual on Social Economic Analysis (SEA) after the Ministry of 
Finance (MF) and the EIA report on Veslefrikk can be placed within the Instrumental-
Received Research Paradigm (IRRP). These two documents are therefore 
characterized by coherence between the five elements: objective ontology, received 
image of science, utilitarian ethics and quantitative-statistical esthetics. 
The Goliat report is characterized by objective ontology, but features of subjective 
ontology are also present. The EIA-research of Goliat is thus characterized by a 
double internal incoherence: both objective and subjective ontologies and 
instrumental and non-instrumental external ethics are present. The image of science 
and esthetics of Goliat is compatible with the received, naturalistic perception of 
science. The conclusion in this case can therefore be interpreted as incoherent. The 
driving values behind Goliat are, however, undoubtedly instrumental, but the 
inclusion of cultural values provides evidence for paradigmatic development in 
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Norwegian EIA research; a development towards more ecosophical and hermeneutic 
ideals. The conclusion that the Goliat report is - a special case - incoherent and that 
elements of an "intruding" paradigm exist, seems to provide the correct analysis of 
this research. 
The earliest manual and the two latest manuals on EIA and HWB according to the 
Ministry of the Environment (ME) and Ministry of Health and Care Services are all 
characterized by subjective ontologies, while the four remaining elements lie within 
the IRRP. These ca ses are therefore also characterized by incoherence between the 
five elements. 
Earliest Latest Manuals Veslefrikk Goliat 
Manual EIA; HWB; SEA; 
ME MHCS MF 
EHRP ..; ..; ..; ..; 
Ontolog~ 
of Man IRRP 
..; ..; ..; 
Image of EHRP 
Science 
IRRP ..; ..; ..; ..; ..; ..; 
Ethics EHRP 
..; 
IRRP ..; ..; ..; ..; ..; ..; 
EHRP 
Esthetics 
IRRP ..; ..; ..; ..; ..; ..; 
Double 
Conclusion Incoherenee Incoherenee Incoherence Coherence Coherence internal incoherenee 
What is then, actually the value of in-/coherence? Hermeneutics seeks to reveal the 
meaning or underlying coherence of text or text-analogues through studying and 
interpreting each part in relation to the whole and vice- versa. Coherence of parts 
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and wholes, that is, the parts are logically related to the whole, is thus the secure 
criterion of adequate interpretations. Therefore, in general, coherence is something 
positive, something meaningful. Coherence in relation to the paradigm concept, as it 
is interpreted in this study, means that the five elements are compatible with each 
other; as we saw was the case for the manual on SEA according to the MF and the 
EIA reports on Veslefrikk (see Tab. 9). If this is not the case we have incoherence; 
which is the situation for four of our six cases. 
Does this mean, then, that the manual on SEA according to the MF and the EIA 
reports on Veslefrikk represent more concise, truthful and coherent 
knowledgejinformation? In one sense it does mean just this as the criterion of 
coherence is fulfilled: consistency between ontology, method, ethics and esthetics. 
This means that there exists a peaceful co-existence between worldview, methods, 
sound ethical praxis and esthetics. 
On the other hand, the argumentation for objective ontologies (nature and man), 
which the manual according to the MF and the EIA reports on Veslefrikk and Goliat 
holds, represents abstracted or simplified laboratory versions of human and natural 
reality or the concrete, and is thus something negative . The manual on SEA 
according to the MF does indeed recognize this criticism and the limitations and 
dangers of assuming and juxtaposing all values into money terms; for the purpose of 
making the various Cost-Benefit Methods operational. If the economists assume 
otherwise, however, that is, a non-instrumental image of man, they know they will 
have to abandon, most likely, the cost-benefit theory. If this should happen, new 
theories and methods need to be developed; in fact we see new "green" economic 
modeis, methods and theories popping up everywhere in the academic world (cf. the 
discussion on ecological economics in chapter IV). In despair, however, economists 
and the manual on SEA find it easier to define problem statements that fit the 
traditional cost-benefit method: the economic endeavor is to determine the 'price' 
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of social and ecological goods and services (similar to the discussion on neoclassical 
economics in Chapter Ill). 
The method in the manual on SEA for determining 'non-priced values' (cf. discussion 
in Chapter VII and Fig. 24), is, however, interesting. The method here is actually in 
accordance with deep-ecology and subjective ontology and the hermeneutic theory 
of science and esthetics. This is because the method aims at collecting a rich 
qualitative account of the various environmental and social phenomena related to 
initiatives. In practice this means that researchers approach their study objects as 
text or text-analogous to be read, and by doing so they exercise the 'I-Thou' relation; 
all for the purpose of getting access to subjective and phenomenological 
information/knowledge. The manual on SEA according to the MF does therefore also 
here argue for and interprets that reality cannot be understood through instrumental 
and natural scientific terms alone, such as the statement that all values are really 
quantifiable, but that values are more complex and of a qualitative character, 
meaning that these need to be interpreted and studied by means of qualitative 
methods in order to be revealed and understood. The problem with the 'non-priced 
value'-method, however, is the framework it adopts for comprehending and 
synthesizing the qualitative information. Instead of keeping the research process and 
the value assessment within the hermeneutic circle, that is, continuing to build a 
common understanding (melting of horizon) through qualitative argumentation, the 
method attempts to interpret qualitative argumentations through the language of 
mathematics; or to step beyond subjectivity and the hermeneutic circle. For example 
by reinterpreting an argumentative account concerning the intrinsic value of some 
ecosystem experience, into quantitative U+U (pl us) and u_u (minus) which are further 
subtracted from each other. 
The question of the value of in-/coherence and the assumption that coherence is 
positive and incoherence is negative, can now be adjusted. Coherence, as it occurs in 
the manual just discussed and the EIA reports, cannot be classified as positive 
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because this assumes an abstract image of man and nature, which it accepts "in 
despair", and thus ends up in the fallacy of mistaking the abstract for the concrete. 
Coherence in this sense is thus one- dimensional and reductionistic, meaning that 
only the instrumental and physical/empirical descriptive sides of a project are 
covered and assessed. Coherence between ontology and the lower meta-Ievels, as 
we see in the manual on SEA and the report on Veslefrikk and by far also in Goliat, 
also prevent or blocks constructive criticism and paradigmatic development because 
of the strong position the neoclassical economic paradigm enjoys. This is probably 
the reason why the manual on SEA does not spend time reflecting upon the concepts 
of 'value', 'social economic surplus', 'willingness to pay', etc., and why the Goliat 
report juxtaposes 'social-values' into 'economic values'. In this sense coherence must 
therefore be classified as something negative and even potentially dangerous. It 
must be underlined that the following study strongly advises and alarms political 
economists and economists of profession speedily to engage in inter-disciplinary and 
dialogical processes with other professions. A central aim of these most needed 
endeavors should be to develop economic policies, theories and methods that are 
based on concrete and realistic assumption about reality instead of being method 
centered and letting the rigid and abstract criteria of cost-benefit analysis determine 
projects and reality. 
What about incoherence then? Is it all good or what does it means? Incoherence 
means that worldview is not compatible with science/method, ethics and esthetics. 
This is the case for the earliest, two of the latest manuals and the EIA-research on 
Goliat. These documents clearly articulate and express intensions of internalizing 
holistic values, but argue that EIA-research ought to be based on the received image 
of science. 
Incoherence can in one sense be interpreted as something negative, because 
ontology and epistemology are not compatible. It is negative because the natural 
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scientific method converts the worldview to fit with its rigid criteria, which in turn 
makes the worldview deviate from the initial, intended worldview of these manuals. 
Incoherence can, on the other hand, be interpreted as something positive because it 
means the existence of different perspectives meaning in turn that our research is 
more reflexive and interdisciplinary. This means that the incoherence of the three 
manuals and the Goliat report represent something positive because they are of a 
more reflective kind involving the inclusion of subjectivistic and hermeneutic 
ideals/values. These incoherent manuals and the report become therefore more 
developed, more mature, more concise, more truthful and more 
meaningfuljcoherent in asense. This is because they are less abstract, less reality 
diluted, less superficial than the coherent ca ses presupposing objective ontologies. 
Incoherence in this sense means that they are intended to fit a reality characterized 
by complexities, multiple perspectives, by human emotions, ethics and esthetics. This 
cannot be understood otherwise than political attempts to foster more humane and 
eco-friendly projects and societies. Thus, in this line of reasoning, incoherence in 
manuals and EIA reports must be understood as something positive. 
It is obviously political and general pressure from society and businesses themselves, 
that contributes to the worldview and ideals/norms of these three manuals pl us the 
Goliat report and thus the corresponding paradigmatic incoherence. The reason for 
the incoherence we see in the most recent and state-of-the-art EIA-research can be 
explained by the increasing pressure from politicians and other members of society 
to enforce international rights and conventions in relation to ecological and human 
concerns, but that scientists, professionals and specialists applying the received 
image of science are in practice responsible for the actual EIA-research into the 
various ecological, social and economic parts. Evidence of such an explanation is 
especially apparent from the latest manual regime in which we see the same 
inconsistencies existing between ontology and methodology, but in contrast to the 
earliest manual we find additional incoherence in ontologies between the different 
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ministries. For example the Ministries of the Environment and Health and Care 
Services hold a clear subjective ontology, whereas the Ministry of Finance operates 
with an objective image of man. 
An example fitting the system well is the following. Politicians and society claims the 
following: "well-being for human beings and natural beings". This statement 
represents the ontological norms or the political ideals/intensions. Furthermore 
scientists are hired to study how a case relates to human well-being and bio-
diversity. The researcher endeavors to study the conditions as value-free and 
objectively as he or she can, that is, he/she applies the received view of science, thus 
immediately displacing consistency between top and lower leveis, because his 
method presupposes an objective ontology; i.e., the reductionistic approach only 
captures the physical, primary qualities of the concept of well-being. Maybe the 
most grave consequence of this practice can be seen in the Amazonas with the 
petroleum industry affecting the life and culture of indigenous tribes in a devastating 
way; but still extraction goes on because scientists cannot find objective/physical 
("cause-effects"; e.g., in relation to cancer) evidence for the negative exposure. 
The reason that the latest manual regime includes different and incommensurable 
ontologies is probably due to different ministries being occupied in their daily work 
with different parts of society, reality and social phenomena. This dynamic together 
with the interplay between partial ministries and partial scientific camps (researchers 
and research-consultants with their scientific modeis, theories, concepts, 
presentation styles), for example, between the Ministry of Finance and economists, 
between Ministry of the Environment and ecologists, biologists, etc., and between 
The Ministry of Health and Care Services and psychologists and physicians (medical 
doctors) contributes towards a more and more fragmented culture where 
cooperation, interdisciplinarity and consistency between political ideal, intensions 
and norms (ontologies), on the one hand, and practices on the other hand, is 
experienced and conceived as more and more difficult. (This is probably the reason 
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for the rapid growth of academic literature and interests concerning phenomena 
such as 'complexity' (see e.g., Taylor, 2001; Ehrenfeld, 2008). 
The demand for inter-disciplinarity, as expressed in the 'instruction', remains utterly 
unresolved in the latest manual regime when no communication between the 
ministries is established; each ministry is responsible for developing its own manual. 
This means that each social, environmental and economic impact/effect is assessed 
totally independently of each other and that the nature of the relationship between 
effects (ministries) can only be constituted by some form of utilitarian weighting 
(similar to the discussion on 'non-priced effects' in Ch. VII). Correspondingly the 
relations between the parts and their link to the whole are lost/absent/ignored. 
It makes sense to understand incoherenee as a positive feature of EIA-research in the 
sense that it fosters dialectical EIA-research. The EIA-research of the Goliat report 
characterized by double internal incoherencies (ontology and external ethics), 
represents a positive paradigmatie development which our earliest empirical case 
(EIA report on Veslefrikk) does not include. This fact sends a strong signal that EIA-
research/practice has changed during the last 20 years or so. The nature of this 
change has also been effectively described by the use of the two paradigm concepts 
applied in this dissertation. The shift we see involves a fundamental re-orientation of 
values and stakeholder responsibility in relation to project endeavors. This is evident 
from the internalization of elements of subjective ontology and non-instrumental 
ethics in the Goliat report. 
If the hypothesis stating that the existence of an ecosophical-hermeneutic rivaling 
paradigm is on the march or struggling through a Kuhnian pre-paradigmatic phase is 
correct, that is, EIA-research experience a slow paradigmatie development, we 
should expect that the future will involve more interpretative, hermeneutie and 
phenomenological studies and the internalization of non-instrumental and strieter 
environmental ethics, in addition to a broader use of more soft and qualitative 
esthetics. A crucial success factor of future hermeneutie EIA-research rests upon 
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authorities', proponents', and social researchers' ability to understand and reveal the 
conscious content, the psychic social impacts, of how individual and unique subjects 
experience and evaluate the situationjproject. This understanding is increasingly 
being demanded and underlined in modern EIA research (cf. manual on health and 
well-being), but unfortunately and surprisingly current EIA-research is severely 
ignorant of the field of hermeneutics and the science of man. 
It is an interesting observation to see that paradigmatic changes of EIA-research 
seem to originate and build their force external to and not from within research 
communities. It is possible to interpret these particular instances as evidence pro 
Kuhn's hypothesis of research communities as totally or partly closed systems with 
little interest showed towards other research communities and perspectives, as 
proclaimed in his theory of the 'psychology of research' (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1999). 
This evidence enhances the view of Kuhn, but diminishes the thoughts of Sir Karl 
Popper; at least from a descriptive angle (Popper's normative view on a research 
community as open, reflexive and critical is beyond doubt the right view of how 
scientific discovery ought to happen; i.e., his theory of the 'Iogic of scientific 
discovery'). 
As stated, the trend towards more holistic EIA-research seems to be initiated and 
fostered from outside research communities. This implies that the success of future 
EIA-research based on ecosophical values and hermeneutics depends on the 
pressure established by politicians and in society. This means in turn that 
development must probably be forced through stricter legislation. It is also important 
to underline that academic freedom and new-thinking within research and scientific 
work deserves more attention and ought to be supported and promoted. The 
central aspect here is to foster and encourage research that is "Iooser" meaning that 
traditional naturalistic criteria such as objectivity and interpersonal results must be 
downsized in relation to social research. 
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The rest of this chapter includes an account suggesting how EIA-research can be 
developed from their current instrumental-received character (atomistic) to become 
a more humane, eco-friendly and holistic tool for authentic sustainability; as we in 
fact have seen from the ontology of the manuals, is the intended purpose of the 
Norwegian EIA regime. 
4 From atomistic to holistic EIA-research: ontological, epistemological and 
methodological implications 
Through Part IV of the thesis it is evident that the following (1) ontology and (2) 
epistemology enjoys hegemony and govern contemporary EIA researchjpractice: 
1. Objective Ontology 
2. Received Image of Science 
An objective ontology means that contemporary impact assessments are centered on 
describing the potential instrumental effects on project development. EIAs are 
therefore dominantly concerned with the instrumental values of the initiatives to be 
taken. 
The received image of science means that contemporary EIA-research is centered on 
empirical description and observation of factual (objectivejphysical) sides of social 
phenomena. The result is, as we have seen, a severely superficial and thin 
description of social impacts - ignorant towards 'psychic effects'. 
These two traits are the reason that contemporary EIAs are atomistic. In order for 
the EIA tool to serve the purposes intended in the different manuals, it is therefore 
necessary to supplement contemporary EIAs on these twa leveis: ontology (values) 
and epistemologyjmethodology (methods for inquiry). Furthermore the thesis will 
discuss some ontological, epistemological and methodological implications for 
holistic EIA-research. 
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From va/ue monism to va/ue p/ura/ism 
The current partial structure dividing problem statement and responsibility between 
the various ministries (specialist organizations) must be transformed into a structure 
allowing and ensuring inter-diseip/inary approaches and com mon responsibility, that 
is, knowledge of the various 'parts' (ontologies, norms) and their relation to the 
'whole', that is, the holistic-coherent picture. 
The most significant consequences of anchoring EIA research in trans-disciplinary 
approaches involves an enlarged focus on values, that is, from merely instrumental 
(economic), utilitarian values to cultural and meaning-centered values. This means 
that holistic EIA-research needs to cherish and promote development projects 
fostering the realization of cultural and meaning-centered projects, that is, 
humanistic-existential values; similarly to the way contemporary EIA cherishes 
instrumentality. This does not mean that utilitarian values should be suppressed, but 
rather balanced with meaning; if they are not balanced, the project will be 
experienced as meaningless - precisely because meaning-values are suppressed. The 
fundamental implication of subjective ontology in relation to development projects 
involves anehoring projeets more deep/y within a humanistie-existentia/ or a braader 
va/ue-horizon or eu/tura/ eontext. In short this means that a person's intrinsic needs, 
values, feelings, potential, etc. must be internalized more seriously than is the case 
today. 
In practice this means that the Ministry of Health and Care Services and the Ministry 
of the Environment must be involve more pro-actively. Because these ministries 
stand for subjectivistic ontologies in the form of humanistic and ecological values 
needing to be internalized in the planning of project much more seriously than is the 
case today. 
As a reference system for cultural/humanistic values, Maslow's theory of human 
motivation and persona lit y can be partially used (cf. chapter IV). The crux of 
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meaning-oriented projects is thus to develop and realize the inner life of humans. 
This implies that physiological (exercise, physical well-being, safety, etc.) and 
psychological (love, friendship, contact, self-realization, spiritual, psychical well-
being, etc.) values/needs must receive attention, not merely instrumental values; 
which are in fact only "means-values" and never "ends-values"; i.e., ends in 
themselves such as cultural values. 
Anchoring initiatives more deeply in a cultural and ecological context also necessarily 
means measuring not merely physical-chemical change in relation to nature and 
culture, but also va/ue change, that is, subjective-psychical ecological and cultural 
values; i.e., felt and experienced qualities together with ethical evaluations. 
This means that projects cannot simply be evaluated in relation to instrumental 
values, but must be understood and interpreted in the light of cultural and natural 
values as well. This implies that the experience of work is at least or perhaps even 
more central for social development than merely material outcomes/products. This 
means that the being dimension of work, that is, the kind of identity work gives us 
and the fee/ing of this, is at least as important as the having dimension, that is, the 
materialoutcomes of work (e.g., materials, benefits, etc.). 
Holistic environmental management research is visualized in modelLThe model 
emphasizes the need to internalize a pluralistic set of values: from instrumental 
(benefits and costs) to intrinsic values; physical and psychical cultural (e.g., 
friendship, belongingness, health) and ecological values (ethical and esthetical). 
Projects endeavoring holism need necessarily to ba/ance instrumental and intrinsic 
values, that is, to move away from the contemporary weighting (utilitarian) of 
'effects'. This is precisely because they are intrinsic va/ues, that is, values in 
themselves and thus not substitutable. 
Modell is of course an abstraction of holistic projects because it is partial, that is, it 
splits values into three areas (economic, ecological and cultural). The reason for 
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doing this is analogous with that of splitting the paradigm concept into a worldview, 
a perception of science, and 50 on, that is, for pedagogical-analytical means. In reality 
the values are closely interrelated; hence the stippled line encapsulating the model 
and the values. For example sustaining biodiversity is basically a cultural norm which 
can increase psychic well-being; increasing economic benefits may lead to the 
subjection of cultural and ecological values and 50 on. 
Value/meaning-change 
~~~ 
Physical/chemical chang 
Project 
I 
Value/meaning change 
///// 
Physical/chemical 
change 
~I ~~-----------
Revenues Benefits 
Costs 
Criteria which should be adopted by a manual on EIA or an EIA-report anchored in 
deep-ecology and subjective ontology: 
Value assessment: What type of values does the initiative 
promote? 
How does the initiative promote meaningful development; i.e., 
balanced interplay between utilitarian, ecological and cultural 
values? 
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From partial to dialogical/inter-disciplinary EIA-research 
If EIA research are to serve the purpose of revealing the holistic impacts of projects, 
that is, to go along and assess how initiatives impacts (physically and ethically) the 
economy, culture and nature as described above and visualized in model l, it is 
necessary to produce interdisciplinary research. If the manuals, for example, are to 
work as a skein for how proponents ought to go along and assess the holistic picture, 
the various ministries or researchers' or specialists' for that matter, need to 
communicate and cooperate together. Through dialogues and cooperation the 
parties gain insight into one another's realmsjperspectives and concerns 
(ontologies), that is, economic (Ministry of Finance), cultural (Ministry of Health and 
Care Services) and environmental (Ministry of the Environment) concerns and values; 
pl us the ministries currently responsible for their individual manuals (cf. tab. 4 in Ch. 
VII) (see model 2). The idea behind the dialogue method is to establish integrated 
networks which in turn make it possible to coordinate concerns and interests for the 
various ministries or stakeholders, that is, to take into consideration, at the same 
time, economic, eultural and ecological values. First then can a common, coherent 
interdisciplinary account be comprehended and worked out, that is, a holistic 
understanding (Verstehen') of the relations between a project's cultural, economic 
and environmental impacts - as visualized in Modell. 
259 
---~-----------------------~ 
/ , , , 
~:tween in~~~~~~~t SpecialiS::\~ 
\ / 
, I 
" ,,' , / 
~-------------------------------~ 
The dialogical framework has the potential to produce knowledge about which 
projects are meaningfulj-Iess, with the gist of this, lbelieve, being to bring 
humanness back down to Earth and into EIA-research. This is because dialogues are 
hermeneuties in practice because 'value-change' or psychical knowledge in relation 
to culture and nature is articulated and expressed and made public for the 
participants thus producing knowledge which the received image of science, i.e., 
precise and impartial observation of objective data suitable for descriptive claims 
and generalizations, i.e., physical knowledge, does not produce. 
Indeed it is plausible to assume and hope that these collaborating networks will shed 
new light on things enabling new problem identification and problem solutions. Not 
least will this contribute to assessing the real meaning of projects, that is, the 
relationship between the initiative and the cultural field, and the true ecological 
balance/imbalance of the initiative, that is, the relationship with the field of ecology. 
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In the space of a relatively short time, I think, the network perspectives will 
illuminate that a clear line does not in fact exist between what is good for culture, 
economy and ecology (cf. discussion on ontology in the manual on HWB in ch. VII, 3). 
The logic behind this claim appears trivial. The reasoning here can be found in the 
deep-ecology interpretation of self-realization meaning that it is a culturally 
meaningful phenomenon to designs projects in balance with the laws of nature; i.e., 
which do not deplete our local natural ecosystems. 
Another consequence of the network perspective concerns ethical and esthetical 
experience of a project; that is, the phenomenology of work. Directing attention to 
the meaning dimension of work enables us to discover whether or not and why work 
is experienced as meaningful or not. Experience knowledge is useful because it 
makes clear if and which part(s) of work are meaningfulj-Iess. This knowledge is 
important for at least two reasons. First, if work is experienced as meaningless, the 
whole endeavor should be questioned as to whether it should be initiated or 
abandoned. Here utilitarian values must obviously play a role. Secondly, it enables us 
to design businesses that are more fun, more enjoyable, and more qualitatively 
valuable for human need-gratification and self-development. 
Criteria to be adopted by a manual on EIA or an EIA-report anchored in hermeneuties: 
Dialogical method for coordinating values. 
Through the application of hermeneutic-interpretative methods 
the values and meaning of an initiative should be assessed and 
presented. 
It is an advantage if the findings from previous hermeneutical 
research are presented in various qualitative forms (e.g., 
articulated as clearly as possible in literary form, but also 
expressed through pictures, music, plays and other creative 
expressive forms). 
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5 Some personal, ad-hoc reflections on the future of EIA-research anchored in 
deep-ecology, subjectivistic philosophy and hermeneutics 
Anchoring projects more thoroughly in an existential context provides a categorical 
fundament for (re-)defining human needs, values and freedom. It makes sense then 
to assume that this view will, in fact it must, change to significant extent 
materialistic-instrumental oriented projects. This will in turn decrease superficial 
needsjpreferences and reduce the usage of matter and energy from natural eco-
systems. 
The need to evaluate the qualitative motivation behind projects to a much higher 
degree, that is, morally to discriminate between projects, will probably offset much 
production because of the shift in decision philosophy from cost-benefit regimes; 
i.e., a shift from doing what we purely can do, uncritical of our motivation, to what 
we ought to do. 
At the same time one can also imagine that the new values will initiatejpromote new 
projects which have previously been categorized as unreasonable based on a 
utilitarian, cost-benefit point of view, but experienced as highly meaningful from an 
existential-ecological point of view. But in general, at least in the short and medium 
range of time, the increased focus on internalizing ecological and cultural values will 
probably imply the reorganization and transformation of already existing 
projectsjpractices (as we have for example seen with the increased focus on social 
and ecological values from the EIA on Veslefrikk to the EIA on Goliat), as well as 
reducing production and consumption of matter and energy in general. It also seems 
plausible to assume that another major change will involve choosing renewables, 
both energy forms and materials, as well as more "soft" and less energy intensive 
technologies. We already see this happening to a certain degree today with an 
increased focus on producing renewable energy, electric engine cars, Italy's 
abandon ment of plastic shopping bags and so on. 
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The trend of thinking in non-reductionistic ways is, however, far from acceptable, in 
that this would ultimately mean focusing more strongly on the consumption side of 
energy. The real problem is our ever-increasing demand and "need" for energy. A 
truly holistic approach on the energy issue forces us to move further on and ask 
deeper questions than merely those technical ones concerning how we can enhance 
efficiency or switch our national and global energy balances from fossil fuels to 
renewable energy or whatever. Authentic sustainability is only possible if we ask the 
question: "how can we decrease, substantially, our energy demands while at the 
same time keeping stable or in fact even increasing the human and non-human 
qualities of life?" Maybe it is correct to say that we need a shift or even 
supplementing the technical centered questioning with cultural and meaning-
centered questioning. The point is that while sustainability issues in relation to the 
link between economy and nature are more or less recognized, the link to the 
cultural context is almost completely ignored. 
It is easy to see that changes in the input of matter and energy of our economies and 
projects are inextricably linked to changes in our cultural values; or input of cultural 
capital or knowledge and values. This probably means that if we want to change our 
projects, we must also probably make changes in ourselves, that is, transform our 
current instrumentally centered culture. 
61deasforfurtherresearch 
Ecosystem approaehes 
Ecosystems are examples of holistic systems in which all parts are harmoniously 
related to one another and the whole. It thus makes sense to see natural ecosystems 
as a metaphor for sustainable socio- and economic systems: so ca lied 'ecosystem 
approaches'. The gist of ecosystem approaches is to establish harmonious symbiotic 
relationships between socio-economic and ecological systems, analogous to the 
circular patterns we find in ecology. This involves establishing networks of producers, 
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consumers and redistributors (or decomposers), niches, all mutually dependent on 
one another's input and output. 
Can eco-system approaches be integrated in EIA? Is this auseful framework to 
adopt? 
From tap-down to bottom-up projects 
The change in ontology from an objective to a subjective perception of reality 
necessarily means ascribing more autonomy to individuals and local stakeholders, 
once again attaching special importance to ethnocentricity, and thus once again the 
re-enchantment of the world. This argument suggests then a pro-active attitude 
encouraging decentralized and bottom-up initiatives. Correspondingly the subjective 
ontology also promotes policies and initiatives enhancing cultural diversity, as well as 
biological diversity. 
Currently top-down planning dominates the agenda. Logical-positivistic 
epistemological endeavor is largely responsible for legitimizing these standardized 
and universal/objective policies, because the objective construal reduces cultural 
differences. In fact any unique qualities or local meaning codes are more or less 
regarded as metaphysical hog-wash or na·ive pre-modernity (as we in fact saw 
explicitly articulated in the Goliat report concerning the Sam] people). There can be 
no other reasoning behind the fact that one single authority can sit on his high horse 
ladIing out his wisdom and preaching the future for other autonomous and rational 
and non-rational beings. 
There are many reasons why bottom-up initiatives will prove the most efficient way 
to organize projectsjsociety. The ecological reasons are obvious. For example we can 
mention more energy-efficient (decreased energy need) transportation, fostering 
soft technologies, and 50 on. Also the social-psychological reasons are clear-cut. For 
example, through fostering tight bonds between society members or natural I-Thou 
relationships, high er motivation for cooperation and responsibility, engagement, 
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feeling of worth, more transparent dependency structures, etc.; in other words, a 
more holistic frame for existential realization. 
What emerges from this is a more holistic project and collective culture. This means 
that the relationships between economic, cultural and ecological values merge 
together into a complex web. This complexity has both a personal and a systematic 
dimension. It is personal in that it fosters, in principle, ageneralist rather than 
specialist meaning individuals need to possess or learn a variety of skiils (both 
technical and empathic). It is systematic in the sense that societal functions will 
become more integrated, leading to a more dynamic and healthy relationship 
between culture and nature. This latter point will be especially observable in relation 
to the production, distribution and consumption of food. Today our practice ignores 
the fact that we, and not least our children in the future, will depend on rich 
biological resources in their surroundings to sustain food security. This is due to the 
increased fragmentation of precisely the network-relations between natural and 
cultural systems. The decrease of local natural resources increases the demand for 
energy-intensive ways of distributing food and other daily necessities which in turn 
hinder the realization of the reduction of the material and energy loops. I suggest 
that the main reason for this stems from the epistemological construal of the world 
dating from the seventeenth century; here the reductionistic ideal is especially 
evident. 
Based on the discussion in the thesis, I would like to signalize that this area ought to 
be further addressed by researchers, especially, by way of multi-disciplinary scientific 
work. 
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that contemporary Norwegian EIA-research can be  characterized as  much “talk”, or promises 
about sound ethical and humanistic concerns, and less “walk”, or little actual research and 
implementation of the norms and values promised; hence then the lack of correspondence 
(incoherence) between values (ontology) and method/practice. 
The kernel message of this dissertation is to make it clear that the reason why humanistic 
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epistemological and methodological choices of EIA-researchers. These choices in turn result 
in consequences for ontology. The dissertation discusses it being necessary to use the 
epistemological position of hermeneutics in order to gain a deeper (intuitive and emphatic) 
understanding (‘Verstehen’) of social and environmental impacts. This method utilizes 
a subject-subject relationship between the researcher and the study object in order to 
understand the inner unique experience of subjects and social phenomena. 
The thesis suggests several ways forward (ontologically, epistemologically and 
methodologically) with regard to how current atomistic EIA-research can be developed into 
holistic EIA-research. 
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